The Helsinki process and the Vienna follow-up conference (11/09/86)

10th ANNIVERSARY OF THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI GROUP

The Helsinki process and the Vienna follow-up conference

by Orest Deychakiwsky

The Helsinki process has come under increasing scrutiny in the last few years. To a great extent, this questioning of the value of the Helsinki process is directly related to Soviet and East European lack of respect for the commitments which they voluntarily assumed under the Helsinki Final Act.

Despite some recent positive gestures, in general, the Soviet Union's human rights record today is as bad, if not worse, then it was when the 35 signatories of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe met in Helsinki in 1975. Hence, there have been voices calling for the renunciation of the Final Act, arguing that continuing and egregious violations of its human-rights provisions by the USSR and its East European allies have rendered the agreement meaningless. This frustration is understandable.

In light of this controversy over the merits of Helsinki, it may be useful to examine a few positive aspects of the process. A basic merit of the Helsinki Final Act (and the 1983 Madrid Concluding Document) is that they establish and reaffirm certain standards.

With the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, human rights - for the first time in history - were recognized as fundamental in the conduct of international relations. The agreement recognizes and affirms the linkage between security and respect for human rights; between peace and freedom. Andrei Sakharov, in his Nobel lecture on receiving the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize, addressed the thesis that human rights and peace are inextricably linked, stating: "I am convinced that international trust, mutual understanding, disarmament and international security are inconceivable without an open society with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to publish and the right to travel and choose the country in which one wishes to live."

The theme of human rights as being an essential ingredient for the establishment of true security and cooperation is underscored in the writings of the Ukrainian, Moscow and other Helsinki monitoring Groups. (Many of the members of these monitoring groups, whose aim it was to facilitate the Soviet government's compliance with the Final Act, suffered tremendously for their efforts. Four, including three members of the Ukrainian group - Oleksa Tykhy, Yuriy Lytvyn and Vasyl Stus - and one Armenian monitor, Edward Artunyan, paid for their efforts with their lives).

The setting of standards and norms of responsible behavior, even if these are not met, is necessary, just as the creation of laws is essential, despite the fact that there are those who break the law. The Final Act remains a Magna Carta and an inspiration to those struggling for their human rights.

Indeed, one of the key positive aspects of the Final Act is that it has provided numerous forums by which the West can hold the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies to the standards embodied in the Final Act, standards by which we can measure behavior. Among these forums were the 1977-1978 Belgrade Review, the 1980-1983 Madrid Review Meeting, the 1985 Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting and Budapest Cultural Forum and the 1986 Bern Human Contacts Experts Meeting. These comprehensive, probing reviews of implementation have clearly established the legitimacy of human-rights issues in the over-all context of East-West relations. It is now generally recognized that the way in which a state treats its own citizens is not purely an internal matter, but a legitimate concern to all the participants of the Helsinki process.

Throughout the review meetings and the experts meetings, the West, and especially the United States, has called attention to myriad human rights issues, some of which, until the last few years, barely had been acknowledged as subjects to be raised in international diplomatic discourse. The United States, throughout these meetings, has provided a detailed record of Soviet non-compliance, repeatedly raising issues such as the plight of Helsinki monitors, the treatment of nationalities and ethnic groups (including Russification), religious rights and emigration.

These U.S. efforts have been backed by strong support by the public, particularly by non-governmental organizations representing peoples with cultural and linguistic ties to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The U.S. delegations to these conferences have also raised issues of concern to Ukrainians - the persecution of individual Ukrainian rights activists, the plight of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and Russification.

The review process has a beneficial consequence in that it provides those suffering under Soviet oppression with a channel of hope - the force of public knowledge of rights abuses. The other benefit of the constant Western pressure for Soviet and East European compliance has been the slowly increasing realization by the Kremlin that its actions will not go unrecognized or ignored.

There is no question that the Kremlin has paid a price for its lack of implementation of its Helsinki commitments through a marked drop in credibility in the United States and Europe. Admittedly, this realization has had little practical effect thus far, but there are indications that some Eastern signatories, and even the Soviets (during the April 1986 Bern Human Contacts Experts Meeting where they promised to resolve 67 U.S.-Soviet divided family cases) have taken steps to ease restrictive practices or to resolve specific cases (Anatoly Shcharansky, Yuri Orlov). While these have been few and far between, they do argue that consistent political pressures can, if not in the short term, then in the long term, help curb some abuses.

In essence, Western pressure for compliance, induced by periodic review meetings, including the current Vienna Conference, can make the Helsinki process a significant and unique mechanism for international diplomacy through which human-rights violators can be held accountable for actions which flagrantly violate the Helsinki Final Act.

These are merely a few arguments for the value of the Final Act as a human-rights instrument. Further arguments focus on the positive results that have taken place since Helsinki, especially by some East European signatories, and on the value of the process in terms of developing a unified Allied position on human-rights questions.

Despite its positive aspects, the Helsinki process faces serious challenges. At Vienna, the West faces an uphill fight to preserve and promote the human dimension of CSCE as being indispensable to the realization of true security and cooperation in Europe. The Soviet Union and its Eastern allies will undoubtedly follow their past behavior of minimizing this human-rights component, focusing instead on the genuine security concerns of the participating states, but in such a way as to further their influence in European affairs.

Indeed, given the depth of feeling for a Europe more secure militarily and the recent agreement at the Stockholm Conference on Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), there are some fears that, at Vienna, the human-rights component of the Helsinki process will not be taken as seriously as the military security component of the Final Act.

Hence, it is incumbent upon the West, at Vienna, to insist upon compliance with commitments. If the Soviets continue their intransigence, the West should consider refusing to accept any further agreements (except to meet again) until there is significant improvement in the implementation of existing agreements. After all, if the Soviet Union continues to so arrogantly flout existing agreements, can it be trusted with new ones? For that matter, can a government which is not at peace with its own people(s) be trusted to maintain peace in its external relations?

These are questions we must not lose sight of, even as we continue to patiently and painstakingly strive for the fulfillment of ideals embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. The future of the Helsinki process depends on persistent efforts to bring all its promises to fruition.

Orest Deychakiwsky is a staff member of the U.S. Helsinki Commission and a member of the U.S. delegation to the Vienna Review Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government.

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