AN ANALYSIS: Ukraine's sovereignty declaration suggests no clear-cut approach (07/22/90)

AN ANALYSIS

Ukraine's sovereignty declaration suggests no clear-cut approach

by Dr. David Marples

The six-page document released by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet that announced the declaration of state sovereignty in the republic is a curious affair.1

It was preceded by a lengthy debate among deputies, part of which took place in the absence of numerous members of the Parliament, who took time off to attend the Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

The key issue was whether Ukraine would declare sovereignty within a revamped union, or whether such a declaration would be unilaterally separatist. The final document released suggests that no clear-cut decision was reached.

In theory, Ukraine has far more power than hitherto: control over its own economy and industry, over its own armed forces. Also, several clauses appear to preclude the future usurpations of state jurisdiction over natural resources by all-union ministries.

But at the same time, there are apparent contradictions in the text, and one imagines that some of them could be the subject of new disputes over interpretation in the future.

For example, the title of the document is "Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine" (Deklaratsiya pro Derzhavnyi Suverenitet Ukrainy). Further in section 1, there is a clause stating that opposition to national statehood on the part of political parties is prohibited by law. In this same section, however, the wording begins with the phrase: "The Ukrainian SSR as a sovereign, national state..." In other words, the document assumes that state sovereignty and the concomitant democratization pertains to a Soviet, socialist Ukraine.

That this constitutes a problem becomes more evident in section 11 on popular authority, in which one reads that "The people of Ukraine are the single source of state power in the republic." If this is really to be the case, then why should the document assume that Ukraine is to remain a Soviet or socialist republic?

Such a presumption is even more incongruous after the declaration of a press free from party control, and the gradual transition of the Soviet Union (and Ukraine) to a multi-party state. Throughout the document the terms "Ukraine" and the "Ukrainian SSR" are intertwined as though they are synonymous.

A second difficulty is how to define Ukraine's relationship with the union authorities. All those persons living on Ukrainian territory are to be subject, first and foremost, to Ukrainian laws. Section 11 of the document states that the Ukrainian Constitution and republican laws are to have supreme authority in the republic. The first clause of section IV, however, guarantees every citizen the right to remain a citizen of the USSR.

Is this, then, dual citizenship or parallel citizenship? Does it mean implicitly that a Ukrainian citizen also has the right to reject Soviet citizenship?

As it stands, once again, the law is confusing. It seems to signify that Ukraine will likely remain part of the USSR, but it does not say so directly. On the other hand, there is no provision for the development of a separate state. A flight from Kiev to Moscow, for example, would not become an "international" flight under the terms of the

Section VI pertains to the economic sovereignty of the republic, a topic that has been debated for over a year. The emphasis is on Ukrainian rights over natural resources, and the national bank of Ukraine is declared the highest credit authority in the republic. It is anticipated that Ukraine will eventually have its own currency.

Section VII concerns ecological protection, including the establishment of a Ukrainian committee for radiation protection. The republic has allocated itself the right to halt the construction or operation of any industrial enterprise that constitutes a threat to the natural environment. Both these sections are directed largely against union enterprises, such as the ministries of power, nuclear energy and industry, and land improvement and water economy, though it is far from clear what financial arrangements are to be made in the light of past Soviet investment into enterprises now considered ecologically hazardous.

Further, Ukraine is to have access to Soviet gold reserves and to all-union funds that have been created through the "efforts of the people of the republic."

What is not known, however, and not addressed in the declaration is whether Moscow is to be permitted any compensation for its past investment in Ukrainian industry; or how Ukraine is to pay off its budget deficit, known to be over 6.5 billion rubles at the end of 1989.

The declaration has been issued six months before the start of a new planning year: realistically, there is not sufficient time for the republican authorities to take control of every industry and every factory and to supervise new plans, however decentralized. What will happen to the numerous foreign workers in Ukraine? How will Ukraine compensate power for enterprises that are shut down on the grounds of being ecologically dangerous?

The logical solution would be for some form of economic arrangement with the Russian republic, but a reading of the document would give one the allusion that Ukraine is autarkic. Yet at present, Ukrainian industry is already radiant on "external" resources and the trend is likely to accelerate following the announcement of state sovereignty.

One of the most significant parts of the document is section IX, which declares that the Ukrainian SSR has the right to its own armed forces, and that Ukrainian soldiers cannot be used elsewhere in the Soviet Union without the permission of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But here once again, the final document seems to have approached the edge of a precipice and then retreated a step. A national state with a national army that was truly independent would not have needed to include the clause on powers over Ukrainian reservists.

Section X concerns the right to make international agreements and is likely to be more effective than Ukraine's nominal status as a member of the United Nations, as agreed upon by Stalin after World War II.

Also of note is the statement that a sovereign Ukrainian state will work toward peace outside military blocs because it suggests that in the event of an international conflict between the USSR and another power, Ukraine could not be called upon to defend the union.

Essentially the document is a compromise, but many problems remain because of the lack of clarity over the political make-up of the state and its status within the USSR. This is not a declaration like that of Lithuania in March, effectively seceding from the union; it is not even as radical as that of Russia's declaration of economic independence. Indeed, it might be perceived within the context of a reaction to the events outside the republic, with the exception of some genuine economic and ecological grievances.

Ukrainians are discontented with the current system, the document demonstrates, but within the Supreme Soviet there are a significant number of deputies who are very hesitant to sever or even define connections with the union. Is state sovereignty, then, a sort of badge that can be worn to indicate one's "otherness" while remaining a Soviet citizen? Or, conversely, could Ukraine's existence within the union be similar to that of France within the European Common Market?

The danger is that various factions will interpret the document in their own way. Outspoken separatists, among which can be included the Ukrainian Republican Party and perhaps, the Ukrainian Democratic Party (which favors a more gradual approach), may regard the declaration as the first step on the road to genuine independence. Sincere federalists will recognize that the declaration could have gone much further, but will no doubt have concerns about the sudden reduction of Soviet authority in Ukraine. To some extent, the deputies of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Soviet have been obliged to recognize realities, such as the firm stand taken against military service outside the republic by the governments of the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivske and Ternopil oblasts of Western Ukraine.

Above all, the virtual unanimity of the vote (355 to 4) indicates that deputies were anxious to issue some form of declaration to make clear Ukraine's position in the changing Soviet world.

However, the document released has not succeeded in clarifying the situation. Rather it reflects the diverse views within the Ukrainian Parliament today, which have resulted in a series of stormy debates and walkouts. Many deputies evidently refuse to look beyond the existing state structure perhaps because of the deep entrenchment of the party and government apparatus in this republic in the past.

There are also problems of borders (since the Ukrainian SSR in its current boundaries was a result of the now discredited Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) that are only guaranteed through the existence of a Ukrainian SSR; and of the nature of a society that is intensely patriotic in the west, but less so in the east and south.

But one feels that given the enormity of current economic problems in Ukraine that the deputies of the Supreme Soviet could have gone much further. The future of the USSR may be in doubt, but it has not received a major threat from its second largest republic. Not yet.

1. "Deklaratsiya pro Derzhavnyi Suverenitet Ukrainy," Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1990. The author expresses his gratitude to The Ukrainian Weekly for providing this document, originally sent from the headquarters of the Rukh in Kiev, July 16, 1990. [Back to text]

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