1992: A LOOK BACK: Ukraine: a year of transition (12/27/92)

1992: A LOOK BACK

Ukraine: a year of transition

by Dr. Roman Solchanyk
RFE/RL Research Institute

Ukraine's first year as an independent state witnessed a fundamental realignment of political forces within the country that resulted in the division of the democratic forces into two basic camps, both committed to the same over-all goal of consolidating independence, but with differing views on how best to achieve that end. A key issue separating the two camps is the attitude towards the policies and persona of President Leonid Kravchuk. In spite of these differences, Ukraine remains politically tranquil, showing few if any signs of the deep political divisions that have beset several of its newly independent neighbors, including Russia, and which, in some cases, have led to civil war and armed conflict.

At the same time, the Ukrainian experience has once again shown that politics and economics are tightly interwoven. The steadily worsening economic situation combined with the government's inability or, as critics have argued, unwillingness to press ahead with economic reform resulted in the forced resignation of Prime Minister Vitold Fokin and his Cabinet. The new government, headed by an experienced representative of the industrial lobby, has pledged to move towards a market economy at a steady pace, but without resorting to "shock therapy." For the time being, the opposition is prepared to let the new government demonstrate what it can do.

Much depends on Ukraine's relations, both political and economic, with Russia. After an initial period of confrontation, the tensions between the two most important members of the CIS have subsided.

President Kravchuk and Russian President Boris Yeltsin held two summit meetings in 1992 to iron out their differences, but it would be naively optimistic to suggest that the Ukrainian-Russian relationship has suddenly undergone a fundamental transformation. The basic question of whether Russia is able to abandon its view of Ukraine as an integral part of Russia, which has been conditioned by several centuries of history, remains open.

Moreover, there are any number of practical problems stemming from the collapse of the Soviet Union that the two sides have yet to resolve. One of these is the disposition of the strategic nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory. Although Ukraine has pledged to become a non-nuclear state, there is a growing pro-nuclear lobby in the country that cannot be ignored. This, in turn, is a problem of utmost interest to the West, and one that directly impinges on Ukraine's relations with the outside world.

Political landscape

In a recent article, the well-known literary critic and commentator Mykola Ryabchuk portrayed the current situation in the Ukrainian democratic camp in terms of the Faust-Mephistopheles syndrome. The suggestion, of course, is that a pact had been made with the devil (personified by Mr. Kravchuk) for the sake of Ukrainian independent statehood. Mr. Ryabchuk had in mind primarily developments within Rukh, which emerged during the period of perestroika and served as an umbrella organization bringing together the democratic opposition to the Communist regime. In the course of 1992, Rukh split into two camps. The fault line was the policies and persona of Mr. Kravchuk, who, as the ideological secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, had previously been the nemesis of the democrats.

On one side of this fault line is Vyacheslav Chornovil - a prominent former political prisoner, the first head of the democratically elected Lviv Oblast Council, and runner-up to Mr. Kravchuk in the December 1991 presidential elections - who enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of Rukh organizations in the oblasts, particularly in western Ukraine.

Mr. Chornovil insists that a democratic society cannot be created without an opposition, and he has taken it upon himself to lead what he calls a "constructive opposition" to the political and economic policies associated with President Kravchuk. Specifically, Mr. Chornovil points to what might be termed the "unfinished revolution" in Ukraine, criticizing the Ukrainian president's reliance on the old Communist Party apparat in the state administration and the hesitation on the part of the executive branch to fully commit itself to radical market-oriented economic reform. No doubt there is an element of personal conflict between Mr. Chornovil and President Kravchuk that can be traced to the presidential campaign. It came to the surface at the World Forum of Ukrainians in Kiev in August, which witnessed a biting attack on Mr. Chornovil by the Ukrainian president.

On the other side of the barricades are many prominent figures from the old democratic opposition like Ivan Drach, the first head of Rukh; Dmytro Pavlychko, the first head of the Ukrainian Language Society; Mykhailo Horyn, also a long-time political prisoner and now head of the Ukrainian Republican Party; Larysa Skoryk, earlier one of the most outspoken critics of Mr. Kravchuk in the Parliament; and other key figures in the Rukh central leadership. The point of departure for this group is the defense and consolidation of Ukrainian statehood, which is identified with President Kravchuk.

Moreover, the Ukrainian leader has skillfully courted the opposition. In his speech to the opening meeting of the Fifth Session of the Parliament in January, Mr. Kravchuk called for a roundtable of political parties, groups, movements and trade unions to discuss the formation of a government of popular accord and emphasized that Rukh could play the leading role in such an undertaking. When the roundtable convened in February, the president advanced the idea of creating a State Duma (Council), the leadership of which was subsequently staffed almost exclusively by prominent figures from the opposition. Representatives of the latter have also been named to important posts in the state administration, government and the diplomatic corps. In short, President Kravchuk has succeeded in co-opting both the Rukh program and many of its top leaders.

The split between the two Rukh camps was visible for all to see at the organization's third Congress on February 28-March 1. Although the majority of delegates supported Mr. Chornovil's line of "constructive opposition," a formal split was averted by electing three co-chairman (Messrs. Chornovil, Drach and Horyn) and agreeing on a compromise resolution that characterized Rukh as being in opposition, but at the same time supporting President Kravchuk's policies insofar as they do not conflict with its platform. Subsequently, Mr. Horyn left the triumvirate to take over the leadership of the Ukrainian Republican Party. Mr. Drach, on the other hand, while formally retaining his post as co-chairman, simply stopped playing an active role in the Rukh leadership.

At the fourth congress, which was held December 4-6, Mr. Chornovil assumed full control of Rukh and, in effect, transformed the organization into a political party. The delegates voted to annul the institution of co-chairmen and went on to elect Mr. Chornovil as sole head of the organization by an overwhelming vote of 423-8.

Thus, by the end of 1992, Rukh, armed with a new program of state-building adopted at its congress, was transformed into a political base for Mr. Chornovil's expected candidacy in the next presidential elections. With about 50,000 card-carrying members and many more supporters and sympathizers, it is the largest and most important political grouping in Ukraine.

In the meantime, the Rukh minority formed its own organization on August 2 called the Congress of National Democratic Forces (CNDF). This coalition was put together by Mr. Horyn's Ukrainian Republican Party and the Democratic Party of Ukraine led by Yuriy Badzio and Mr. Pavlychko, and was joined by a number of center-right political parties and groups. The CNDF clearly delineated its line in support of Mr. Kravchuk while joining Rukh in the call for a new Cabinet of Ministers and new parliamentary elections.

A third coalition that emerged in 1992 is New Ukraine, which was formed in January and may be said to reflect the views of the democratic center-left. The driving force behind New Ukraine is the Party for Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, which traces its origins to the Democratic Platform in the Communist Party of Ukraine. It groups together various social democratic, liberal, Green and trade-union organizations, and also includes representatives of the rising industrial and business lobbies.

In its early stages, New Ukraine focused primarily on promoting the acceleration of economic reform. By the spring, however, the coalition went into political opposition to the government, and at its first congress in June it declared that it opposed the president and the presently constituted Parliament as well. Since then, New Ukraine has been coordinating its activities with Rukh in the organization of a referendum to force early parliamentary elections. However, the effort to gather 3 million signatures by the December 21 deadline on a petition calling for a referendum has proved unsuccessful, which testifies to the widespread political apathy and disenchantment among the population.

The left opposition is represented by the Socialist Party of Ukraine, which was formed in October 1991 as the successor to the banned Communist Party of Ukraine. The socialists led by People's Deputy Oleksander Moroz, convoked their second congress in December and concentrated their energies on the party's "anti-crisis" economic program, which is openly hostile to the market and privatization, and on the campaign to lift the ban on the Communist Party.

With a membership of close to 30,000, the Socialist Party of Ukraine cannot be ignored as a political force. But even their numbers do not tell the full story. The notion of "socialism" is still very popular among large segments of the population, particularly in times of economic misery, and the socialists have skillfully played this card in their appeals to the masses.

On the other side of the political spectrum, 1992 witnessed the organizational formation of several ultranationalist and extremist groups proclaiming their commitment to exclusively "Ukrainian national interests."

Politics and the economy

At the end of September, President Kravchuk finally caved in to opposition criticism of the government's economic policy and on September 30 announced the retirement of Prime Minister Fokin. The Ukrainian president decided to sacrifice his head of government, but wanted to retain the core of the Cabinet of Ministers. However, on October 1 the Parliament adopted a resolution expressing no confidence in the entire government forcing President Kravchuk to name a new Cabinet head within a 10-day period.

The president responded by selecting First Deputy Prime Minister Valentyn Symonenko as interim prime minister; and on October 13, he proposed the candidacy of Leonid Kuchma, whom the lawmakers approved by a large majority. Mr. Kuchma, general director of the Southern Machine Construction Plant production association in Dnipropetrovske, which is described as the largest missile production plant in the world, is a 54-year-old Ukrainian who has spent most of his working life at the plant he now heads.

His initial statements left observers with the impression that the new Ukrainian prime minister is a practical-minded manager who will pursue a gradual course to the market and is intent on avoiding the "shock therapy" identified with a rapid embrace of the market.

The Cabinet crisis in the fall was preceded by several months of inconclusive attempts to launch a program of economic reform against a background of political infighting between proponents of a radical reform package and traditionalists wary of the market. At the same time, the country was experiencing a steady deterioration of the economic situation characterized by a decline in production, spiraling inflation, and increasing prices for consumer goods. In the first two months of 1992, for example, industrial production fell by more than 17 percent as compared to the same period in the previous year; production of consumer goods declined by more than 23 percent; and production of foodstuffs dropped by almost 36 percent.

The duality in the approach to economic reform was reflected in the virtually simultaneous appointments in March of Oleksander Yemelianov as chairman of the State Council's Collegium on Questions of Economic Policy and Volodymyr Lanovoy as deputy prime minister and minister of economics.

Mr. Yemelianov, who came from the State Planning Committee, was charged with formulating economic policy, which resulted in a document titled "Fundamentals of the Economic Policy of Ukraine" that envisaged introduction of a Ukrainian currency and preparations for an immediate abandonment of the ruble zone. The plan was approved in principle by the Parliament at a closed session on March 24.

Mr. Lanovoy is a 40-year-old proponent of radical market reform and one of the leaders of the New Ukraine coalition. Several days after Mr. Yemelianov's "Fundamentals" was approved, he subjected the document to stinging criticism, saying that it was not a program but rather a hastily assembled collection of incompetent and anti-market responses to the liberalization of prices introduced in Russia earlier in the year. Clearly, such a situation could not be maintained for very long.

And, indeed, on July 11 President Kravchuk sacked Mr. Lanovoy, unconvincingly arguing that a high-ranking government official could not simultaneously be a member of an opposition political group. In his place, Mr. Kravchuk appointed Valentyn Symonenko as first deputy prime minister. Mr. Symonenko previously served as mayor of Odessa and was then appointed presidential representative in the Odessa oblast. His appointment, and especially the firing of Lanovoy were widely interpreted as back-tracking on economic reform.

By all accounts, Mr. Symonenko was President Kravchuk's first choice to succeed Mr. Fokin, against whom the opposition mounted a determined campaign in the summer. After an unsuccessful attempt on June 3 to place a vote of no confidence on the Parliament's agenda, on July 7 the Parliament placed the question of confidence in the government on its agenda. The prime minister responded by citing President Kravchuk's support and reading a prepared statement demanding that either the lawmakers accept his terms or assume responsibility for the situation in the country; thereafter, most of the ministers left the hall. Parliament, in turn, before recessing for the summer, passed a resolution proposing that the president submit new candidates for ministerial posts.

At the same time, more than 20 political parties and groups formed a coalition called "A New Parliament for an Independent Ukraine, which demanded the government's resignation, new parliamentary elections and a referendum on the dissolution of Parliament. When the Parliament reconvened in September against the background of what was described by Mr. Fokin as a "profound crisis" in the economy, Mr. Symonenko still did not have a completed economic reform package. In the final analysis, the Fokin-Symonenko plan for "deepening" economic reforms and a restructuring of the Cabinet of Ministers never saw the light of day. The government was forced to resign on October 1.

Within two weeks of his appointment on October 13, Mr. Kuchma presented his choices for ministerial posts, which were approved by the Parliament on October 27. The job of deputy prime minister and minister of economics went to Viktor Pynzenyk, who had previously criticized the government's economic policies.

Mr. Kuchma himself came out in support of market reforms, but emphasized that the transition should be a gradual one. According to the new prime minister, the process should begin with the privatization of small and medium-sized enterprises, consumer services, trade and agricultural production facilities. Large state-run enterprises should be denationalized at a slow pace and only those deemed essential would continue to be subsidized. Mr. Kuchma has also come out strongly in favor of maintaining close economic ties with Russia.

At the end of November, the Parliament granted Mr. Kuchma extraordinary powers for a period of six months in order to facilitate his economic reform program of tight budget and wage controls combined with accelerated privatization and what appears to be a serious effort to wipe out corruption.

Foreign policy: Russia, the CIS and the West

Ukraine's relations with Russia go well beyond the question of bilateral relations between the two most important successor states to the Soviet Union. They impinge on the fate of Russia itself, on the future of the CIS, and are crucial to Western security interests. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued that the litmus test for Russia's future course of development is whether or not it can live with an independent Ukraine.

That question is still open. For many Russians, regardless of their political convictions, the "loss" of Ukraine is simply incomprehensible. The problem is primarily a historical one. Russian political thought traditionally viewed "Little Russia" (Ukraine) as an integral part of Russia and "Little Russians" (Ukrainians) as part of the "all-Russian" (obshcherusskoy) nation. Stated differently, Ukraine and Ukrainians were never considered to be legitimate concepts. Indeed, Russian historiography traces the origins of the Russian state to Kievan Rus'. The "loss" of Ukraine, therefore, represents the loss of a key aspect of Russian history and, consequently, Russian national identity. Ukrainian independence has had the practical effect of forcing Russia to reconstruct its national memory.

Admittedly, this is not an easy process. Leading Russian political figures, both in the Yeltsin camp and in the "red-brown" coalition of self-styled patriots and disgruntled Communists, have on numerous occasions made it clear they cannot accept an Independent Ukraine.

The Russian opposition has been particularly forthright. Sergei Baburin, a central figure in the National Salvation Front, was quoted in May as telling Kiev's ambassador in Moscow that "either Ukraine reunites with Russia, or there will be war." Leading Russian democrats like St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak and former Moscow Mayor Gavrill Popov, although considerably more diplomatic, reacted to Ukraine's independence with undisguised horror and territorial claims.

And statements like those by Vice-President Aleksander Rutskoi that the Russian Federation should not be confused with Russia or Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Poltoranin's reference to President Kravchuk's "separatism" in the context of centrifugal movements inside Russia suggest that the Russian White House is not entirely immune to what the Ukrainian president has often referred to as Russian "imperial thinking."

This problem was reflected in the tense relations between Kiev in Moscow throughout the first half of 1992, which were clearly visible, particularly in the disputes over the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. On January 23, the Russian Parliament voted overwhelmingly to adopt a resolution instructing two of its committees to examine the constitutionality of the 1954 decisions to transfer the Crimea from the RSFSR to Ukraine. In another resolution, the Ukrainian Parliament was asked to find a speedy resolution to all questions related to the Black Sea Fleet. An unsuccessful attempt was made to place both of these issues on the agenda of the Sixth Congress of Russian People's Deputies in April. The following month, a closed session of the Russian Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution declaring the 1954 transfer of the Crimea as being "without the force of law." More recently, the Seventh Congress of Russian People's Deputies on December 5 called into question Ukraine's right to the Crimean city of Sevastopil, which is home to the Black Sea Fleet.

Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk held two summits in 1992. The first, in the southern Russian resort town of Dagomys on June 23, focused on economic issues and set the stage for the current negotiations on a new Ukrainian-Russian treaty. The Crimean question was not on the agenda, which represented a victory for the Ukrainian position that this is purely an internal Ukrainian matter.

The second summit was held in Yalta in August and yielded an interim solution to the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet by placing it under joint Ukrainian-Russian command for a three-year period, after which it is to be divided between the two sides. Negotiations on the issue are continuing.

But it would be overly optimistic to assume that these specific problems have been resolved and, more important, that the larger issue of Russia's attitude toward an independent Ukraine has suddenly been reversed. Recent statements by Vice-President Rutskoi on the Crimea and, even more disturbing, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's remark that territorial claims on Ukraine could not be excluded provide little ground for optimism on this score.

From Kiev's standpoint, the Russian version of the draft of a new treaty between Ukraine and Russia, which was made public in September, gives added weight to Henry Kissinger's claim he never met a Russian who accepted that Ukraine can be truly independent. The draft, among other things, calls for a joint military doctrine and provides for the use of Ukrainian territory by Russia's military, and has been rejected by Kiev.

The Ukrainian-Russian imbroglio has also had a visible impact on the course of developments in the CIS. The latter was formed by Ukraine, Russia and Belarus in December of 1991, but Kiev's motivations for joining were quite different from those of its two Slavic neighbors. The latter were prepared to sign Mikhail Gorbachev's confederative union treaty but ultimately did not do so because Ukraine rejected Mr. Gorbachev's plans outright. The result was the CIS, which Mr. Yeltsin agreed to in order to maintain the link with Ukraine. For Mr. Kravchuk and the Ukrainian leadership, the CIS provided a mechanism for what has been described as a civilized divorce process.

These two diametrically opposed approaches largely explain the ineffectiveness of the CIS. Russia would like to see a more tightly integrated CIS replete with its own charter and coordinating bodies. Ukraine has flatly rejected all suggestions of transforming the CIS into a new "superstate," and on various occasions President Kravchuk and other Ukrainian leaders have suggested that Ukraine will abandon the Commonwealth.

Rukh and other political groupings have incorporated the demand that Ukraine leave the CIS into their programs. The frustration of the Russian side can be seen in the appeal addressed by the Seventh Congress of Russian People's Deputies to the Parliaments of the Soviet successor states to consider forming a confederation or some other form of closer association of European and Asian states.

All of these problems are viewed with dismay from Washington, London, Bonn and other Western capitals. Their main concern is the fact that Russia and Ukraine, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan, have formidable arsenals of nuclear weapons on their territories. The nuclear arms issue also has a Ukrainian-Russian angle. As a matter of principle, Kiev has objected to Moscow's determined effort to play the role of sole successor to the USSR, especially in international affairs. A case in point is negotiations with the West on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

Ukraine's position that it is an independent party in the nuclear arms negotiations was finally agreed to in May with the signing of the Lisbon protocol to START. Neither the West nor Russia were anxious for Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to, in effect, join the nuclear club. Only several months earlier, in March, Ukraine suspended its transfer of short-range nuclear weapons to Russia, claiming there was no guarantee the arms were actually being destroyed as had been agreed. The transfers were subsequently resumed and by May, when President Kravchuk visited Washington, all tactical nuclear weapons had been removed from Ukrainian territory.

But the problem of strategic nuclear weapons remains, with Ukraine demanding the right to "administer" these weapons while leaving "operational management" to the command of the CIS armed forces. Moreover, increasingly Ukraine is being seen as stalling on the ratification of START, which President Kravchuk recently admitted would not be possible before the new year. At the same time, there is a growing and increasingly vocal lobby in Ukraine that argues for the retention of a nuclear capability, and Mr. Kravchuk himself has insisted that Ukraine should be given security guarantees and financial compensation before it becomes nuclear-free.

* * *

Thus, the balance sheet of one year of Ukrainian independence presents a mixed picture. President Kravchuk and his allies in the democratic camp succeeded in asserting and consolidating Ukrainian independence vis-a-vis Russia and in the international arena. But now they are faced with the no less formidable task of providing the economic underpinning for translating that independence into something concrete with which ordinary citizens can identify and which, in the final analysis, will provide the backbone and muscle needed to promote the development not only of an independent but also a democratic state and civil society.

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