ANALYSIS: Demographics of party support in Ukraine (12/26/93)

ANALYSIS: Demographics of party support in Ukraine

by Jaroslaw Martyniuk
Media and Opinion Research, RFE/RL Research Institute

PART I

On September 24, three days after accepting Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma's resignation, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to hold parliamentary elections on March 27, 1994, and presidential elections on June 26, 1994. The vote in favor of new elections came on the heels of a protracted and often heated debate and was undoubtedly motivated by the desire to avoid a confrontation similar to the one that was unfolding in Russia at the time.

In preparation for the elections, the Ukrainian Parliament had to pass a new electoral law determining whether a system of majority or proportional representation would decide the composition of the Parliament elected in March 1994. On November 18, the 450-member legislature voted by 245-8 in favor of the majority system. The law thus favors the Socialists and Communists, who have larger memberships than the other major Ukrainian parties and are better organized to carry out election campaigns. The Democrats, who had been in favor of some degree of proportional representation, refused to vote and walked out in protest._1_

Since the referendum on independence of December 1991, the Ukrainian political scene has been characterized by the proliferation of political parties and frequent realignment of political forces. Many parties have similar names and platforms, and there are also numerous politically active organizations; for example, of businessmen, kolhosp (collective farm) directors, and private farmers. Between June and October 1993, the number of political parties registered with the Ministry of Justice increased from 19 to 28, although only a handful can be considered major political forces._2_

How much support the largest of these registered political parties enjoy is an open question. No one has yet attempted to measure their popularity through nationwide polls. Party leaders point to membership figures, but these are often inaccurate indicators of popular support._3_

In May 1993, the Media and Opinion Research (MOR) Department of the RFE/RL Research Institute commissioned a Ukraine-wide survey focusing on media behavior that included questions intended to reveal voter intentions._4_ The following analysis of the survey's results sheds some light on the level and distribution of support for the major political parties in the spring of this year._5_ The analysis is by no means an attempt to predict the outcome of the parliamentary elections scheduled for March; rather, the poll results can be regarded as a baseline with which future political shifts can be compared.

Of the 2,034 respondents, a majority (55 percent) said they would vote if elections were held during the week of the survey, 30 percent said they would not, and 15 percent were undecided or did not know._6_ The 55 percent projected participation was considerably below the 84 percent turnout at the presidential elections and the referendum on independence in December 1991, perhaps owing to the current difficult economic conditions in Ukraine and increasing disenchantment with the political process._7_

Who supports which party

Data from the survey reveal some interesting demographic and regional patterns of party affiliation. The most significant of these patterns was that the democratic parties (especially the Democratic Party of Ukraine, Rukh, and the Party for Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine) tended to attract younger voters. In addition, these parties were more likely to attract residents of western Ukraine, those with higher education and those with strong religious beliefs. The Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU, the discredited former Communist Party), on the other hand, attracted a large proportion of middle-aged voters (between 50 and 64 years of age), proclaimed atheists and unskilled workers. The relatively low levels of support for the Ukrainian Republican Party and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (4 percent and 3 percent, respectively) make it difficult to identify any demographic patterns among their constituencies.

The single largest group of respondents was formed by the undecided voters (37 percent), who were likely to be elderly (nearly half were age 65 or over), living in eastern Ukraine and in possession of an incomplete or secondary education. Female voters were more likely to be undecided than male voters. The demographic profile of the undecided voters closely resembled that of the respondents who said they would vote for the SPU. This finding suggests that many of the undecided respondents may have sympathized with the Socialists but were unwilling to admit their preference to an interviewer.

Party support by region

A regional breakdown of party support shows that support for the DPU was highest in western and southern Ukraine as well as in Kyyiv. With its relatively small party membership (3,000), it is difficult to explain the popularity of this party in these regions. Moreover, it is not clear whether respondents chose the DPU because of their familiarity with the party or merely because they responded to the incorporation of the word "democratic" in its name.

Political analysts in Ukraine attribute the DPU's popularity to two factors: an appealing name, uncolored by other adjectives such as "social" or "national"; and the party's improved image since the charismatic and highly visible Volodymyr Yavorivsky took over its leadership in December 1992._8_ The fact that many of its leading members (including Ivan Drach and Dmytro Pavlychko) are prominent politicians may also contribute to the party's popularity.

The high level of support for the DPU in western Ukraine (24 percent) comes as no surprise, given the region tradition of protesting against the Soviet system and its generally greater political and national awareness. However, the fact that 21 percent of respondents in southern Ukraine said they would vote for the DPU, compared with only 9 percent in eastern Ukraine, is surprising. It seems likely that respondents in southern Ukraine, regardless of whether they were familiar with the DPU, were considerably more attracted than their counterparts in eastern Ukraine to a democratic party whose name contained no adjectives qualifying its orientation.

As expected, the strongly anti-Communist Rukh enjoyed its highest level of support in western Ukraine (l5 percent). The low level of support for the SPU in this region (5 percent) contrasts sharply with its popularity in the eastern, southern and central areas of Ukraine, reflecting the fact that the former Communists are still entrenched there.

The high percentage of undecided respondents in eastern Ukraine may reflect the large proportion of unskilled workers and respondents age 65 and over as well as a lack of information about political parties. In central Ukraine (excluding Kyyiv), the relatively high percentage of undecided respondents may be partly attributed to the region's large rural population. The large proportion of undecided respondents in both of these regions may have been due to the reluctance of many respondents there to admit openly an affiliation with the SPU. The lower percentage of undecided voters in southern Ukraine is consistent with the finding, referred to above, that the residents of this region have different voting tendencies from those in eastern and central Ukraine (excluding Kyyiv).

Aggregate support for blocs

Although several democratic coalitions have been formed, their composition and orientation have been in a state of flux. Some political parties belong to more than one coalition; thus it is more meaningful for the purpose of this analysis to group the eight major parties according to their general political orientation (see Table 1)._9_ The democratic category consists of four democratic center-right parties, three democratic center-left parties, and the small national democratic parties included in the "other" category.

Democratic bloc political parties were selected by a total of 48 percent of the respondents. The combined number of those who said they would vote for either the Socialists or the Communists was 11 percent. The key unanswered question is how the large group of undecided voters (37 percent) would have cast their ballots. Given that the demographic profiles of the undecided respondents resembled those who indicated that they would vote for the SPU, it is possible that most would have voted for either Socialist or Communist parties, as was the case in the Polish elections in September 1993 and the Lithuanian elections in the fall of 1992. In the unlikely event that all the undecided voters would have cast their ballots for the Socialist and Communist camp, the political forces of the left would have had the support of nearly half (48 percent) of the electorate. In such a case, the democratic forces would not have had a clear mandate to govern or to introduce economic reforms.

Since the winter of 1992-1993, some left-wing political parties have emerged in eastern Ukraine. These parties have come to dominate the political landscape in the Donbas region (Donetske and Luhanske oblasts) and are increasingly influencing political life in Kyyiv, too._10_ The largest of these parties, founded in December 1992, is the Labor Party of Ukraine, commonly derided as the "party of red directors."_11_ Most of these parties and movements began to emerge only during the first half of 1993; thus, they were relatively unknown outside eastern Ukraine at the time of the May 1993 survey. Their importance and support bases are likely to grow before the upcoming elections._12_

Recent developments suggest that the SPU may be joining forces with the revived Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), which was registered in Kyyiv on October 5, 1993. In early November, for example, the leader of the SPU, Oleksander Moroz, addressed a joint meeting of the CPU and SPU in Kyyiv, declaring that "only Communists can save the state system of Ukraine."_13_

Reuters, November 18, 1993. [Back to Text]
Demokratychna Ukraina, October 6, 1993. [Back to Text]
In its August 13, 1993, issue, Vechirniy Kyyiv estimated the membership of the Socialist Party of Ukraine at 90,000; the Ukrainian Republican Party, 12,000; the coalition New Ukraine, 5,000; the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party, 4,000; the Liberal Party of Ukraine, 3,000; and the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, 2,500. [Back to Text]
The survey, designed to study media and public opinion in Ukraine, was carried out by the Kyyiv-based International Institute of Sociology. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 2,034 respondents, selected in a random procedure designed to provide a sample representative of the population of Ukraine. [Back to Text]
This analysis focuses on eight political parties that, according to MOR polls, had the support of at least 3 percent of the population in Ukraine in May 1993. [Back to Text]
Respondents were asked; "If general elections were to be held this week, would you vote?" If the response was "yes," the respondent was then given a list of 10 parties and asked to name one. If the party of the respondent's choice did not appear on the list, his preferences was recorded in the "other" category. [Back to Text]
The demographic profile of the 45 percent of the respondents who said they would not vote or were undecided did not differ substantially from that of the 55 percent who said they would vote. [Back to Text]
Based on author's conversation with Valeriy Khmeiko of the Kyyiv International Institute of Sociology on October 12, 1993. [Back to Text]
The use of the terms "right" and "left" in this article is consistent with standard usage in the West. [Back to Text]
For a full discussion of the emerging regional parties and organizations, see Andrew Wilson, "The Growing Challenge to Kyyiv from the Donbas," RFE/RL Research Report, No. 33, August 20, 1993. [Back to Text]
The Labor Party of Ukraine is often confused with the Labor Congress of Ukraine, formed in March 1993. The latter considers itself part of the "constructive center" and insists that economic reform must be accompanied by "social guarantees." [Back to Text]
Only a handful of respondents included in the "other" category were able to identify these parties by name. [Back to Text]
Kievskiye Vedomosti, November 5, 1993. [Back to Text]

Table 1
Support for Major Political Parties, May 1993
(Percentage of those who said they would vote if elections were held the same week)

Party Total Support Support According to Various Categories Support

Democratic Party 16 Residents of western Ukraine 24

Those age 35 and under 20

Those with higher education 20

Socialist Party 9 Professed atheists 19

Unskilled workers 17

Those age 50 - 64 13

Rukh 7 Those age 20 -24 17

Residents of western Ukraine 15

Strong religious believers 14

Those with higher education 11

Party of Democratic Rebirth 6 Those age 18 - 29 10

Residents of Kyyiv 9

Peasant Democratic Party 6 Those living in settlements with a population of less than 2,000 15

Green Party 5 Residents of Kyyiv 9

Those in low-household-income groups 9

Republican Party 4

Social Democratic Party 3

Other * 7

Undecided 37 Those age 65 and over 48

Residents of eastern Ukraine 44

Those with incomplete secondary education 43

Women 42

Men 31

* More than half of the respondents in this category did not name any party; roughly one-third (2 percent) said they would vote
for the Communist Party; and the remainder (1 percent) named small national democratic parties. Some of the parties in the last
category were the Party for Radical Reforms, the Christian Democratic Party, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the
Conservative Republican Party.

Note: The sample size was 1,070 (only those respondents age 18 and over who indicated that they would vote are included.

[Back to Text]

Table 1
Support for Major Political Parties, May 1993
(Percentage of those who said they would vote if elections were held the same week)
Party	Total Support	Support According to Various Categories	Support
Democratic Party	16	Residents of western Ukraine	24
Those age 35 and under	20
Those with higher education	20
Socialist Party	9	Professed atheists	19
Unskilled workers	17
Those age 50 - 64	13
Rukh	7	Those age 20 -24	17
Residents of western Ukraine	15
Strong religious believers	14
Those with higher education	11
Party of Democratic Rebirth	6	Those age 18 - 29	10
Residents of Kyyiv	9
Peasant Democratic Party	6	Those living in settlements with a population of less than 2,000	15
Green Party	5	Residents of Kyyiv	9
Those in low-household-income groups	9
Republican Party	4
Social Democratic Party	3
Other *	7
Undecided	37	Those age 65 and over	48
Residents of eastern Ukraine	44
Those with incomplete secondary education	43
Women	42
Men	31
* More than half of the respondents in this category did not name any party; roughly one-third (2 percent) said they would vote for the Communist Party; and the remainder (1 percent) named small national democratic parties. Some of the parties in the last category were the Party for Radical Reforms, the Christian Democratic Party, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Conservative Republican Party. Note: The sample size was 1,070 (only those respondents age 18 and over who indicated that they would vote are included. [Back to Text]

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