ANALYSIS: Decree by Boris Yeltsin reveals Russian imperial ambitions

by Volodymyr Zviglyanich

President Boris Yeltsin on September 14, 1995, issued an edict declaring a program aimed at restoration of the Russian Empire on the territory thus far known as the Commonwealth of Independent States. The program is titled "The Strategic Course of Russia Toward States of the CIS." It consists of several chapters that reflect Russia's hierarchy of strategic priorities on the territory of the former USSR.

The very fact that this document appeared on the eve of parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia reflects important tendencies in Russia's foreign policy toward "the near abroad."

Neo-imperial ambitions

Numerous perspectives on the problem of Russia's relationship to the CIS have periodically come from various presidential and quasi-presidential think tanks in Russia.

Their primary goal, however, was to check public reaction rather than to serve as guidelines for practical actions.

In contrast to these studies, Presidential Edict No. 940 is a program of official actions and contains directives for state institutions such as the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry on Cooperation with Countries of the CIS. The document refrains from theoretical reflections on the subject of "Russia in a Constellation of Equals" and dots all the "i's" by barring from the text the mere mention of "independence" and "equality." Therefore, the illusion of equality seen in the nascent ClS's documents has given way in Edict No. 940 to an overt and pragmatic description of Russia" understanding of its role in the CIS.

In contrast to these studies, Presidential Edict No. 940 is a program of official actions and contains directives for state institutions such as the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry on Cooperation with Countries of the CIS. The document refrains from theoretical reflections on the subject of "Russia in a Constellation of Equals" and dots all the "i's" by barring from the text the mere mention of "independence" and "equality." Therefore, the illusion of equality seen in the nascent ClS's documents has given way in Edict No. 940 to an overt and pragmatic description of Russia's understanding of its role in the CIS.

Russia's goals and tasks

The CIS countries are the principal target of Russia's geopolitical ambitions first and foremost because it is there that "our [Russian] vital interests in the domain of economics, defense, security, protection of the rights of Russians, the guarantee of which constitutes the basis of the national security of the country," are concentrated, according to the document.

The war in Chechnya, which put Russia on the brink of disintegration, led the authors of the edict to state that effective collaboration of Russia with the CIS countries is the remedy against centrifugal tendencies within Russia proper. Therefore, the document openly asserts that from now on the preservation of the territorial integrity of Russia is the communal matter of the CIS rather than Russia alone.

The main aim of Russia's policy toward the CIS is the creation of a union of states integrated both economically and politically, and capable of assuming its rightful place in the world community. This, of course, should be conducted under Russia's guidance, in accordance with the principle "Russia's interests first." The document excludes the possibility that Russia, by pursuing its interests, could hamper those of its neighbors.

Addressing the major tasks of Russian policy toward the CIS countries, the document lists a broad range of measures aimed at limiting and eventually eliminating their independence and equality. In particular it presumes the preservation of Russia's leading role in the formation of a new system of interstate political and economic relations in the post-Soviet space via the creation of political regimes friendly to Russia.

The ways and means

How does Russia intend to attain these goals? In the economic sphere, there would be an expansion of the CIS Customs Union through the involvement of members of the CIS Economic Union (Ukraine is an associate member of the Economic Union). Russia plans also to integrate national economic systems with the help of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS. This assembly is a murky organization created by one-time speaker of the Russian Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, with the aim of uniting supporters of the USSR's restoration and creating opposition to President Yeltsin. For these attempts the Russian Parliament was forceably dissolved by Mr. Yeltsin in October 1993, and Mr. Khasbulatov wound up in the famous Lefortovo Prison.

Now the very same idea is supported by President Yeltsin himself. Does this mean that its opponents are now expected in Lefortovo? Edict No. 940 leaves them some hope. The model of "multispeed integration" (a euphemism for the restoration of a "single and undivided" empire) is not obligatory. But the attitude of Russia's partners to this model will determine the volume of its economic, political and military assistance to them.

The edict envisages an enhancement of the Payments Union with the aim of using the ruble as a "reserve" currency. Therefore, Ukraine can no longer delay the introduction of its full-fledged national currency, the hryvnia, if it really wants to create an economic basis for independence and to avoid an eventual demolition of its financial system by its northern neighbor.

Russia also urges the creation of judicial and economic conditions for "joint property" in the CIS countries. If one remembers the zeal with which Russia pursued possession of a chunk of Ukraine's gas processing facilities, one could easily see the ultimate goal of such integrationist moves: control over strategic branches of national industries through the ad hoc Financial-lndustrial Groups, those new oligarchies emerging in Russia and scheduled to appear in Ukraine.

The fate of these national FlGs is not hard to predict. Either they will be swallowed by the Russian giants such as Lukoil, Sidanko, Yukos or Gazprom, or they will exist as a temporary cover for the redistribution of "joint property" to the benefit of Russia.

The KGB and the military

Mikhail Barsukov, the recently appointed chief of the Russian Security Service, and Pavel Grachev, Russia's defense minister, have prepared a clear plan for Russia's domination of the CIS countries. It includes several measures:

• 1) creation of a system of collective security on the basis of the Treaty on Mutual Security of the CIS countries of May 15, 1992 (which Ukraine did not join);
  
  
• 2) establishment of Russian - Russian only - military bases in the CIS countries;
  
  
• 3) creation of a joint system for the ClS's border protection and the legal provisions for the presence of Russian border troops in these countries;
  
  
• 4) introduction of joint peacekeeping activities on the territory of the CIS; and
  
  
• 5) informing "third parties" and international organizations involved in peacekeeping operations that "this region is the zone of Russia's interests."

Therefore, the game-plan is as follows: the Customs Union, "joint property," Russian military bases to ensure its protection, and Russian border troops to combat "foreign influence" with the participation of the Russian Security Service.

The humanitarian issue

This picture of the restoration of the Russian Empire is to be accomplished via a broad program of Russia's penetration of the media (both TV and radio), education, and book markets of the CIS countries.

However, the major task is the "protection of the rights of the Russians ('Rossiyany')." What these "rights" consist of and who are these Russians is not delineated in the document. Therefore, Edict No. 940 deliberately confuses the notions of ethnicity and citizenship, and thus borrows from the policy of Hitler who started war against Czecho-Slovakia under the pretext of protecting the rights of the Sudeten Germans. Russia's ethnic foreign policy thus challenges the post-World War II system of international and European security.

Challenges to Ukraine

Edict No. 940 challenges Ukraine's efforts to overcome its economic crisis and to build its independent state.

First, Russia now pursues a policy toward the CIS countries that consists of diktat, and economic and military pressure, ignoring the norms of international law regarding the rights of national minorities. To conduct an independent economic policy upon such dictates (or their threat) is practically impossible.

Should Russia move to implement this edict, Ukraine will be forced to quit the CIS. Certain pro-nationalist circles in the Russian body politic would applaud such a decision, as it would enable the creation of a Russian-Belarus-Central Asian Customs Union (and other unions) under Russia's uncontested dominance. However, any geopolitical configuration on the territory of the former Soviet Union without Ukraine is virtually impossible. Therefore, one possible scenario would presume the use of Edict No. 940 to continue Ukraine's economic crisis and especially to "flex muscles" before the Russian presidential elections, as the Zhirinovsky line is now official Russian policy.

Second, the possible increase of Russian pressure on Ukraine in the wake of the edict would compel Ukraine to reconsider its position regarding NATO membership and to revoke its neutral status. To avoid Russia's possible pressure on Ukraine to join the CIS Defense Treaty, should Ukraine revoke its neutral status, the time span between that revocation and its joining NATO should be the shortest possible. Responsible cooperation on the part of Western states should serve this purpose. The alternative is preservation of the existing state of uncertainty and potential crisis in the center of Europe.

On the bright side, however, Edict No. 940, despite its neo-imperialist spirit, could lead Ukraine to a better understanding of its own foreign policy priorities and development of a realistic vision of its future in Europe rather than in Eurasia.

Dr. Volodymyr Zviglyanich is adjunct professor of East European area studies at George Washington University

Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, January 14, 1996, No. 2, Vol. LXIV

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