Independent Ukraine: a beacon of security in Central Europe? (05/19/96)

Independent Ukraine: a beacon of security in Central Europe?

by David R. Marples

Recent attempts at further integration between countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Russian Duma's mid-March 1996 renunciation of the 1991 Belaya Vezha accords ending the Soviet Union have been counterbalanced by the proposed expansion of NATO eastward to include states in Europe that have embraced democracy since 1989, such as Hungary and Poland. Both developments leave Ukraine increasingly isolated in Central Europe, and, despite official denials to the contrary, it appears to have taken on the role of a buffer state between two military-security alliances.

Ukraine, ruled by President Leonid Kuchma since the summer of 1994, is trying to preserve a delicate balance in its relations with Russia and the CIS countries, while moving demonstrably closer to the United States as a strategic partner.

Though there seems to be no question of formal adherence to the NATO partnership, Ukraine may attend NATO discussions in the 16 + 1 arrangement that was initiated in Brussels in 1995. At the same time, Ukraine's army has conducted joint maneuvers with its U.S. counterpart, and since the Russian decision to invade Chechnya in December 1994, Ukraine has been perceived by the United States as a key player in the balance of power and in the stability of Eastern Europe. Arguably, such a policy represented a profound change in U.S. strategic policy. Today, if not a guarantor of Ukrainian independence, NATO may be described, at the very least, as a strong supporter.

The expansion of NATO is a complex affair that is bitterly opposed by Russia. The latter country has moved inexorably closer to integration with some of its partners in the loose CIS alliance. Ironically, that alliance would be rendered null and void had the Russian president accepted the March 15 decision of the Russian State Duma to re-enact the 1922 agreement that established the USSR. For the present, the CIS still exists on paper, but Ukraine has carefully avoided any form of commitment to its former Soviet neighbors.

Ukraine also decided not to sign the 1991 security agreement signed in Tashkent by Russia and neighboring states such as Kazakhstan and Belarus. This agreement remains currently the most important strategic alignment in the former Soviet space. The strategy of President Kuchma, his defense minister, Valeriy Shmarov, and the secretary of the Ukrainian National Security Council, Volodymyr Horbulin, has thus far been to avoid antagonizing Russia while placing Ukraine at the very center of European security as a stable and democratic partner. The road ahead, however, appears perilous.

The Ukrainian state, formed in December 1991 after a massive ratification of Parliament's declaration of independence on August 24, 1991, is based on border agreements signed by all responsible powers after World War II. Recently, Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary agreed to accept the present state borders, forestalling a potential nightmare of disputes as to the validity of ownership of various territories. Romania, however, has insisted that its own adherence to the post-war borders was obtained under duress. Its signing of the Helsinki Act in 1975, which reconfirmed the present borders, has likewise been denounced.

Its main disputes are with Ukraine and can be divided into two areas: 1) Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna, seized by Stalin in June 1940 and reannexed to the Soviet Union after World War II; though Bessarabia had been part of the old Russian empire, there was no viable premise for the grabbing of Bukovyna; 2) the tiny Zmiynyi (Serpent) Island on the Black Sea, a continental shelf linked to the Romanian mainland.

It is reported that the area around the island possesses about one-third of Ukraine's potential oil reserves, and some 25 percent of natural gas deposits. Since Ukraine's main disadvantage in its dealings with Russia is its energy deficit, the island has assumed much more than strategic significance. Frankly, Ukraine cannot afford to give up this territory and is unlikely to do so. Yet, although Romania is not in a position to threaten Ukraine militarily, the protraction of the dispute has undermined stability on Ukraine's southwestern border.

Relations with Russia are clearly the key issue. In early April, Russian President Boris Yeltsin canceled for the sixth time his proposed visit to Kyiv to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation. The main reason cited was the failure to agree on terms for the division of the Black Sea Fleet, though most of the remaining problems appeared to have been resolved last year at Sochi.

More significant is the confusing debate over the status of the city of Sevastopil, which has been the subject of increasingly belligerent statements from the Russian Duma and some of the candidates in this summer's presidential election. President Yeltsin, who appears to be gaining on his Communist rival, Gennadiy Zyuganov, in most polls, has adopted an ambiguous stance.

His campaign has clearly benefited from recent attempts at further integration of what President Yeltsin calls the "near abroad" and from the April 2 union agreement with Belarus. The status of Sevastopil falls into this same category.

The port remains the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Yet, in contrast to the city's authorities (who have declared Sevastopil a "Russian" city) and the Russian State Duma, Ukraine refuses to countenance any agreement that does not acknowledge that Sevastopil is Ukrainian territory. Though Ukraine is willing to sign a political agreement without a simultaneous concord on the Black Sea Fleet question, Russia's Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has been unwilling to divide the two. Since President Yeltsin's arrival would have signaled the start of trade by barter, the costs to Ukraine of a further delay are considerable.

The problem is much broader than issues relating to the Crimea and concerns the reluctance of a contingent of Russians and Russophile Ukrainians to embrace the separate route of non-aligned statehood adopted by the present administration. Though far from dominant, the group is represented by a powerful alliance of Communists and Agrarians in the Ukrainian Parliament and constitutes a potential fifth column in the industrialized areas of eastern Ukraine and in the Crimea.

Left to themselves, this group would be incapable of controlling Ukrainian policy. In the current political nexus, however, it is being approached by Russia as a potential ally, even to the extent that some prominent Ukrainians recently accused Russia of espionage in parts of Ukraine.

Ukraine's economic predicament has weakened its political clout. Specifically, Ukraine has run up debts exceeding $1.1 billion to Russia for imports of oil and gas. Almost five years of independence have not reduced this predicament, and it raises the significance of the recent G-7 talks in Moscow, which included the question of the closure of the Chornobyl nuclear plant and the amount of compensation that Ukraine is to receive.

Despite contradictory statements, Ukraine's basic policy in the energy sphere has been to develop its already large nuclear power complex. At the same time, Ukraine's good relations with the European powers rest in part on a satisfactory resolution of the Chornobyl problem, a fact that has been reiterated often in meetings between them.

While Ukraine's economy has faltered, it has explored widely in the area of international trade and has developed good trading relations with China, Iran and Central Europe. It also signed six intergovernmental agreements with Romania in the period March 23-30, which encompassed cooperation in the development of oil refining, metallurgy and hydroelectric power, despite the border dispute.

Though Ukraine's present political course is a risky one, the leadership has displayed considerable skill and dexterity. Ukraine's international status has improved immeasurably over the past two years. President Kuchma has staked much on the victory of Mr. Yeltsin in the coming Russian elections, even to the extent of pointedly taking a vacation during the recent visit to Ukraine of Communist candidate Mr. Zyuganov, a snub that is unlikely to be forgotten, should the latter emerge as the victor. A Yeltsin victory, thus, is essential for Ukraine to maintain its current policy.

Even with a Yeltsin victory, however, Ukraine's position will be untenable without some economic recovery, continuing credits from the International Monetary Fund, and the backing of NATO and the United States in particular. One can surmise that failure in any one of these spheres could cause the derailment of President Kuchma's policy and force Ukraine to assent, at least to some degree, to closer integration with Russia and its partners.

David R. Marples is professor of history at the University of Alberta in Edmonton and director of the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, which is based at that university.

| Home Page |