THE STATE OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE: An overview from Harvard: Foreign affairs (08/25/96)

THE STATE OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE: An overview from Harvard

Foreign affairs

On August 5, a roundtable discussion on Ukrainian foreign affairs during the past five years was held at the Ukrainian Research Institute. Participants included Roman Szporluk, Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History and director of HURI; Fiona Hill, associate director of the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project at the Kennedy School of Government; and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, professor emeritus of political science at Carleton University, Ottawa, and HURI associate; Zenovia Sochor, professor of political science at Clark University, Worcester, Mass., and HURI associate; and Lubomyr Hajda, associate director of HURI, who moderated the discussion.

Q: Lubomyr Hajda: Prof. Szporluk, you have frequently said that since independence Ukraine finds itself in a new neighborhood. Could you explain what you mean by this phrase, and how Ukraine's place in the world and its foreign policy have been affected by this fact?

A: Roman Szporluk: To put it very simply, Ukrainian history for the past three and a half centuries was taking place in a setting of a conflict between Russia and Poland over Ukraine, and a Ukrainian struggle with Russia and Poland. This was the geopolitical neighborhood, which was not only an external neighborhood, but also an internal context under which Ukrainians lived.

After World War II this geopolitical struggle no longer existed. There was a great change for the better, and this change consisted in the transformation of Poland from Ukraine's historical antagonist into an ally and supporter of Ukrainian independence. Poland re-oriented its own geopolitical thinking, its own national interest. Polish decision-makers saw Ukrainian independence as a positive development. And this new geopolitical fact was a critical factor in making Ukrainian independence possible.

Q: Hajda: If Poland was a major factor in Ukrainian history on its western frontier, then obviously in the east it was Russia. To what degree has Moscow become reconciled to the loss of Ukraine, and what are the main contours of Moscow's policy toward Ukraine today?

A: Fiona Hill: If Poland has reoriented its geopolitical thinking to see Ukrainian independence as a positive development, I'm afraid we can probably say the opposite about Russia. In Russian eyes, Ukrainian independence has been a negative, rather than positive development.

However, there has been a decided change over the period of Ukraine's first five years of independence. In 1991, Ukrainian independence was a great shock, but at first Russian reaction was muted because Russia itself had to face the same problems of state-building as the other former Soviet republics. But from early 1992 and into 1993 we saw a very heavy-handed approach on the part of Russia - a kind of desperation, almost - to keep Ukraine from pulling away further than it had.

And, indeed, Russia has had considerable leverage: the potential border issue and the Crimea; the Black Sea Fleet and the division of the military hardware left behind in Ukraine after the disintegration of the Soviet armed forces; the question of nuclear weapons (which then created a very difficult relationship for Ukraine in the early days of independence with the United States). Then there was the issue of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine (which is not necessarily ethnically Russian). Energy has been a major issue, with Ukraine dependent on Russia for most of its energy supplies. We still have not seen any friendship treaty signed between Russia and Ukraine.

In 1992-1993, after the initial shock of independence had worn off, Russia tried to exert pressure on all these points, exploiting the position of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers within Ukraine's borders, continually raising questions of whether Ukraine's borders were legitimate, questioning the status of the Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet - I could go on.

But since 1993 Russia has basically overextended itself. Russia is facing so many problems that Ukraine now has the opportunity to consolidate its position. In many respects, Russia's reach is greater than its grasp. Especially now that Russia has become bogged down in war in Chechnya, we've seen it starting to look inward. The position of the Crimea improved rather dramatically once Russia realized that supporting separatism and secession is not exactly in its best interests, even outside its own borders.

Still, Russia's main objective is to stop Ukraine from moving too far from an association with Russia. Certainly Russia does not want to see Ukraine as a member of NATO. It will exert leverage wherever it can. But this leverage will be rather weaker now. The main challenge for Ukraine is to find a fine balance between consolidating its statehood, trying to become integrated into European institutions, and keeping Russia at bay - especially finding ways of weaning itself from dependence on Russian energy, ways of making statehood inclusive so that ethnic issues can't be raised, ways of coming to terms with the Black Sea Fleet issue.

The greatest challenge for Ukraine now that the initial challenges of creating statehood - creating a Parliament, Constitution and presidency - have been tackled, is to get the economy regularized. If this fails, and Russia manages to improve its own economic position, it may indeed become a magnet for the more disaffected elements of the Ukrainian population. But if Ukraine can tackle the challenge of its economic reform, there is a good chance that its independence will be consolidated and Russia will be unable to reverse this once its grasp becomes as strong as its reach.

For the immediate future, Russia is going to be too preoccupied with its own problems. Yeltsin's health is a big question mark. Should Yeltsin die, which is entirely conceivable, even within the next few months, then Russia will be pushed into a succession crisis and will not have the wherewithal to turn to Ukraine, if it had that in mind. The Chechen war is certainly going to continue into the foreseeable future, and while that war is progressing, Russia is not going to attempt anything spectacular on the Crimean front or on the Black Sea Fleet. I doubt, however, that the treaty between Russia and Ukraine will be signed any time in the foreseeable future.

This next two-year period - I don't know whether we can really look any further ahead than that - I think is actually quite a good time for Ukraine in many respects. I don't think Russia has the wherewithal right now to turn its attentions to Ukraine.

Q: Hajda: Ukraine, not just since independence, but even from its proclamation of sovereignty in 1990, has varied in its attitudes toward issues of security and even in the development of its own military doctrine. There have been advocates of strict neutrality; advocates of closer military cooperation or integration with Russia and the CIS; advocates of a Central-East European security bloc; advocates of cooperation in the Partnership for Peace Program with NATO, or even Ukraine's eventual adhesion to NATO. What is the role of Ukraine in the security vacuum that has developed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union?

A: Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone: From the very beginning, Russia's and Ukraine's perceptions of the role of the CIS differed. Ukraine saw it as the liquidator of the former USSR, Russia as an instrument to safeguard Russia's interest and hegemony within old boundaries. Ukraine's policies, especially the formation of an independent Ukrainian army, thwarted Russian expectations.

In the security vacuum after the break-up of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact there emerged three sets of actors: the East European states, Russia and the West. And then there is Ukraine, whose major importance is strategic.

The East European states, all former Warsaw Pact members, are seeking two things: a security umbrella through membership in NATO, and democratization and economic development through ties with the European Community.

Russia since 1993 has pursued a neo-imperialist policy, with support for it expressed across the political spectrum. This has resulted in the restoration of a Russian military presence at most borders, the establishment of military bases in some former Soviet republics, and in restoring control over most of the former Soviet airspace.

In the West this policy line has led to a partial restoration of Russia's image as a great power and to recognition of its special interests in the former imperial zone. Russia has been adamantly opposed to the expansion of NATO, but much less so to the expansion of membership in the European Union, largely for economic reasons. For a peaceful all-European integration, Russia's cooperation is essential and thus a change in Russia's policy, which in turn depends very much on the nature of its new identity. So far, even the narrowest interpretation of this identity includes, if not Ukraine as a whole, at least eastern Ukraine.

It is sometimes very difficult to describe Western policy because of the multiplicity of actors. There is now a general commitment to the extension of NATO, but different countries have different rationales and enthusiasms for it, and there is no consensus on future candidates and the timetable. Russia's veto is an important factor in the background. The prime candidates for NATO membership, according to Western criteria, are Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - the Visegard group.

On the whole, by Western criteria, Ukraine does not fit in this first rank of prospective new members of NATO. On the other hand, Ukraine is of such strategic importance - in terms of location, size, population and commitment to independence - that there is sufficient recognition on the part of the United States to support its independence, perhaps unconditionally. Whether this commitment extends to helping Ukraine become viable in economic terms remains to be seen.

Q: Hajda: There is clearly a close link between domestic policy and foreign policy in any country. What has been the nexus between domestic and foreign policy in Ukraine over the last five years?

A: Zenovia Sochor: Foreign policy can help to shed light on one of the puzzles surrounding Leonid Kuchma, i.e., why has he followed an even-handed approach in his foreign policy once he came into power despite his earlier pro-Russian position during the election campaign. The typical explanation is that in order to embark on economic reforms, Kuchma needed allies in Parliament. Those allies could not be the Communists, who threw their support behind Kuchma during the election but resisted economic reforms; therefore, the allies would have to be the national democrats, who would not tolerate a pro-Russian policy.

In fact, there is another explanation. The change in Russian foreign policy toward the near abroad limited the range of Kuchma's options. When Kuchma came to the bargaining table with Russia, he found that there was no special relationship in the Anglo-American sense. He had to do hard bargaining, just as if he were dealing with any other country. That must have been a sobering experience.

Meanwhile, the U.S. began to re-think its Russocentric policy. As Russia became more hard-line, the West started to recognize the strategic importance of Ukraine. U.S. interest gave Kuchma some options. In other words, the changing international context accounts for Kuchma's even-handed approach as much as domestic conditions and the need for economic reform.

Another link between foreign and domestic policies involves the Communist Party of Ukraine. There has been a singular lack of new thinking along programmatic lines because the CPU's orientation has remained toward Moscow. East Germany's Honecker did not meet indigenous challenges because he assumed the USSR would back him up; so, too, with the CPU. Just look at the excitement aroused at the prospect of Zyuganov winning in the recent Russian elections. Now that the Russian Communist Party is in disarray after losing the elections, the left bloc in Ukraine will have to fend for itself and rethink its program more in keeping with the needs of Ukraine itself. A likely scenario is a splintering, and perhaps a social democratization of at least part of the left bloc.

Q: Hajda: How would you characterize the state of the Ukrainian-American relationship, and the present trajectory, especially now that the nuclear weapons question, which had been an irritant, has been put to rest?

A: Sochor: The emphasis has shifted from nuclear weapons to policies of democratization and economic reform. Kuchma and his advisers need to show the seriousness of their intent in pursuing economic reform to maintain the Ukrainian-U.S. relationship. A potential problem arising now is a lessening of the momentum towards economic reform.

Rakowska-Harmstone: The Russians can throw a monkey wrench into the proceedings by manipulating the oil policy and other economic levers. It's really not in Russian interests to have reform succeed.

Hill: The U.S. has not recognized that in some respects the U.S. is itself to blame for the lag in Ukrainian economic progress because it did not give any encouragement to the very fitful early attempts at economic reforms and focused only on the issue of nuclear weapons.

Szporluk: From this discussion it is clear that the key foreign policy problem for Ukraine remains Russia. But what is also becoming evident is that there are really two Russian policies toward Ukraine.

There is something we can call an imperial policy, in which Russia is not so much interested in subverting or breaking up individual ex-republics, but rather putting them in its geopolitical space - a Monroe Doctrine of sorts.

There is also increasingly loud ethnic Russian nationalism which is turning against Ukraine by invoking linguistic, racial, ethnic arguments. It is subversive of Ukraine's integrity and in some sense contradicts Russian imperial motives.

Clearly, the Russians themselves are confused about what it is that they want to achieve. They need to realize that Ukraine cannot be reduced to the post-Soviet or ex-imperial Russian space, for reasons such as its former connections to Poland, Romania, Hungary, Austria and Turkey. The destabilization of Ukraine would also unsettle much more than just Ukraine.

I would hope that the United States and other powers will see that Ukraine, with its many shortcomings, is in a special class. Let me conclude with a quotation from Chairman Mao: "A perfect bee is only a bee. A horse with many defects is still a horse."