Russia, NATO and Ukraine: a united, or disunited Europe? (06/15/97)

Russia, NATO and Ukraine: a united, or disunited Europe?

by Volodymyr Zviglyanich

CONCLUSION

What to expect

What can be expected from Russia? The following scenario presents itself:

Further elaboration of the position that NATO enlargement is fraught with the dangers of further division of Europe and destablization of European security.
Further insistence on using OSCE structures versus NATO.
Indefinite deferral of the second wave of enlargement, which would cause misgivings and uncertainty in a significant part of Europe. Deferral would create the feeling that the West is accepting a de facto new division of Europe into spheres of influence. This would have corrosive effects on NATO, America's position in NATO, and the cohesion of the alliance.
Insistence on a 10-year freeze on future enlargements, with the understanding that at no time and under no circumstances could the Baltic countries be considered as candidates for membership (although this stance implies tacit acceptance of membership for others, such as Slovenia and perhaps Romania).
A demonstrative Russian move on one of the Baltic countries - Estonia and Latvia would be the primary candidates._1_

Furthermore, it should be noted that if the alliance accepts four or five new members this year, it might be assumed in the Baltic capitals that a secret American-Russian agreement exists to effectively exclude them from NATO.

The dangers for Ukraine

The fear of being excluded from the architecture of the new European security system emerging in Europe after NATO expansion could also touch Ukraine. This fear could be reinforced with the possible admission of Slovenia and Romania into NATO - something that Helsinki Commission Chairman Sen. Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.) insisted on in remarks on May 13. Mr. D'Amato stressed that he supports the admission of the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Romania into NATO during the first round of enlargement.

Slovenia's route to NATO membership can serve as a model for other countries from the former Yugoslavia and for some former Soviet republics such as the Baltic states and Ukraine.

The Helsinki commission's co-chairman, Rep. Christopher Smith (R-N.J.), emphasized that "none of the candidates has come as far in such a brief period of time as Romania." He said: "Romania was among the first countries to join the PfP program, has actively participated in the NATO-led efforts in the former Yugoslavia. Romania continues its efforts to enhance civilian administration and oversight of the military, and has engaged in a number of successful joint exercises with the U.S. military."_2_

However, admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland and - possibly - of Romania and Slovenia, leaves Ukraine in a gray zone between Russia and an enlarged NATO. Russia at all costs will try to preserve its dominance over Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine turns into a test of not only Russian intentions, but the West's willingness to fill the post-Soviet security vacuum.

One could stress several possible dangers to Ukraine:

feeling of being isolated from the mainstream of European politics and the European security infrastructure;
failure to conduct a sweeping and profound military reform to meet the established standards of NATO accession, including its OSCE commitments;
avoidance of enhancing civilian administration and oversight of the military;
increasing economic dependence on Russia, especially in the sphere of energy supply and orientation of the Ukrainian market on Russia rather than Europe;
continuation of the border disputes with Russia, thus undermining prospects of joining NATO;
rise in political and regional tensions among Ukrainian political elites regarding Ukraine's admission into NATO;
increasing anti-Western sentiments among the population based on the feeling of being abandoned.

Who is to blame, what is to be done?

All these possible negative consequences of Ukraine's non-inclusion in the first tier of would-be NATO countries could seriously thwart Ukraine's political and economic reforms. Ukraine risks being turned into a Central European pariah-state with a stagnant economy, unclear prospects for democracy and rule of law, institutional corruption and bureaucratic oligarchies at the top. It was a strategic mistake of both the Western and Ukrainian political elites that Ukraine was not treated as a serious potential candidate for admission into NATO.

It was tacitly presumed that Ukraine's activities within the Partnership for Peace program and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia is enough to sustain its "separate" position from Russia. The major obstacle to treating Ukraine as a possible first-tier candidate was Russia's vehement objection to any former Soviet republic's admission into NATO.

The Western political establishment never wanted to undermine its relations with Moscow for the sake of its former satellites. The Ukrainian political establishment did not have enough stomach and political will to pursue the line of independence as seriously as did Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Instead, Kyiv always found excuses in the form of its non-bloc status, the "objective" unreadiness of the country to join NATO, lack of economic reforms, etc. Only recently, especially after Moscow's open territorial claims on Sevastopol and Crimea, did some representatives of the Ukrainian political elite (Leonid Kuchma, Hennadii Udovenko, Volodymyr Horbulin) begin to hint that Ukraine could revoke its non-bloc status and appeal for NATO membership. Mr. Horbulin even indicated the year 2010 as the possible date of Ukraine's joining NATO. However, another influential Ukrainian politician, a former prime minister and potential presidential candidate, Yevhen Marchuk, thinks that Ukraine's path to Europe (including NATO) lies through the development of its contacts with Russia._3_ It is clear, that contrary to some media reports,_4_ the Ukrainian political establishment lacks the coherence on joining NATO that was characteristic of neo-Communist Polish or Hungarian political elites.

What could be done?

The Ukrainian political establishment should eventually understand that non-bloc status now, after NATO enlargement, is detrimental to Ukraine's national security. Therefore, it should openly declare its desire to revoke this status and to become a full-fledged NATO member.
Ukraine should declare its desire to be among the second-tier of candidates for NATO members (e.g., Slovenia and Romania.)
Ukraine should concentrate on sweeping and profound military reform in full accordance with the requirements for admission into NATO.
A separate Ukraine-NATO charter should be seen only as a preliminary step to joining the alliance.

Ukraine's doctrine of a "strategic partnership" with the U.S. is based on adherence to common values and principles. Among these a very basic principle is the idea of NATO's enlargement as a pivotal point for the new united Europe after the Cold War. Therefore, Ukraine should not be the last to understand this idea.

Ibid., p. 4. [Back to Text]
House, Gov., Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, second hearing in a series on NATO enlargement, May 13. [Back to Text]
Yevhen Marchuk. Ukraina-Rosiya-NATO: Pozytsiya Dynamichnoyi Rivnovahy. Den, April 18. Mr. Marchuk even asserted that European integration for Ukraine "does not presuppose its enhanced membership in all and sundry European structures." [Back to Text]
See, for example, Igor Torbakov's statement: "Ukrainian officials openly hint that the strategic decision to join NATO has already been made and that what is now at issue is timing and political circumstance. The time does not yet seem to be ripe. Ukraine still depends on Russia for energy supplies. It has yet to achieve the economic progress that would make it immune to Russian political pressures." Igor Torbakov, "Ukraine: the Acid Test for NATO Expansion." The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, p. 19. [Back to Text]

Dr. Volodymyr Zviglyanich is a research fellow with The Jamestown Foundation.

PART I

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