NEWS ANALYSIS
Ukraine in the new Europe
by Dr. Roman Jakubow
OTTAWA - Karl Marx once said that "Men make their own history; but they do not make it just as they please." The same holds true for nations. Fate and will are inextricably linked. Circumstances and choices combine to produce results. That is why the subject Ukraine in the new Europe is an open question. We do not know the future shape of Europe. Even more uncertainty shrouds the prospects for Ukraine. Finally, the ultimate nature of the relationship between Ukraine and its European neighbors is very much a work in progress.
The old continent conjures up many images. Think of the Renaissance and Enlightment, British institutions, Roman law, Greek philosophy and Judeo-Christian values. But European experience also has a dark side. Its anarchical system of states generated many wars. In our tragic century alone, Europe spawned two world wars, fascism, communism, the Holocaust and the Cold War. In this century, too, Europe ceased to be the center of the world politics and became an object of contention between the two superpowers.
Today, none of the European states is strong enough to act as a major global actor. They are attempting to compensate for their weakness by creating a united Europe. Powerful forces are shaping this new Europe, two of the most important being enhanced economic integration and a redefinition of trans-Atlantic political and security partnership. The European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are the key institutions in dealing with the process of change. Both are adapting and both are enlarging.
Competition in the age of information is on a global scale. Wealth is power. One who has it is instructive. Of the world's output of 30 trillion or so American dollars, 80 percent is in the hands of 20 percent of the people. The rich regions [of the world] form a nearly evenly split triangle: North America (NAFTA), European Union (EU) and Asia, that is, Japan and the struggling "tiger." To be specific, 372 million people who live in the 15 countries of the European Union account for more than $8 trillion of output, or more than a quarter of the world's wealth.
On the political and security side, the two great European challenges of the contemporary period - the integration of a united Germany into the West and the relationship of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) to Russia - cannot be managed without North American involvement. Of course, the role of the United States is paramount. Its involvement prevents re-nationalization of security policies in Europe and enormously reduces pressures to acquire nuclear weapons. According to Henry Kissinger, it also creates global equilibrium which is necessary to manage either the resurgences or the disintegration of Russia, the two most threatening outcomes of the Soviet collapse.
The Alliance is in the process of enlarging - Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary having been invited in July 1997 in Madrid to join. A Permanent Joint Council (PJC) has been created to manage the NATO-Russia relationship. Of equal significance is the NATO-Ukraine Charter which provides a practical mechanism for further development of Ukraine's relations with the Alliance.
What will the future of Europe look like? Two of the possible visions, in my opinion, are not likely. I doubt that Europe will return to its fragmented past where fear and envy would again be stronger than the impulse to cooperate. Can you imagine a British observer ever again saying after an extended tour of Germany: "Every one of these new factory chimneys is a gun pointed at England?" His grandfather did.
I also doubt that Europe will soon unite into a single state. The idealist vision of Maastricht 1991, which foresaw common foreign, security, defense, economic and social policies, remains a distant goal.
The most likely Europe is an increasingly economically integrated Europe with a common currency. It will be a broader Europe with more members as well as more areas of "pooled sovereignty" and a greater sense of European identity. Not perhaps a very tidy arrangement. Yet, in spite of its modesty, this vision of an increasingly federated Europe promises a safer, richer and more hopeful continent.
Two conclusions follow - one specific and one general. First, if Ukraine wishes to have a chance of access and eventual inclusion in the European economic space, then structural reform of its economy along modern lines is a sine qua non condition. Second, more broadly, the new Europe would then be a Europe in which use and threat of use of force was not a means of resolving inter-state disputes. War and fear of war would cease to be the driving motor of politics among nations. In technical jargon, European Union would form "a pluralistic security community" - a group of states among whom war was unthinkable. Such a change in relations among developed states would represent a truly historical discontinuity.
Like me, you might prefer an image to words. I particularly like a metaphor that comes from a title of a book on geology "Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle" by Stephen Jay Gould. Does history resemble an arrow or a cycle? Is there a constant uni-directional change or do patterns recur in regular cycles? ...
If history resembles an arrow, then some changes are irreversible. What I am suggesting is that in the Western part of the European continent, we are likely to see time's arrow. In contrast, to the East, we are likely to see time's cycle. That is because there are many new states there and in the early phases of state-building process, traditional patterns of international politics are more likely. That does not mean that war is inevitable. Much depends on internal developments in each country. The West can also support peace and stability in that region by helping build appropriate institutions, habits and processes. That brings us to Ukraine. The views are my own. I am sure that they can be improved upon.
The rise of an independent Ukraine is one of the great events of this century. Geopolitically, it meant the end of the last empire in Europe. Russian power has receded from the center of the continent. Many nations have regained their freedom including, in a sense, Russia itself.
For the people who live on the land called Ukraine, freedom meant a momentous possibility to overcome their past, the possibility to start on a road where decent life and a respect for human dignity are real. Ukrainians paid an exceeding by high price for powerlessness. "Shliakhta," tsars and commissars exacted a terrible toll on ordinary people of Ukraine as well as on its best, most creative, sons and daughters. It is a tribute to the past generations that they had the spiritual faith and a monumental endurance to prevail.
I will touch lightly on the record of independent Ukraine. Much has happened since 1991. Judgement depends, in part, on expectations. The record is mixed. Politically, the peaceful transfer of presidential power, adoption of a Constitution and the process of political party formation are positive and significant steps along the road to modern governance.
In the area of foreign policy, the record is better. Ukraine is increasingly visible in the world as an independent and responsible actor. The relationship between Ukraine and Russia is now handled as an international problem subject to accepted rules of foreign policy. [Key events that] I would mention here are the trilateral nuclear accord of 1994, the comprehensive friendship treaty signed by Russian President Yeltsin in Kyiv on May 31, 1997, and the NATO-Ukraine charter issued in Madrid on July 9, 1997. Ukrainian security strategy, designed to keep all options open, indeed, to create new options, is effective.
The same cannot be said of (Ukraine's) economic strategy. The introduction of (the) hryvnia was professionally done. It shows that the capacity to do the right thing is there. However, it is not evident whether popular consensus and political will exist to do other real reforms in all sectors of the economy. Let me be clear: the task is Herculean. Its magnitude requires patience; it also requires a sober assessment of strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian society. (However) it is not an excuse for inaction. History will not excuse failure by the magnitude of the task.
In thinking of the future, I believe that much of Ukraine's potential is still there. People are hardworking, But, not surprisingly, they are not willing to be exploited by either the individuals or the state. Material resources exist. The level of education is high. Of vital significance is the domestic peace among the different ethnic groups. Equally important, the external context is favorable and provides conditions in which diplomacy and international law can operate.
Ukrainian weaknesses are rooted in the legacy of history, which has left strong, damaging marks. That legacy manifests itself in the political culture of the Ukrainians, key elements of which include weak integration of society (lack of unity), lack of trust and even animosity towards other citizens and an ideological method of thinking. The shackles are gone; the cobwebs remain.
Two factors (are) critical in shaping (the) future: the first is political, (the) capacity to govern the state; the second is economic modernization. These two key variables are not exclusive - remember the traditional term political economy - and they interact. Three broad scenarios can be envisaged.
The first, called a "defeated Ukraine" involves failure of the state: the young political system proves ineffective in coping with internal contradictions - regional, economic, ethnic, religious, social, etc. - and (with) external pressures. The cumulation of crises overwhelms both the elite and the population and they return to dependence. I believe that such a development would not come without internal turmoil and it would also torpedo Russia's chances to become a normal country.
On the other hand, if the state is reasonably effective in terms of the basics such as law, money, order, taxes and the army, then two possibilities arise depending on what is done about the economy. One scenario is called a "wounded Ukraine" and amounts to more or less the retention of antiquated economic relations; a stalemate between those nostalgic for the past and those hopeful for a better tomorrow; limited room for, and hostile attitude toward, private property and enterprise; a growing gap between those who monopolize economic levers and the rest of the population which is increasingly poor and resigned. Authoritarian temptation would loom large.
Another possibility involves good governance and successful economic modernization. I call this scenario "Ukraine of its dreams." This path would combine success in state-formation with a genuine revival of the society. Private ownership of the means of production combined with a fair distribution of profits would, at last, make (real) the possibility of a decent life for people of Ukraine.
What of the relationship between Ukraine and the new Europe?
A defeated Ukraine would result in a "cold peace" relationship between the new Europe and a resurgent imperial Russia, but without the fire of faith that animated the Soviets during the Cold War. A reconstructed Russian superpower is not the sort of Russia the rest of Europe wants next door.
A wounded Ukraine would result in a "velvet curtain" that descends across the continent to separate the rich from the poor. In a word, indifference rather than hostility would characterize the relationship.
A Ukraine of its dreams would ultimately result in a truly inclusive Europe. Ukraine would be a full member, a "citizen of Europe." confident of itself and making creative contributions to the wider community and the world.
I would like to leave you with three messages:
First, in the words of St. Augustine, "Justice is the foundation of the state." That is why Ukraine as a new state needs to reach a broad consensus on moral purpose and not only focus on formal authority, the monopoly to use force or sovereignty.
Second, no political system can in itself guarantee the growth and vitality of the state. Ultimately the quality of the people, particularly its leaders and officials, will determine the issue of strength and survival.
Third, and last, in searching for the way ahead, for the Ukraine of its dreams we might well reflect on the words of the Spanish proverb: "Traveler, there are no roads. Roads are made by walking."
Dr. Roman P. Jakubow is director of strategic analysis, National Defense Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada. The above text is excerpted from a presentation made on February 3 in Ottawa.
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, May 24, 1998, No. 21, Vol. LXVI
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