ANALYSIS: Agreements on Sevastopol and Ukrainian independence (03/14/99)

ANALYSIS

Agreements on Sevastopol and Ukrainian independence

by Volodymyr Zviglyanich

The fate of the "big treaty" between Russia and Ukraine, which was signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin after its ratification by the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian Duma, now depends on ratification by the Verkhovna Rada of three agreements on Sevastopol. That was the condition imposed on this treaty by Russia's Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov.

There is a great deal of probability that Ukraine's national deputies, especially after the notorious vote to join the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (IPA) of the CIS, will ratify these additional agreements. However, just a simple glance reveals how detrimental they will be to Ukraine's independence.

The agreements in question were signed on May 29, 1997, in Moscow by Ukraine's prime minister at the time, Pavlo Lazarenko, and his Russian counterpart, Viktor Chernomyrdin. According to these agreements, Ukraine should lease to the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) some 18,232 hectares of Crimean land with nearly 5,000 objects for the period of 20 years. The annual payment will be $97.75 million, i.e., 53 cents per square meter. It is highly probable, however, that Ukraine will not see this money, as it would go toward payment of an outstanding debt to Russia, which is reaching $2 billion.

Besides the Crimean land, the text of the agreements foresees the lease by Ukraine to Russia of the waterwarys of Sevastopol and Feodosiia bays, without mentioning payment. Neither does it foresee compensation for the huge ecological damage (some several hundred million dollars annually) caused by the BSF to Crimea.

The issue of the division of the BSF's ships also is far from clear. From 1992 to 1996 more than 263 ships of the BSF were decommissioned. The agreements on mutual payments between Russia and Ukraine presuppose that Russia will compensate Ukraine 50 percent of their cost, i.e., $5.5 million or only $42,000 per vessel. In comparison, Pakistan pays $2 million for the Ukrainian-made T-80UD tank. According to the documents signed in Moscow, each side gets 50 percent of 525 ships of the former Russian BSF. However, Ukraine then gives to Russia 117 vessels as payment for interstate credits. As the result of this "brotherly" division, Ukraine's navy appears to be one-third the size of Russia's.

Although the Russian vessels resemble scrap metal more than potent military units, according to Vice-Admiral Borys Kozhyn, the BSF is a well-organized structure, capable of provoking a conflict at any time in Crimea (Nezalezhnyi Pohliad, February 19).

The huge infrastructure of the Russian BSF in Crimea is a major source of employment on the peninsula. Russian admirals could demand that workers hold Russian citizenship due to security reasons. This will increase Russian influence on the peninsula along with the Russian right (also mentioned in the agreements) to participate actively in the social-economic development of Sevastopol. After the Verkhovna Rada ratifies these agreements Sevastopol will be transformed into a de facto Russian town, which could make separatist aspirations on the peninsula unstoppable.

The agreements presuppose that the "main base of the Russian BSF is situated in Sevastopol." On the one hand, this provision questions the Ukrainian status of the city. On the other, it contradicts Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which prohibits the deployment of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory. These agreements do not contain any reference to provisions of international law, or mention the possibility of addressing international organizations concerning property issues - the term "lease payment" does not even appear in the agreement.

According to the resolution on military units passed by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on of August 24, 1991, the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR became the property of Ukraine. The agreements in question de facto repeal this resolution and pave the way to thwarting Ukraine's independence.

Russian admirals, according to Vice-Admiral Kozhyn, want to replace old-fashioned SU-17 planes with modern SU-24s, which can carry nuclear warheads. Together with Russia's exploitation of stations of early-missile-warning system situated on Ukrainian soil, this can only bring Ukraine closer to Russia's armed forces.

Is this the way to strengthen national independence? What will be next: joining a customs union with Russia, becoming a full-fledged CIS member, or joining the Russia-Belarus Union?

Ukrainian relations with Russia, unfortunately, are far from that of "equals" - a status that is the declared desire of the Ukrainian establishment. In reality they do not even approach the state of a former metropolia's relation to its former colony, e.g., Great Britain and India. Russia obstinately does not, and will not, treat Ukraine as an independent state - no matter what treaties are concluded. It will refuse to acknowledge a full-fledged state border between the two countries, will continue its interference in Ukrainian internal affairs, as well its linguistic and cultural expansion.

The vote on joining the IPA-CIS was a litmus test for Parliament Chairman Oleksander Tkachenko, the mouthpiece of the Russia's "fifth column" in Ukraine, of the readiness of the national deputies to ratify documents much more significant for the adherents of "Slavic unity."

Never before in its short post-Soviet history has Ukraine been closer to losing its independence - mostly because of the steps that would follow the ratification of the agreements on the BSF.

Volodymyr Zviglyanich is an adjunct professor of East European area studies at George Washington University and a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation.

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