ANALYSIS: Can Putin move Russia beyond obstructionism (04/09/00)

ANALYSIS

Can Putin move Russia beyond obstructionism?

by Christopher Walker
RFE/RL Newsline

In Soviet times, the prevailing Communist concept of equality was based on the notion that it was fairer for all to fail than for one to prosper. As Russia has slid from the reform path and turned further inward over the course of the past half decade, it is reasonable to ask whether Vladimir Putin's Russia will rely on this old Soviet model or on one based upon cooperation and mutual advantage.

For Russia's immediate neighbors, the stakes are particularly high. And the Baltic countries are a case in point.

Indeed, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are among the most interested parties in the intense speculation over how Mr. Putin's ideological orientation and governing style will evolve now that he has won the presidential election. The Baltic countries want to anchor themselves in the West and intend to fulfill this goal by joining key Western institutions, namely the EU and NATO.

Over the past several years, Russia's stance toward the Baltics has been demonstrably uncooperative on a range of matters, including sensitive border disputes, as well as citizenship and language issues. Whether or not Mr. Putin believes there is a long-term benefit for Russia through cooperation with its three Baltic neighbors will determine if Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia realize their ambitions to join Western clubs according to their own timetable, rather than one controlled by Moscow.

In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, there was a period of cooperation, at times even characterized as a "partnership," between Russia and the West. But since the successes of Communist and nationalist forces in the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections, Russia has moved away from such cooperation.

In fact, the nature of Russia's obstructionism over the past several years can be seen to fall into two categories: one active, the other passive.

Active obstructionism was born of the failure of Western-style reforms to take root and the steady erosion of Russian living standards. Nationalists and Communists took advantage of a sour popular mood to slow down cooperation with the West on a number of fronts. While NATO's action in Kosovo clearly annoyed Russia, Moscow's increasingly uncooperative posture predated the NATO campaign.

But perhaps more troubling is the variant of Russian obstructionism that is passive in nature, resulting principally from political gridlock and administrative incompetence. Severely drained by Russia's financial collapse, institutional exhaustion and corruption, President Boris Yeltsin's administration was catatonic in its final years. Mr. Yeltsin himself was the clearest emblem of the overall moribund state. During this period, diplomats from neighboring countries routinely complained that they were unable to obtain decisions from Moscow or often simply could not locate an appropriate official in Moscow to answer their calls.

Russia's negative behavior manifested itself in other ways, including the conduct of military exercises with such provocative names as "Operation Comeback" on its borders with the Baltic countries or threatening to apply sanctions or otherwise isolate countries with which it disagreed. Russia has recognized that its poor relations with the Baltic states may be used as a tool to keep the Baltics from advancing toward western institutions.

Much of Mr. Putin's popularity is derived from the substantial support he enjoys as a result of the war in Chechnya and what is best described as the remilitarization of Russia. For the time being at least, it appears the campaign in Chechnya has served Mr. Putin's purpose, allowing him to garner considerable domestic political support, while simultaneously diverting attention from Russia's serious economic and social ills.

It remains to be seen whether the campaign in Chechnya will restore Russia's sense of prestige in the longer term. Should the campaign ultimately fail, Russia would find itself enfeebled to an even greater degree. Success achieved on the basis of abject brutality is similarly no source of comfort. Despite claims of President-elect Putin's ostensible administrative prowess, rigorous discipline and high energy levels, he may not be capable of modernizing Russia quickly enough to keep pace with the rest of the world.

And, at the same time, Russia may not be willing simply to watch its immediate neighbors in the Baltics advance and join the former Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe on the road to the West. Furthermore, Mr. Putin's stated intention of restoring Russia's strength and national prestige may not be consistent with integration into the community of nations and cooperation with Russia's neighbors.

Thus, if Moscow is unable to formulate a cooperative policy of its own - or otherwise come to terms with the fact that the Baltics and other states formerly under Moscow's domination will eventually join the West - Mr. Putin's Russia may end up playing the only role it believes that it can, namely that of a spoiler.

Christopher Walker is a New York-based analyst specializing in Eastern European affairs.

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