ANALYSIS: What to expect of Putin: a tightening of central control (04/16/00)

ANALYSIS

What to expect of Putin: a tightening of central control

by Julie A. Corwin
RFE/RL Newsline

As Russia and the rest of the world waits for President-elect Vladimir Putin to make some decisive policy moves, leaders in Russia's far-flung regions already know what to expect. During his three months as acting president, Mr. Putin initiated changes in how Moscow manages its relations with the periphery. And in a marked contrast to how he began his tenure at the helm of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Mr. Putin is making no assurances that a major overhaul will not occur.

Consider Mr. Putin's words at his first press conference when he took over as director of the FSB in 1998. He promised that "there will practically be no new approaches to work with the regions." He declared that control in the regions "will be strengthened but no extra tightening of the screws (zakruchivaniye gaek) will take place."

Before his FSB assignment, Mr. Putin headed the Kremlin's Control Department, where, among other things, he uncovered 9,000 cases in which federal money totaling some 3 trillion rubles ($104 billion U.S. at the current exchange rate) had been spent by the regions for purposes other than those intended. Mr. Putin's rise to power made regional leaders understandably nervous.

Now, as then, regional leaders' anxiety is almost palpable. Governors of all political stripes moved with breakneck speed to back Mr. Putin's presidential campaign and form their own branches of the Putin-backed Unity movement. Some even suggested that the presidential term be lengthened and the federation reformed into a smaller number of more manageable units. But rather than reassuring the fretful regional pubbahs, this time Mr. Putin started promising change from the very beginning.

Less than a month after taking over from former President Boris Yeltsin, Mr. Putin called for declaring a war against the "legal chaos" existing in regions where local laws often conflict with federal legislation. Later, he spoke about the need to place "all subjects of the Russian Federation in the same economic conditions vis-à-vis the federal center," noting that "several subjects have certain privileges that others do not." So far, Mr. Putin's only concession to maintaining the status quo was rejection of the idea of appointing - rather than electing - governors, as some regional heads had suggested. The president-elect noted that the Russian population has "gotten used to its right to influence who will be its leader."

But more important than Mr. Putin's words have been his actions and that of his government. One month after his appointment as acting president, Mr. Putin dismissed more than 20 presidential representatives to Russian regions, replacing them with his own appointees.

In the weeks that followed, the Justice Ministry announced the formation of a commission to check the compliance of regional laws with federal legislation; the Internal Affairs Ministry reorganized its structure, subordinating all of its regional criminal police units to Moscow headquarters; the Finance Ministry announced stricter controls over regional finances; and the Tax Ministry announced expansion of its project to maximize information about the regions' tax-paying capabilities.

And, the week before last, German Gref, the head of the Center for Strategic Research, the think-tank charged with drafting Mr. Putin's economic program, told reporters that the relationship between the federal government and regional governors will be revised.

What all these diverse policies have in common is a tightening of control by the center over the regions. And it may be reasonable to assume that in the future President Putin will seek to maximize control by supporting those regional heads who not only express loyalty but can themselves control outcomes on their territories and deliver on their promises to the center. Those leaders who did not get the vote out for Mr. Putin in presidential elections may find themselves in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis Moscow.

One example might be Primorskii Krai, where Yevgenii Nazdratenko was one of the first governors to support Unity. There, Mr. Putin barely scraped a victory with some 40.08 percent of the vote, compared with Communist Party leader Gennadii Zyuganov's 36.36 percent. Similarly, in Buryatia, Mr. Putin also performed poorly next to Mr. Zyuganov, 41.96 percent versus 40.53 percent. This occurred. despite the fact that three vice prime ministers in the republic's government took three-month vacations so that they could head the local election headquarters for Mr. Putin.

Since Mr. Putin has rejected the notion of appointing governors, he may have to rely on less obvious means of controlling regional leaders. Viedomosti suggested last month that new legal measures being introduced to tighten federal control over regional finances may make regional leaders "docile" without the necessity of more overt administrative measures. After all, only a handful of Russia's 89 regions contribute more in revenue to the center than they get in return. But previous attempts at recentralizing Russia have generally failed - stymied in part by the sheer size of the federation. Mr. Putin may have one advantage that his predecessors since Stalin lacked: fear.

Mr. Putin's conduct of policy in Chechnya and in the presidential elections suggests he has a tendency toward "overkill" and is uncomfortable leaving anything to chance. In 1998, when Kalmykia's President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov challenged the then-weak Yeltsin leadership by announcing that his republic considered itself outside of the federation and would no longer transfer its federal taxes, Moscow responded harshly, dismissing its federal treasury official there and suspending all aid. What is the likelihood that Mr. Ilyumzhinov or one of his peers will risk making even a less dramatic statement and discovering President Putin's reaction?

Julie A. Corwin is an RFE/RL Newsline staffer based in Prague.

| Home Page |