FACES AND PLACES
by Myron B. Kuropas
Putin's Third Rome
Moscow is undergoing a revitalization campaign. It's not a religious revival, although there are hints of that. Nor is it an economic or a political renewal, despite some cosmetic changes. The recovery that is taking place is religio-cultural and what is being restored is the vision of Moscow as history's Third Rome.
The concept of Moscow as the Third Rome is centuries old. It was first articulated by Filofei, a Russian monk, in a letter to Tsar Ivan III, soon after the fall of Constantinople (the Second Rome) to the Turks in 1453. "Take note, O religious and gracious czar," wrote the monk, "that all Christian kingdoms are merged into thine alone, that two Romes have fallen, but the third stands and there will be no fourth." This doctrine soon became a significant pillar upon which the Muscovite state was solidified and later expanded.
Two other doctrines characterized the Muscovite state: autocracy and "narodnichestvo." Autocracy was the principle of absolute supremacy of the tsar whose comsummate powers were divine. Even the Church was subservient. Narodnichestvo was a kind of deified version of the Russian people, the messianic soul of Holy Russia, the "narod" (the people) steadfastly loyal to tsar and patriarch.
Although open fidelity to the Orthodox faith disappeared during Soviet times, the three tenets of the Russian state remained. "Instead of the Third Rome in Russia, the Third International was achieved and many of the features of the Third Rome pass over to the Third International," wrote Russian philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev in 1948. "The Third International is also a consecrated realm, and it is also founded on an orthodox faith." Under the Soviets, the messianism of the narod was transferred to the proletariat, vanguard of Marxism/Leninism.
During the 1920s and 1930s, religion was ruthlessly persecuted by Lenin and his heirs. The first significant change came during the second world war. When it appeared that Soviet citizens were less than enthusiastic to fight and die for Stalinism, the Russian patriarch was called in to broadcast a message urging Soviets to fight for "Holy Russia."
"The modern history of the role of religion in Soviet foreign policy began on April 10, 1945," writes William C. Fletcher in his book "Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-1970" (1973). "On that date Stalin, together with Molotov, was visited by the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church ..." From then on the Russian Orthodox Church was once again a willing vehicle of Russian imperialism.
Controlled by the NKVD and later the KGB (most ROC clergy were KGB agents), the plan from the beginning was to secure ROC hegemony over all Orthodox Churches within the Soviet occupation zone. The plan succeeded. By 1950 "the Moscow Patriarchate emerged as the unquestioned leader of Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe," writes Dr. Fletcher. Especially close relations were established with Orthodox Church leaders in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Poland and Moldova.
During Khrushchev's time, atheistic violence returned to plague all religious denominations in the USSR. The foreign policy role of the ROC, however, continued. The ROC was welcomed into the left-leaning World Council of Churches (WCC). The WCC adopted all intiatives, proclamations and denunciations of the West drafted by the KGB. Whether it was "peaceful coexistence," "colonial oppression," "wars of national liberation," missile testing or any other Cold War issue, it was usually the motives of the United States rather than the USSR that were questioned by the WCC.
Today, Russia is ruled by Vladimir Putin, and the Third Rome ideal has been reborn. Autocracy has returned. Elections have been stolen; Russia has been divided into seven "okrugs" (regions) under the direct control of the president; an independent press has all but disappeared; political murders are never solved; plans are under way to draft a new Russian Constitution predicated on greater presidential control; independent-minded scholars and intellectuals are being arrested; the government has clamped down on international scientific cooperation; and Chekists have been feted during a gala anniversary celebration of the Russian secret police. Mr. Putin later declared that no government, let alone his, could survive without secret agents.
In an essay published in December 1999, President Putin made it clear that Russia would never become another United States or Great Britian, "where liberal values have deep historic roots. Our state institutions and structures have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people. For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly to be gotten rid of - it is a source of order and the driving force of any change."
Narodnichestvo also is making a comeback. Ultra-nationalists such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn are wooed by Mr. Putin. New histories of the Cold War are published suggesting, once again, that it was American imperialistic aims after World War II that led to the Cold War. Adopting the melody to the Soviet anthem for the Russian national anthem is a not-so-subtle attempt to emphasize the continuity of Russian history and its greatness.
The ROC is once again under government control. In a special Easter message last April, Mr. Putin noted that "the Orthodox Church has played a special role in the history of Russia, in the establishment and consolidation of the state." A 1997 law recognizes Orthodoxy as the only Russian religion worthy of the name; other "non-traditional" faith expressions have been relegated to second-class status. Russian Orthodox publications regularly warn readers of American imperialist aggression and the dangers of globalization.
Mr. Putin is using the Russian Orthodox Church to bring Ukraine back into Moscow's fold. During a recent meeting Presidents Kuchma and Putin both stressed the importance of Orthodoxy in the march toward Slavic unity. Bishop Ippolit of the ROC in Ukraine speaks of a "common Russian self-awareness" in which Great, Little and White Russia constitute "Holy Russia," while another ROC agent meets with President Kuchma, calling for the unification of all Orthodox groups in Ukraine.
Is the Russian Orthodox Church Russia's Trojan horse in Ukraine? If the past is to be our guide, the answer has to be "yes."
Myron Kuropas' e-mail address is: mbkuropas@compuserve.com.
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, August 5, 2001, No. 31, Vol. LXIX
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