Scholars offer assessments of papal visit to Ukraine

The Rev. Dr. Peter Galadza


This is the second in a series providing a scholarly assessment of Pope John Paul II's visit to Ukraine on June 23-27. Scholars with expertise on the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the religious situation in Ukraine and relations among the Vatican, the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Russian Orthodox Church were asked to comment on the relevance, immediate consequences and potential impact of the pope's visit on Ukraine and throughout the region. The series was prepared by Ika Koznarska Casanova.


THE REV. DR. PETER GALADZA is Kule Family Professor of Liturgy at the Sheptytsky Institute of Eastern Christian Studies, St. Paul University, Ottawa, and editor of Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies. Last year he served as dean at the Lviv Theological Academy. He is the first Ukrainian Catholic to be appointed to the North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Dialogue sponsored by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Standing Conference of Orthodox Bishops of America. During the papal visit, he served as commentator for the live coverage provided by EWTN (Eternal Word Television Network) in Birmingham, Ala.


Q: Would you please offer a general assessment of Pope John Paul II's visit to Ukraine?

A: Only superlatives are in order, and keep in mind that I am not prone to flights of papal triumphalism.

To begin with, the visit was a manifestation of gospel truth. Forgiveness, prayerfulness, child-like joy - these radiated during those five historic days. And it came at the right time. Many had been hoping for this visit since 1991 and yet it was precisely now, when post-independence euphoria has entirely waned, that Ukraine needed this event most.

Nor was it about providing people with an escapist reprieve from misery. For all their hype, visits like this have profound substance, that derive from the gestures, words and attitudes of the one whom former Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev once hailed as the world's greatest moral authority.

Second, the visit put the nails in the coffin of Ostpolitik. John Paul II had always detested that policy of appeasement and he patiently (as biographer of his points out, referring to one of his character traits) worked to dismantle it.

The visit didn't occur sooner, however, because the pope is also a sincere ecumenist. Whatever we might think of the Church headed by Metropolitan Volodymyr Sabodan (and ultimately by Patriarch Aleksei), the pope, quite rightly, believed that every possible avenue should be explored to gain the participation of the UOC-MP. In the West, we understandably tend to dismiss this Church. But it commands the allegiance of millions, and in this case there is some difference between its leadership and laity. The patience paid off, even if Metropolitan Volodymyr didn't come around, because it demonstrated the pope's good will.

Finally, trips like this are always significant because of the entourage that follows the pope. These are the people who will be developing and implementing Vatican policy. Just three examples: the Vatican's chief ecumenist, Cardinal Walter Kasper, a rising star in world Catholicism, spent significant time at the Lviv Theological Academy observing the UGCC's best and brightest at work. The new prefect of the Oriental Congregation, Cardinal Ignace Daoud, not to mention Cardinal Angelo Sodano, the secretary of state, also had a chance to see first hand the vigor of a Church whose matters they are called upon to adjudicate.

Q: How do you think Pope John Paul II's visit will affect the religious situation in Ukraine, particularly the relationship between the four Ukrainian Churches - Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UGCC), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate(UOC-KP), the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church (UOAC), and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)?

A: Certainly the UOC-KP and UOAC have been drawn closer to each other and to the UGCC. Patriarch Filaret of the UOC-KP delivered an impeccably crafted speech during the meeting of the Council of Church and Religious Organizations, sketching a vision of Ukrainian Christianity's openness to other faiths and its need to confront the challenges of modern agnosticism and moral decline. The visit galvanized those Churches committed (at least ostensibly) to such a vision.

However, even the UOC-MP may be structurally impacted by this visit in a positive way. Note that after the pope's visit, at the conclusion of a meeting in Zurich where rapprochement among Ukraine's Orthodox was the topic, the Moscow Patriarchate's chief external affairs officer, Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk, extended an olive branch, praising the delegate-bishops of the UOC-KP and UOAC for their sincere love for the Church. The human sciences speak of "mimetic desire" as a powerful motivator. The Moscow Patriarchate may be motivated to allow its affiliate in Ukraine to emulate the stress on unity so characteristic of Catholicism.

I have always believed that "constructive competition" is a good thing in Christianity - provided polemics are avoided. (Would Petro Mohyla's educational revival have taken place without the challenge of the Jesuits?) Consequently, even those Orthodox inimical to Rome may decide that Orthodoxy in Ukraine must unite. When that happens it will be much easier for Greek-Catholics to speak of their re-integration into a single Kyivan Church.

Q: Pope John Paul II's visit to various countries, e.g., Poland and throughout Latin America, often had far-reaching effects beyond the religious sphere. Could the pope's visit have a similar positive impact on Ukrainian civic and political development?

A: Notwithstanding my response to the first question, comparing the trip to Ukraine with those to Poland or Latin America would be fallacious: the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are not Catholic. Symbolic interactionism suggests that for a symbol to work people must have bonded with it.

For Catholics in western Ukraine, where "Rome" is more deeply embedded in popular consciousness, the visit may become the catalyst for gestures of civic reform, etc., but throughout the rest of the country the visit has only planted seeds. Of course, this too is important, but anticipating an immanent social re-birth would be unrealistic.

Q: How will the visit and the beatification of martyrs for the Church serve the further growth of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, strengthen its identity in western Ukraine and its possible expansion beyond western Ukraine?

A: One may suggest that as a priest I am expected to stress this, but for me the importance of the beatifications is symbolized by the fact that the only time I began to tear up during the coverage of the visit was when, at the climax of the beatifications, the UGCC Seminary Choir of Rudno chanted the All-Saints troparion sung throughout the year, but now applied to these heroes of our homeland. Knowing that a near contemporary, and "one of your own" has endured unimaginable hardships with peace, joy and charity makes sanctity come alive. In the age of the anti-hero, people desperately need these models of holy triumph.

Note the high number of married priests beatified, clerics who suffered in Siberia with their wives and children. For us married clergy and our families, their witness challenges us to begin living with real evangelical detachment and apostolic zeal. The beatified monastics spur our monks and nuns to return to the real (and collective) poverty mandated by their vows. Even a cantor (Volodymyr Pryjma) was beatified. An example of how this is already leaving its mark is that at the Sheptytsky Institute in Ottawa we are hoping to inaugurate a summer cantors training program under his patronage.

Finally, the beatification of a non-Ukrainian, Leonid Fedorov, whose process was actually initiated by Metropolitan Sheptytsky in 1935, indicates that "Ukrainian Catholic Church" does not mean "Catholic Church for Ukrainians." Back in 1901 Sheptytsky stressed that such an ecclesiology is heretical: Christ did not die to re-enforce the divisions among peoples.

In sum, the beatifications will have the "intangibly tangible" effect of providing holy substance for that unique human function, imagination. And this will do far more to strengthen the UGCC's "identity" than many of the initiatives undertaken by our parishes whose goal frequently becomes worldly self-promotion.

Q: Why do you think conditions are not yet favorable for the beatification of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky?

A: Having written my Ph.D. dissertation on Metropolitan Sheptytsky and worked in his archives, I hope I can be trusted when I say that I have no doubt whatsoever about his sanctity. However, the "conditions" you mention relate to a phrase found in his public statement of July 1, 1941, in which he welcomed "the victorious German army" upon its occupation of Ukraine (and its rout of the Soviets). Anyone who knows the vicissitudes of Ukrainian history, not to mention Metropolitan Sheptytsky's outstanding biography (he sheltered hundreds of Jews from the Nazis) and in general his change of stance towards the Germans, will view this mistake in context. (Keep in mind, that a beatification or canonization is not a proclamation that a person never erred, but that their life or aspects thereof are generally worthy of emulation).

However, most non-Ukrainians do not appreciate the aforementioned vicissitudes or the otherwise heroic dimension of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's life. A Vatican, which since the 1960s has had to fight a public relations battle regarding alleged papal complicity in the Holocaust (recall the recent best-selle00r, "Hitler's Pope") is understandably cautious about the "optics." In one sense, the onus is on us Ukrainian Catholics to contextualize that statement of July 1941 for non-Ukrainians, but as anyone who has ever done Ukrainian anti-defamation work realizes, that is no mean task. We could publish hundreds of books on the topic, but without Hollywood it won't change much. But Metropolitan Sheptytsky will have his day, and the wait makes him even more symbolic of Ukraine's tragedies and triumphs.

Q: It has been announced that Pope John Paul II will visit Kazakstan, and it is assumed that he would like to visit other countries that were once part of the Soviet Union, i.e., Armenia, Belarus and, ultimately, Russia. How do you view the possibilities of these visits? Has the visit to Ukraine facilitated such subsequent visits or has it created difficulties?

A: You will notice that after the trip to Ukraine, polls showed a dramatic rise in the number of Russians favoring a papal visit. Nonetheless, President [Vladimir] Putin's ability to pressure Patriarch Alexei is not infinite, and I do not expect the latter to change his attitude. From a human point of view, his age gives him the advantage over John Paul II, and the next pope might not be as interested in the former Soviet bloc, or worse yet, might decide that some form of "appeasement" towards the Moscow Patriarchate is appropriate.

As for Belarus, as your readers know, whither Moscow, thither Minsk. I say this in spite of the optimism of Minsk's Cardinal Kazimierz Swiatek, who recently stated that Patriarch Aleksei's veto may not be headed.

Regarding Armenia, the death last year of Karekin I, the Oxford-trained Catholicos, simply slowed the planning for such a visit, but the pope is scheduled to join celebrations marking the 1,700 anniversary of Armenian Christianity in September. And, of course, he will also be visiting Kazakstan, where, according to the Encyclopedia of the Ukrainian Diaspora, 800,000 Ukrainians live.

Q: What is your assessment of the coverage of Pope John Paul II's visit to Ukraine by the Western press and media?

A: In terms of overall volume, I am told that it was disappointing. Raymond Arroyo, the anchor at EWTN News, who has covered dozens of papal visits, told me that after the first two days the secular press coverage began to evaporate, at least as compared with other visits. Considering that this trip was initially described as being as difficult as the ones to Cuba and the Holy Land, one would have expected more.

In essence, once the media realized that there wouldn't be violence or embarrassing incidents, they lost interest. In one sense, the Moscow Patriarchate did the Vatican a favor, because as long as it was denouncing the trip, the media remained interested.

Returning to the defamation theme, note that in an attempt to regain attention on the last day of the trip, London's Independent ran a story with the headline "Pope Beatifies Priest with Nazi Links." The story actually made no reference to any "beatified Nazis" (it could not have, as there were none) but instead ran a phrase from Metropolitan Sheptytsky's July 1941 statement. The headline editor had not bothered to read his own reporter's copy - or purposely twisted it.

Naturally the Catholic media did a far better job, and anyone reading Catholic News Service reports, The Tablet, or the National Catholic Reporter, for example, realizes that the days of gross ignorance regarding the UGCC and Ukraine are gone. We have a Polish pope to thank for contributing to that process.


Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, August 12, 2001, No. 32, Vol. LXIX


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