ANALYSIS: Russian presence in former Soviet republics declines (08/26/01)

ANALYSIS

Russian presence in former Soviet republics declines

by Paul Goble
RFE/RL Newsline

The number of ethnic Russians in the 11 former non-Russian Soviet republics and the Baltic states has declined from 24.8 million in 1989 to fewer than 19 million today - an absolute decline that has reduced their percentage of the population in every one of these countries.

That trend reflects the more general Russian demographic collapse, as well as the assimilation and outmigration from these countries to the Russian Federation. And it seems certain both to continue and to have important consequences for these countries and their relationships with Moscow.

A recent article published in Nezavisimaya gazeta surveyed census results from six of these countries (Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Estonia, and Turkmenistan), as well as population estimates prepared by the governments of the other countries in the region. And it reported on the number of ethnic Russians found in all these countries in 1989 by the last Soviet census and the number reported in more recent censuses and in estimates for 1999.

In the Baltic region, there were 474,800 ethnic Russians in Estonia in 1989 and 353,000 a decade later. In Latvia, the equivalent figures were 905,500 and 710,00; and in Lithuania, the numbers were 344,500 in 1989 and 280,000 in 1999.

There were 1,342,100 ethnic Russians in Belarus in 1989, and 1,141,700 there in 1999. In Ukraine, the numbers were 11,355,600 and 9,100,000; and in Moldova, the figures were 562,100 and 501,000 respectively.

In the southern Caucasus, there were 51,600 ethnic Russians in Armenia in 1989 and 8,000 there a decade later. In Azerbaijan the equivalent numbers were 392,300 and 141,700; in Georgia, 341,200 and 140,000. As for Central Asia, there were 6,062,000 ethnic Russians in Kazakstan in 1989 and 4,479,600 a decade later. In Kyrgyzstan, the figures were 916,600 and 603,200; in Tajikistan, 388,500 and 145,000; in Turkmenistan 333,900 and 240,000; and in Uzbekistan, 1,653,500 and 1,150,000.

According to the Moscow newspaper, the current situation is even more "catastrophic" with respect to the overall number of ethnic Russians and their number in each of the countries involved. But even these figures for the 1989-1999 period point to three important conclusions:

First, the absolute number and percentage of Russians in the population are declining in every country. On the one hand, this pattern resembles the end of empire elsewhere and the almost inevitable sorting out of populations that takes place when an empire dies. But on the other hand, it calls into question the assertions of some Russians and others about the supposed special nature of the territory of the former Soviet Union and the future role of Russia and Russians in these countries.
Second, the numbers suggest that ethnic Russians are leaving those countries which face the greatest amount of social instability and even open conflict rather than those about whom Moscow has complained most regularly. Russians are not "fleeing" from what Russian officials often describe as "oppressive" government actions in Estonia and Latvia at greater rates than from "fraternal" countries like Ukraine, Armenia, or even Belarus. Instead, individual ethnic Russians appear to be making choices on the basis of economic opportunity and cultural affinity rather than on the basis of the Kremlin's political calculations.
Third, the declining number and percentage of ethnic Russians in these countries mean that Russians seem certain over the coming years to play a smaller role in the social, economic, and political lives of these countries and that Moscow may not be able to count on a stratum of ethnic Russians who will for cultural and other reasons be especially prepared to advance the interests of the Russian Federation.

Whatever their current difficulties, these countries are likely as a result of this demographic shift to become ever more the expression of the dominant nationality in them rather than of a survival of the past Soviet mindset.

In some of them, that may lead to a new nationalism and heightened ethnic tensions, but in others, the exit from the scene of the ethnic Russian community may reduce ethnic tensions and open the way to a more genuinely civil society.

But perhaps the most important consequence of this demographic trend is likely to be felt not in these 14 countries but in Russia itself. Many Russians, themselves facing a demographic decline widely predicted to reduce the population of their country by more than a third over the next half century, may view the decline in the numbers of Russians in neighboring states as a harbinger of things to come, a development that could help power Russian nationalist or perhaps Eurasianist parties in the future.

At the very least, they are likely to see this trend as reducing still further Russia's role in the world, even if Moscow continues to promote the return of ethnic Russians from these countries to address economic needs in the Russian Federation.

And the Russian government itself almost certainly will have to revise its approach to these countries as a result. In some cases, that may lead Moscow to step up criticism of the governments involved, just as it has done of late with regard to the treatment of ethnic Russians in Ukraine. But in others, it may mean that the Russian authorities will be forced to deal with these countries ever more as countries rather than as remnants of a former Russian empire.

In that event, this demographic development will certainly have fateful consequences even if, as always, demography is not destiny except in the very long run.

Paul Goble is the publisher of RFE/RL Newsline.

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