THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE
INTERVIEW: An academic and professional viewpoint of Ukraine
by Andrew Nynka
The 10th anniversary of Ukrainian independence has given us an opportunity to evaluate Ukraine's first independent decade. Below is the second part of a three-part series of interviews with academics and professionals on the topic of Ukraine's progress toward building an independent and democratic state and nation.
DR. ROMAN SZPORLUK is M.S. Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History and Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University. His most recent publication is "Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union" (Stanford: Hoover Press, 2000)
Q: How do you view the attainment of Ukrainian independence in the context of Ukrainian history?
A: We need to remember, first of all, that founding, creating and maintaining a state is a very tough job - a very difficult operation. The ability of a given nation to win and retain independence depends on whether the people of that nation themselves want to fight for it and achieve it. It also depends on historical circumstances that are beyond the control of a given nation. I feel that the Ukrainian declaration of independence, the referendum and the fact that Ukraine has survived as an independent state for ten years is an extraordinary accomplishment - an extraordinary achievement in itself.
Anybody who looks back at Ukrainian history should ask himself or herself when the last time was that a Ukrainian state existed uninterruptedly for ten years with borders embracing, basically, all of the lands where Ukrainians lived. They should try to recall the last time when a Ukrainian state was at peace with all of its neighbors and had no civil war and no class conflict within. I don't think it would be very easy for anyone to quote an example from the past in the last three or four hundred years when this was the case.
Regardless of other circumstances, the very job of creating a new state is an extremely difficult one, whether it was a state created after W.W.I or W.W.II, or in Africa or Asia. From this point of view, considering under what terrible conditions the Ukrainian people have lived for generations, I think that the creation of Ukraine in 1991 as an independent state and its survival up to now is a monumental accomplishment with few precedents in Ukrainian history.
Q: In the context of Eastern European history, how would you rate Ukraine's progress since gaining independence?
A: When I look at 1991 and the ten years since, I first try to compare that period to the way Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union looked ten years after the first world war. Let's start with 1921 when hostilities finally ended, the Soviet civil war ended, the revolution ended and the peace treaty was signed between Poland, Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia.
How did Eastern Europe, Ukraine, the USSR and Poland look in 1931? They were ten years from the end of hostilities and revolution. You will discover that most of the countries in Eastern Europe were no longer democratic, if they ever had been, but were dictatorships. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania are examples. The Baltic states were not exactly democratic. Even Poland had a coup d'etat in 1926, and around 1931 it was already quite an authoritarian country. In the Soviet Union, ten years after 1921, in the early thirties, you had collectivization underway and a turn to mass terror. It was shortly after political trials of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and the economic situation was pretty bad.
Second, I look at Ukraine in comparison to other Eastern European countries in the last ten or so years. We see that the other post-Soviet republics have not always done very well and, in fact, in many cases have done very badly. In this light, when you compare Ukraine with Georgia, Armenia, Moldavia, and Yugoslavia and its successors, as well as with the situation in Eastern Europe ten years after the first world war, you see a remarkable achievement. Ukraine has survived and has avoided internal conflict between different regions, ethnic groups and religious groups, and has also avoided conflict with its neighbors. In fact, one of the great achievements, in my opinion, an achievement on a truly historical and monumental scale, is the presence of good relations with Poland.
Q: Is it fair to say that the overall expectations for Ukraine were low immediately after independence?
A: That is absolutely true. One of the leading American experts on Soviet policy said: "Compared with what will happen in Ukraine, Yugoslavia will look like a picnic." If you think about it, you'll see there could have been fighting in Crimea and there could have been Russian intervention in the Donbass. I believe there could have been some very bloody events before or in 1991 in Lviv if certain people in the KGB and the Soviet army had wanted to provoke trouble by shooting at students or at Greek-Catholics when they were taking over some churches and bringing them back to their possession. There could have been another Kosovo, Bosnia or Macedonia. So compared with what people expected to happen in Ukraine the outcome was significantly more positive.
Q: Has this pessimistic view that foreign analysts have taken regarding Ukraine changed over the course of the last ten years?
A: I feel that Ukraine still has a negative image in many circles, a negative image which it does not fully deserve. Obviously some features of Ukraine today are in fact negative and deserve to be known, and of course one needs to fight in Ukraine and elsewhere against them. But I feel that in many ways some of those current opinions of Ukraine are undeservedly harsh, and I think one of the most important reasons for it is that people don't seem to be comparing Ukraine with other countries. If you compare Ukraine with Belarus, where the government seems to be systematically killing off activists of independent political groups, the contrast is quite clear. When I think about Russia I cannot forget the name of Galina Starovoitova, the great political activist, democrat and scholar. She was killed in St. Petersburg several years ago, and I don't hear anything about the people who are responsible for it.
Q: How has Ukrainian political leadership handled the new push for democratic reform since independence?
A: First of all, we have to remember that the people in charge of an independent Ukraine in 1991 were basically the people who represented the Soviet regime in Ukraine and, shall we say, converted themselves to the Ukrainian idea shortly before 1991 or even in the course of that year. They owed their careers in Kyiv to the fact that they were loyal servants of Moscow. It was quite an accomplishment for them to decide that from now on they would be serving Ukraine. What is very important here is that unlike the leaders of past communist countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic or Romania, people in charge of Ukraine at that time had to start taking lessons in Ukrainian. So they had to break with being Communist, and they had to learn to be Ukrainian.
In effect, Ukraine had a very tough job of moving toward independence and building a democratic, law abiding state with people in charge who were not very qualified, to put it delicately. And there was no alternative group to replace them. So from this point of view, to me as a historian, the fact that the leaders of the national democratic movement and the newly independent Ukrainian ex-Communists together managed to preserve the territorial integrity of Ukraine, to create a Ukrainian army, to create a Ukrainian diplomatic service and to build up embassies and consulates in many countries of the world was a great accomplishment.
Q: Many analysts have commented on the weakness of the political profession throughout Ukraine around the time of independence. Can you give some insight into where it currently stands?
A: I feel that one of the accomplishments of the past ten years of Ukrainian independence is the emergence of the new generation of politicians, administrators, government people, diplomats, military types, commentators on international affairs, analysts and other people of that sort. Ukraine has created an elite stratum of professionals who are of quite good quality, so far as I can tell, who can now address those questions of security, disarmament, international relations, trade and fighting international crime. In this sense, I think Ukraine has a new generation, which I mean not only biologically. Some of the people of the older generation have won new qualifications, acquired new skills and learned new languages, and this is one of the most positive developments in Ukraine. It now has what you might call a political class.
Q: How do you see Western academia's efforts to include Ukraine in current scholarship?
A: I regard it as a very welcome phenomenon that there exists in the West a generation of young men and women, people usually under forty, some of them close to thirty, who are already specialists. They have become experts on Ukrainian arts, sociology, anthropology, demography, literature and media. These people are writing books on various topics in Ukrainian history, on contemporary Ukraine and on problems of regionalism in Ukraine. There are young men and women who can tell you very professionally about the conditions in the Donbass or the economic problems in Dnipropetrovsk. This is something new, and I see it as a very encouraging phenomenon. I think these people will also be increasingly heard when there is a situation in Ukraine that calls for their expert analysis and comment. We are now in the fortunate situation that you can meet young American, Canadian, French or British people who have actually worked for a year or two in Zaporizhia, Poltava or Odesa, and who know what they are talking about.
Q: In order for Ukraine to progress and move along the road of Western-oriented reform, what fundamental first steps will it need to take to create lasting, effective change?
A: The essential needs for Ukraine and its people are to build a progressive, civilized, civil society. Ukraine has built a state in ten years, but that state is very imperfect because the society is not strong enough and not independent enough to control that state. It is unable to watch over the politicians and to see to it that they do their job right. In order to do that you need to have grassroots democracy-building. It starts with various villages, towns, cities, groups, NGO's, student associations, farmers' groups, religious groups, etc. In order for a society to be successful, to be modern and to run well, people have to become organized. And that is the precondition. The coming decade, the decade that has already begun, should be a decade of organization at the grassroots level, and then at the regional and national levels.
In order to decide where to go, what to do domestically or where to go internationally, you need to have an informed public opinion. It is very important to organize institutions of communications - the media. Ukraine needs to have a high-quality press. It needs to have well-informed, responsible, honest journalists. It needs TV, radio, newspapers and magazines. And one of the responsibilities of that kind of media structure should be to intelligently present to the people, to the citizens, the alternatives.
So, to return to it, one of the shortcomings of present-day Ukraine is the insufficient development of public discourse in the media and in academia. And when I say media, I mean both TV and print media. I think Ukraine is still insufficiently developed to create a group of people who would be analysts and commentators, people who would inform society, who would present alternatives, who would encourage discussion.
Q: There seems to be an idea that the current level of corruption is worse now than it was in 1991. Is this something you agree with?
A: No. I don't agree with it, because I think all of this talk of corruption ignores the fact that the Soviet system was totally corrupt. You see, we sort of seem to think that people in power, people in government, were honest apparently until the time of Gorbachev. Perestroika and Glasnost came, and then the Soviet Union broke up, and people who were previously honest and decent suddenly became corrupt. The Soviet system itself was totally corrupt; it was a criminal system. Innocent people were being killed. Members of the elite of the nomenklatura enjoyed separate health care, had their own vacation palaces, and lived in villas, palaces and houses outside of town. They were exempt from the laws under which ordinary people lived; they lived in a world of their own.
Now, clearly corruption is currently a serious problem and has assumed new forms because we now have a new economic system - and there is more public knowledge of crimes being committed. It is obviously very dangerous and should be fought. In addition to better work by police and the courts, one of the ways to fight crime is for society to organize from below, to have an independent press, to have control, to have publicity for people to know who is doing what.
But the idea that Ukraine is somehow more corrupt than anybody else in the world reflects a tendency of some - certainly too many - Ukrainians to have a low national self-esteem. I think one of the things the Soviets accomplished was to make many Ukrainians think that somehow Ukraine is an inferior country, that Ukrainians are incapable of doing anything right if left to themselves. I regard this idea - that the Ukrainians are "born losers" and will mess things up if if they are let free, and that therefore it is imperative for Russia to take care of them and watch over them so that they behave - as one of the most pernicious psychological legacies of Soviet - and also tsarist - rule over Ukraine. While one should be very critical of one's country, and of one's own people, in cases when such criticism is justified, the tendency to characterize nations in sweeping terms, whether favorably or unfavorably, is dangerous. I am encouraged by the signs that especially the younger people regard it as a self-evident truth that Ukraine is - and should of course remain - an independent country. They are critical of lots of things they see around them; in most cases they are right. But it is possible for them to work for a better life and to believe that they will be able to succeed if they try hard enough, because they are able to draw on what has been accomplished by those who brought us August 24, 1991, and have kept the country going for ten years.
DR. DAVID MARPLES is a professor of history at the University of Alberta at the Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies (CIUS). His recent publications include "Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s," St. Martin's Press, Inc., November, 1992, and "Ukraine under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers' Revolt," St. Martin's Press, Inc., August, 1991.
Q: Ukraine has remained independent through its first decade and has established itself in the international arena. What must Ukraine now do in order to solidify its international presence and continue on the path of democratic reform?
A: The NGO's will certainly play a role. It's also important that Ukraine does not get too cut off from European structures, because Ukraine's ties with the West are critical for the future of democracy. On a positive note, Ukraine definitely has a national presence now. Nation-building is probably the area that has had the most success. So I don't see any possibility of Ukraine moving into some sort of union with Russia like Belarus has. The population is generally dissatisfied, but at the same time I don't believe it's dissatisfied with the fact that it's part of Ukraine as opposed to the Soviet Union or a part of some great block. By the same token, Russia is sort of waiting in the wings to see what happens in Ukraine without getting too involved, probably because Russia has some different priorities at the present time. In that respect, I think that if Ukraine could develop better contacts with the West, it could possibly aim, in 5 or 10 years, for associate membership in the European Union (EU). At the moment, Kuchma has given lip service to a lot of these changes without doing anything constructive, and the Europeans are quite upset with that and the more obvious infringements on human rights that have been taking place.
Q: Ukraine's future path is obviously uncertain, but its political leadership seems divided between moving back towards a union with Russia and Belarus; nationalism and the Yuschenko way; or a middle, "muddled way." Which road do you see Ukraine taking in the future?
A: In my mind only the third of those options is really practical. The first one won't happen, because, if it did happen, Ukraine wouldn't be Ukraine. All the nation-building in the past ten years would simply be dropped overnight, and I don't think that's going to happen. Too much has changed for Ukraine ever to go back. And even if it did go back, Russia has changed too, so it wouldn't be the same kind of relationship.
I don't think that the sort of gung-ho 'move towards Europe group' is ever going to be in the majority either or is going to have the same kind of power. Again, the difficulty is the geographical question. The main industrial zones are in the east, which is where most of the leftist force and influence are. As a resut, the power bases are most likely going to come from eastern Ukraine. I think it's fair to say that western Ukrainians are more oriented toward Europe. It's a great simplification, but, on the whole, that part of Ukraine is more market oriented and democracy oriented. That group lives in the area of Ukraine that's the poorest in terms of natural resources and industrial development, and therefore is never going to have quite the same influence unless there are massive population transfers between one part of the country and another. The best thing to hope for is some kind of compromise where groups that are pro-democracy will have to be much broader in outlook and try to incorporate significant factions from other areas and other groups.
Q: There was a point where, in the early 1990s, Europe realized that Ukraine would gain its independence. Was there any thought that Ukraine would not survive as an independent democracy?
A: There was a lot of speculation in the early 1990s that there would be all kinds of civil strife: problems in the Crimea, Russians wanting to break away, etc. That side of Ukrainian development has just not happened, and I don't really think that the potential was there for it to happen either. There were one or two lunatics in Crimea - one thinks back to Meshkov. But on the whole I don't think there are many sources of civil strife in Ukraine. That's one big advantage of Ukrainian society today compared to some of the other republics. Even though the Russians represent quite a large group in Ukraine, about a fifth of the population, they're fairly well assimilated. I don't think they look at things in terms of 'Russian,' with the possible exception of the Crimea, and certainly not in the Donbass region. I think that economic issues are the most important issue for Ukrainians.
Q: I think it's fair to say that Europe's perception of Ukraine in the early 1990's was fairly negative and pessimistic. Do you see Ukraine making any progress in changing that perception, and where do you see Ukraine's future roll in Europe?
A: The perception of Ukraine by Europe seems to have gone through a period of disillusionment. It was odd because in 1991 and 1992 it seemed to me that it was the United States that had the jaundiced view of Ukraine, and Europe had the optimistic one. Now it seems, at least until very recently, to have come full circle. The United States made a very conscious decision, under Clinton, to orient its foreign policy in that part of the world around Ukraine and really regard Russia as the main problem. This situation has changed quite a bit. The fact that Putin is in power is having an enormous impact, because it has taken a lot of pressure off of Ukraine. Some of that pressure is back now, because Putin is a figure of great power, but he is also a much more subtle type of leader. He wants to centralize Russia and make it the dominant force in the region. And I think it will put a certain amount of pressure on Ukraine and its difficult geostrategic position in between the two powers (the West and Russia).
Q: Do you see Europe, at any point in the future, recognizing Ukraine as a legitimate partner of Europe?
A: I don't think that it's impossible. Some of the countries that are getting into the EU or have the potential to get into the EU certainly have problems as big as Ukraine's. The disadvantage is the fact that Ukraine was a former member of the Soviet Union, and Europe is very wary of those powers. They're not ranked along the same level as Poland or the Czech Republic. Ukraine will have to change significantly to be in that position. I don't see the current government as ever really satisfying the Europeans. There is too much water that has gone under the bridge now. If Kuchma were to suddenly emerge as a democratic figure, it wouldn't be very convincing to many people. It would be seen as another political maneuver.
Q: Has corruption reached its highest point or will we see a cleaner, more transparent Ukrainian elite?
A: It could still get worse. Corruption and bureaucracy are worse now than ten years ago, and, in terms of the former Soviet republics, Ukraine is really up there with the best of them. Perhaps that was inevitable given the lack of a real, united opposition. I think the difficulty is that there is only one power group, and it is monopolizing political life. There need to be more. So if there is going to be a change, it is going to have to come through the existing institutions, especially the Parliament, which has been changing. About six months ago there was clearly a majority of non-communist support in the Parliament for the first time. But then it seemed to dissipate with the Gongadze scandal. The opposition would have to work through the Parliament and come up with some sort of unity on certain issues. Maybe they will have to infiltrate the left as well. I don't see the leftist groups as all anti-democratic, and I believe there are some people in the socialist party and other left-leaning parties that could be incorporated into a general unified movement.
Q: The average Ukrainian citizen seems to be disillusioned with politics and government. How do you see their role in Ukraine's political future?
A: The people seem to me to have less of a role than they had ten years ago. I think the government has really tried to restrict the public protest and public voice, especially throughout the media. This may lead to public discontent, but it may not. I think that the priority of the public right now is less with politics. Most of them seem to be sick of politics, because they can't differentiate between the political parties and groups and what they say. So I don't think that the role for the public looks very promising. I don't see them having much of a voice in decision-making at all.
Q: As a historian who has spent time dealing with the nuclear energy industry, can you comment on the issue of Chornobyl and the reactor's recent closing?
A: This was a very important and strong move made by Ukraine. But paradoxically, with the closure in Chornobyl, I think Ukraine has lost a little bit of its political clout with the West, because that was always an issue that Ukraine could bring up. "We will close Chornobyl if you provide us with sufficient aid, credits or whatever," Ukraine could say. I think that it had to be closed, but it's left quite a mess behind for Ukraine. How to monitor the station; what to do with Slavutych; and how to reorient the energy industry with the loss of the Chornobyl reactor, which was once the largest nuclear power station, are all problems.
Q: Even though the reactor has been shut down, there is still a lot of financial assistance required to deal with the far-reaching impact that the accident at Chornobyl had. Do you believe that Europe, the West or any of the aid-donating institutions will now feel their job has been done and will no longer feel the need to provide assistance?
A: I wouldn't say that they will go that far, but I do think that there will be a reduction in both aid and attention to problems created by Chornobyl. It is unfortunate, because the problems today are probably greater then they were fifteen years ago. And that's something that Ukraine is going to have to focus on and bring to the attention of the world in a different way. At the same time, nuclear power is still very important for Ukrainian energy. It would be in severe straights if all the nuclear power stations were suddenly closed down.
I don't think that the United States would stop aiding Ukraine, but I couldn't possibly predict what this current administration will do. I've tried to follow the events to see what direction it's taking, and I honestly can't tell. Although I don't think Ukraine will be forgotten, it is too important, on account of its position in Europe, to be neglected. That area - Poland, Ukraine and Belarus - is a very, very critical part of Europe, and I think it is likely to remain so.
PART II
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, August 26, 2001, No. 34, Vol. LXIX
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