ANALYSIS: Can expanded NATO defeat terrorism? (12/01/02)

ANALYSIS

Can expanded NATO defeat terrorism?

by Roman Kupchinsky
RFE/RL Newsline

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, augured a new era in international warfare. Since then, the United States has played a prominent role in taking aim at international terrorism, as opposed to concentrating simply on protecting itself and its allies from conventional and nuclear attacks. As NATO has just invited seven new states to join the alliance, this is an apposite moment to look back on the past year to see what role, if any, NATO has played so far in the war on terrorism and how that role could develop in the future.

NATO's response to the September 11 attacks was swift, as the heads of member-states vowed support for U.S. President George W. Bush. The day after the attacks, NATO invoked for the first time in its history Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which says that an attack against any member will be considered an attack on the entire alliance. This landmark decision was soon followed by a number of practical steps to help the United States in its counterattack against terrorism.

First, in response to a request from the United States, NATO agreed on October 4, 2001, to take certain measures to expand the alliance's ability to combat terrorism, including enhanced intelligence-sharing. Second, by October 26, 2001, sections of NATO's Standing Naval Forces had begun patrolling the eastern Mediterranean to monitor shipping there. Third, from mid-October 2001 through mid-May of this year, NATO aircraft flew more than 350 sorties protecting the United States. Finally, a new, closer relationship with Russia developed to bolster the effectiveness of the long-term struggle against terrorism. These new relations resulted in the formation of the NATO-Russia Council in May.

These were important measures, but the alliance has not really played a major role in the ensuing U.S.-led fight against terrorism. While 14 NATO allies participated in Operation Enduring Freedom, this was, nonetheless, a U.S. operation in which NATO did not have an official role. After all, aiming to strike quickly, Washington did not care to deal with political interference from its 18 allies. By bypassing NATO, the United States turned the invocation of Article 5 into little more than a symbolic gesture. Those allies that did send troops to Afghanistan surely did so with confidence in ultimate U.S. victory and few casualties.

The U.S.-led coalition drove the Taliban out of Afghanistan and, according to Jane's Intelligence Report of October 14, up to one-third of Al-Qaeda operatives in that country might have been killed. Nonetheless, subsequent events have shown that the war against terrorism is far from over. The recent attack on an oil tanker off the coast of Yemen and the bombing of a nightclub in Bali have shown that terrorist organizations - Al-Qaeda or others - still have the ability to take the offensive and strike blows against their enemies.

In a similar vein, CIA Director George Tenant told a congressional committee on October 17 that, "When you see the multiple attacks that you've seen occur around the world, from Bali to Kuwait; the number of failed attacks that have been attempted; [and] the various messages that have been issued by senior Al-Qaeda leaders, you must make the assumption that Al-Qaeda is in an execution phase and intends to strike us both here and overseas. That's unambiguous as far as I am concerned."

Since the war against terrorism is clearly not over, the question becomes: Is a new, improved and expanded NATO prepared for this type of warfare?

Traditionally, European NATO members have been reluctant to give the alliance a "global" conflict-resolution role. It was and should remain, in the eyes of many members, a purely North Atlantic alliance. Even given this perception, NATO can still play a role in the changing world of international security. There is no evidence to suggest that terrorists have abandoned European targets. Targeting will shift according to the political goals of the Al-Qaeda affiliate cells around the world. One week it could be a French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen, the next a nightclub in Bali, while the third could be anywhere, for example, the metro in Paris or London or a theater in Moscow.

In such instances, NATO could complement law enforcement and intelligence agencies, whose missions are more geared to fighting this type of war. By implementing greater intelligence-sharing with law enforcement agencies such as Interpol, Europol, the FBI and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police - provided these agencies are ready to use this information wisely and not engage in "turf" fights - NATO could play a key role meeting new security challenges.

By being flexible in their approach to counterterrorism and by avoiding the mistakes made by the United States that created "walls" between police and intelligence services, America's NATO allies can develop a program for counterterrorism warfare. Writing in the summer 2002 issue of the Washington Quarterly, U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar proposed that the Prague summit "ought to focus on developing a comprehensive plan for restructuring European military capabilities, a task which could extend to rethinking completely the current Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). ... More important now is the redirection of the capabilities initiative so as to create and harmonize counterterrorism and counter proliferation to serve both U.S. and European interests."

Following up on Sen. Lugar's views, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson told a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels on June 7 that the Prague meeting "will see the emergence of a modernized, updated North Atlantic Treaty Organization equipped to face new and daunting challenges."

His words were put in perspective by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who declared the same day that: "[Terrorism] is not theoretical. It's real. It's dangerous. If we do not prepare completely to counter it, we could well experience attacks in our countries that could make the events of September 11 seem modest by comparison."

As a military alliance, NATO should first and foremost remain such in order to fight local conflicts. As Philip Gordon, a former director for European affairs at the National Security Council, writes in the summer 2002 issue of the Brookings Review: "Even with all the right reforms, NATO will not again become the central defensive organization it was during the Cold War or even during the Balkan wars of the 1990s. ... It remains an essential tool with which the United States and its key allies can coordinate their militaries ... and quite possibly fight major military operations anywhere in the world."

An expanded version of NATO however, can only be as good as its component parts. This has been one of the major problems facing NATO prior to the Prague summit, where alliance leaders on November 21 formally invited Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria to join. The armed forces of these countries are not up to par with NATO standards. At best, many of the new members are seen as allies only in the political sphere, with little if anything to offer in military or intelligence-gathering terms. Yet, they also might be needed as NATO's mission undergoes changes commensurate with the demands of regional security.

One factor often mentioned in the development of NATO's anti-terrorism mission will be Russia's role. Writing in the International Herald Tribune on November 21, 2001, a group of respected foreign policy analysts from Russia, Britain and Germany concluded that: "For these 21st century challenges, NATO is inadequate, since it is by definition European-centered. A further enlargement of NATO to include Russia represents a serious option to enhance stability and would be far superior to an alliance of Russia with NATO, building on the present NATO-Russia Council. Such an arrangement leaves Russia in a no man's land as a semi-partner and semi-adversary."

Russia did contribute intelligence to the United States and provided other real assistance during the campaign in Afghanistan. Yet, many foreign policy watchers fear the price for this help - a free hand to pacify Chechnya - might be too high for the United States to pay. In any case, neither the operation in Afghanistan nor U.S. silence about Russia's behavior in Chechnya solved the problems they were intended to solve: namely the elimination of Al-Qaeda or the end of the Chechen separatist movement.

The experience gained by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies in combating such terrorist groups as Al-Qaeda indicates that massive military retaliation is not enough to destroy these groups. Some terrorists might be killed, but enough will survive to fight another day. So it remains to be seen how NATO will "update" itself to counter the possible threat of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. However, most analysts agree this will not be a simple task. It is also difficult to predict if the North Atlantic alliance, even in its expanded and reformed version, will be capable of conducting the ruthless warfare many believe is the only way to root out terrorism.

Roman Kupchinsky is the editor of RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch.

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