INTERVIEW: Adrian Karatnycky speaks on Ukraine's internal and foreign affairs

by Yuri Shevchuk

CAMBRIDGE, Mass. - The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute has over many years provided a forum for people directly involved in Ukraine's home and foreign policy, as well as outside experts whose analyses help illuminate the often hidden mechanisms that define it. The number of such discussions peaks in the summer when they occur as part of the Harvard Ukrainian Summer Institute program of special events.

This past summer the program was opened, on July 9, by Adrian Karatnycky, an expert whose knowledge of Ukraine, whose pro-active involvement in the support of human rights and democracy in the countries of the former Communist bloc, and whose personal contacts with many central political actors of the region, assured a unique insight.

Mr. Karatnycky is counselor and senior scholar at Freedom House, an influential non-governmental organization monitoring human rights around the world. In the 1980s and early 1990s, he supervised AFL-CIO's programs of assistance to Solidarity, as well as to independent labor unions in Russia, Ukraine and other Eastern-bloc countries.

From 1991 to 1993 he was assistant to the president of the AFL-CIO. In 1993 he became the executive director of Freedom House, and from 1996 until 2003 he served as its president.

Mr. Karatnycky has contributed scores of articles on East European and post-Soviet issues to journals and newspapers such as Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, National Review, Journal of Democracy, Commentary and The New York Times, and he appears regularly on U.S. television to discuss world affairs. He is co-author of three books, including "Hidden Nations: The People Challenge the Soviet Union" (New York, 1990) and "New Nations Rising: The Fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence" (New York, 1993).

Toronto-based independent journalist Yuri Shevchuk asked Mr. Karatnycky to share his views about the current internal and international situation in which Ukraine finds itself 12 years after it became an independent state.

Q: What is your view of the current political situation in Ukraine?

A: Ukraine is a highly centralized presidential system whose leadership is in the state of uncertainty and pre-transition nervousness. This creates substantial political openings for very many potentially unforeseen combinations and results.

The reason that it is such a potentially dynamic environment is that the public opinion and the democratic process, at least on certain issues, do play some substantial role in determining outcomes and results. No matter what you can say about the authoritarian style of the president, the censorship of the press, there are alternative forms of communicating information whether it's the Internet, some independent radio, print media, and a reasonably active political and civil milieu.

All of these contribute to a higher degree of transparency than you might find in completely and strongly authoritarian systems. All of this affects the looming political moment of the October 2004 presidential elections. Therefore, this means that Ukraine's entrenched governing political and economic elite is uncertain of its future and is looking for ways out. As a result the president's power is waning. Power is shifting more to the assembly of the oligarchic political and economic interest groups, which do not necessarily have the same ideas of Ukraine's political future.

The discipline that has basically kept them all within the bounds has been dependent upon the president's playing the role of apportioning and balancing between competing interests. As the president's power will wane these interest groups will be looking to other new guarantors or seeking new relationships that could protect their interests.

I would say today Ukraine may look authoritarian, but it has a lot of a democratic potential, potential dynamism, because of this important shift. Unlike Russia, which eventually found the way to resolve the problem of the succession to Boris Yeltsin and found a very strong candidate, Ukraine's elite has been trying to put forward a series of options. First it was Volodymyr Lytvyn as the speaker [chairman of the Verkhovna Rada], then Viktor Medvedchuk as the head of the presidential administration, then Anatolii Kinakh as the prime minister, then it was Viktor Yanukovych.

This elite is scrambling and looking for some one person to emerge as an electorally popular standard-bearer. They have not found an answer to that problem, they don't have anybody who at this point looks like he could make it into the second round of the election, like he is capable of defeating Viktor Yushchenko, or prevent him from getting to the second round.

Q: Do you see any candidates for such a standard-bearer of these oligarchic interests?

A: I think they have not come up with anything, and part of the problem is that in Russia you had a different dynamic. You had a president for whom a transition figure had to be found because the president was no longer functioning as the president. He was physically incapacitated and his team was really running things.

The problem with Ukraine is that there still is a president whose position is weakening and whose horizon on the political scene is diminishing. But he is still the president with many of his powers and a certain degree of energy, ego and ambition. His involvement in this process also complicates the game.

In a sense you are not getting the Russian scenario, you are getting a little bit of the Polish scenario under Lech Walensa, not that Kuchma is anything like Walensa in terms of being a democratic leader. Walensa was constantly unhappy with the new people who were contending for power. As soon as they rose above a certain level he would try to undermine, undercut them, find a new favorite, to balance people off.

Kuchma, to my judgment, is still playing this kind of game. He's playing it until a new leader emerges. But by playing the game he makes it less likely that a new paramount consensus figure will emerge that can have enough dynamism with the public to win. Unlike in Russia which had an external and internal threat to its integrity, an internal enemy to create the ground on which a new leader can jump to the top.

Ukraine's ruling elites do not have such a situation. One attempt they made over the last year and a half was to show that the improving economy was not the legacy of Yushchenko but that they brought in competent managers and it is the president and his team that has been the creator of the Ukrainian economic turnaround. But the recent problems with the agricultural harvest have so significantly hurt Prime Minister Yanukovych that they are back to square one - they again do not have a strong potential force to put forward.

Q: And so are we back to square one; can you name specific people that you think might surface as the oligarchs' viable presidential candidate?

A: It's very hard to say because all of the figures don't satisfy all of the elites. It's clear that the appointment of Yevhen Marchuk to a more authoritative and significant position [i.e., Defense Minister] is yet another attempt to put another person into play. Marchuk is interesting in a different sense because he has some roots with social democrats; secondly, he is considered to be reasonably patriotic and to have some support among the nationalists, and the patriotically inclined national democrats. In recent years, he has also behaved in a loyal way to the president.

There's one person who represents the eastern establishment - Yanukovych - and they were trying to make him a broader figure with a wider appeal, I think. But they are not getting very far. Earlier they thought to promote Kinakh as a possible successor. Then the president decided that Lytvyn could be the person to succeed him.

Everyone understood that the president was making a terrible error of judgment in thinking that Lytvyn has the potential to play that kind of role. This is not a person who can instill confidence, build consensus; he is not a very charismatic and appealing figure.

Not to be excluded is some kind of an effort by substantial part of the elite to find common ground with the former prime minister Yushchenko. Yushchenko is critical of the president but he is not an extreme critic. He is the only figure that would be willing to find some kind of a compromise formula acceptable to the current elite. It is possible that failing that, there might be some effort to create a centrist alternative which would include some of the more enlightened oligarchic financial and economic interests around the president along with substantial segments of the "Our Ukraine" bloc and to move in that direction.

In any event, I think that the elite is nervous; they are also trying other maneuvers, they are trying a constitutional maneuver which casts a cloud of uncertainty, and saps resources from Yushchenko and his forces. Rather than focusing on and sustaining positive new initiatives they are fighting off his rearguard action, and so the debate is not about policy performance but around issues that the presidential camp is putting into play.

Q: Do you think it is a foregone conclusion that Kuchma will not run for president in the forthcoming election?

A: Yes, it is a foregone conclusion because again if there is not some kind of maneuver with the Communists there is no possibility of getting a sufficient parliamentary majority of 300 to change the constitution. It's just not possible. There is not enough time to further destroy or strip away enough members of the opposition coalition. I don't even think that if there was a top-down order that the Communists would back this constitutional change. There would be some revolt among the communist parliamentary bloc.

So far there has been no indication that the president is willing to govern extra-constitutionally, he has never crossed that Rubicon in his eight or nine years. I would argue that he would have crossed it earlier rather than later. He can be criticized for a lot of things but he has not transcended constitutional mechanisms.

Q: What in your opinion can be the best and the worst case scenario of the presidential election results?

A: The best result would be that some new figure who is not closely, intimately linked to the current ruling elite and is not substantially beholden to economic oligarchic interests would become president. That would be the best scenario.

The worst case scenario would be that a popular democratically oriented, reformist candidate is removed or stripped from office because of some criminal case that is concocted against him or as a result of some criminal act. That would create a measure of instability that would be tantamount in terms of Western perception to a proclamation of martial law in Ukraine.

It would be very clear in the eyes of the West and in the eyes of Ukraine's neighbors that the mask has come off and a completely authoritarian state emerged, a state on par with Belarus or Turkmenistan. It would create incalculable harm as well as, I think, raise a very substantial degree of discontent, political unrest, and probably civic mobilization.

Q: What are the chances that the opposition today can put out one presidential candidate?

A: I think that the opposition is substantially ideologically divided. I am of the view that in some of the opposition parties there are radical elements who do not have the requisite skills to be effective custodians of government so they are in opposition to corrupt and unfortunate government but they are not themselves a stable answer to it. But in each opposition group there are some moderate forces and they theoretically could be the basis of a broader coalition.

On the other side, in the current presidential bloc, there are also a number of people whom one might call technocrats, pragmatists, people who want a closer integration with the West, who are worried about balancing the influence of Europe and of the United States against the influence of Russia, so that Ukraine could preserve its sovereignty, without becoming too dependent on one or another. These people could fit very comfortably into a broader coalition.

It is very hard, given the poisoning of the political life and political discourse, to imagine something like that happening comfortably and naturally. The electoral process might just help solve that, the electoral process will determine in the end who makes it into the second round.

In the second round if the choices are very clear everyone will be forced to take a position, to decide what is the least poor alternative for them. If Yushchenko and Symonenko make it in, it would be interesting to see how the current interest groups would align themselves, and whom they would seek to make a bargain with. I think there can be some unexpected combinations.

Secondly, if it were a pro-presidential candidate and Yushchenko makes it into the second round it would be very natural that most of the anti-Yushchenko forces - certainly their leadership - would have no alternative but to support Yushchenko, because Yushchenko is at least the guarantor of their not falling victims to political persecution.

Q: There have been signs of Washington's warming up towards Ukraine. Is there, indeed such a thing happening?

A: I think that Washington is pleased to see that Ukraine made some gestures trying to improve the relationship. Ukraine's first effort in this respect was to send a chemical, biological and radiological unit into the Gulf. This allowed the United States to create a broader coalition in the post-conflict effort. The United States welcomes this, and I think it's a good idea to improve the relations between the two countries.

It all has consequences in how President Kuchma is being treated. I think he is being accepted into a multilateral setting again. The new position is that the United States does not oppose his participation in multilateral settings. But I do not think that it goes so far as to see him come to this country before the end of his term or have bilateral meetings with the U.S. president.

Now things are back on a more normal course although not entirely back to normal because, in my opinion, there will not be a reaching out at the level of summitry, of bilateral president-to-president meetings. There won't be that kind of reciprocity between now and October 2004.

Q: What do you make of the new U.S. ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst? What kind of person is he and how does his appointment bode for U.S.-Ukrainian relations?

A: I know that he worked in a very tough environment in Uzbekistan. The U.S. policy is a complicated one in Uzbekistan after September 11, but I think he tried to balance and to integrate some concern for human rights.

One of the things that we do in Uzbekistan is we have set up six regional offices for human rights advocacy to help individuals who are subject to very difficult repression and he as ambassador, played a role in insuring the opening of these offices, negotiating the details so he does seem to have an understanding and commitment to protection of human rights. I think that should continue and there should be some continuity of the policy of his predecessor [Carlos Pascual].

Q: Poland is about to introduce visa requirements for Ukrainians. What consequences will this have for Ukraine?

A: The general feeling is that this will discourage regular day-to-day visits and will reduce the number of short-term visitors. It will probably submit more visitors to greater scrutiny. The number of cross-border travelers from Ukraine will probably diminish by half, which is a very substantial amount.

It will have an effect on the portion of the population that strives through barter and sales and the export of its labor power, deprive them of some additional remittances back to Ukraine. I do not think it will be an impediment for people who are going for intellectual, cultural, educational and civic activities. I think the Polish government is very committed to having a liberal visa regime.

Q: In your opinion what role should the Ukrainian diaspora play in the present situation that Ukraine finds itself in?

A: I think the main role of the Ukrainian diaspora, as paradoxical as it might seem, is not to be a diaspora but to be an American or a Canadian emigration. The Ukrainian diaspora should play a role of trying to influence the policy of their government, their business circles with regard to Ukraine. And I think those are potentially the more influential agents of change in Ukraine.

In the early days it seemed possible that the diaspora could play a major role in helping to bring its skills and know-how into the system. But that period of openness is gone. Ukraine has now developed enough of its own leaders, its own interests. The basic thing for the diaspora to do is to intelligently inform, influence, analyze and support the analysis of Ukrainian events to the Western media, the policy-makers, the business community.

That means that the diaspora should drop this idealistic, reflexive defense of activities of the Ukrainian ruling elite that are not compatible with democracy. Ukraine is strong enough as a state; Ukraine is not going anywhere as a state, it is not going to become a Russian colony; it has its own statehood, its elite; even its corrupt elite, doesn't want to give everything that it owns to the Russians.

We can be very certain that Ukraine will have a long durable period of statehood and there is nothing in the cards that suggests that this is not going to happen. And if Ukraine's independence isn't in danger then the only issue is how to help improve it, to make it more open, transparent, and normal as a country. That should be the role of the diaspora.

The diaspora should not be shy about criticizing Ukraine's failings while reminding people of some of its strengths, but also of allowing real information to continue to flow to policy-makers and to support a real understanding of what goes on in the country.

Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, October 26, 2003, No. 43, Vol. LXXI

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