LETTERS TO THE EDITOR (03/21/04)

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Moscow's objections: it's all about politics

Dear Editor:

On February 19 Cardinal Walter Kasper, chairman of the Papal Council for the Unity of Christians, met with Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, head of the Department of External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate of Moscow. Among the issues discussed at that meeting was the possibility of a Greek-Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine.

At the same meeting, Cardinal Kasper was handed pertinent letters from the Russian Orthodox Church and from other Orthodox Churches. In particular, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew joined the Patriarch of Moscow in expressing his opposition to the creation of a Greek-Catholic Patriarchate.

On February 21, the Press Office of the Holy See in Rome issued a note stating that the common position of all the Orthodox Churches had been taken into "serious account" and that, consequently, any future issues between the Russian Orthodox and the Catholic Churches would be referred to a special working group.

On the next day, Shrove Sunday, Cardinal Kasper met with Patriarch Aleksei II of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Patriarch handed the Cardinal letters from Orthodox residents of Nizhni Novgorod protesting the construction of a Catholic monastery in their region.

Speaking to pilgrims in St. Peter's Square on that same day, Pope John Paul II stressed the importance of Christian unity, but did not mention the Orthodox-Catholic disagreements.

Referring readers to Lubomyr Cardinal Husar's pertinent comments, as well as to the astute, if rather blunt observations by internationally renowned liturgical scholar Father Robert F. Taft, S.J., I would like to offer, in addition, the following remarks:

1. If, as Patriarch Aleksei asserts, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is "part of the Roman Catholic Church," then the erection of a Greek-Catholic Patriarchate is an internal matter of the latter Church and no concern of the Russian Church.

2. The patriarch has warned that the creation of a Greek-Catholic patriarchate would set back ecumenical relations between his Church and that of Rome. How would this occur? It could only occur by the actions of the selfsame patriarch. His statement, in other words, is a threat.

3. This threat is, furthermore, a bluff. If the patriarch is serious about ecumenical relations with the Roman Catholic Church, he will continue to pursue them even if there is one more Eastern Catholic patriarchate. If he is not serious, then there is nothing to lose.

4. It appears from Patriarch Aleksei's statements that his real concern is proselytism. If that is so, then it will be addressed. The special working group announced by the Holy See, to be made up of representatives of both Churches, can handle allegations of proselytism case by case and on the basis of evidence. But the erection of a patriarchate does not constitute proselytism. It is a separate matter.

It is true that even if the Catholic Church were to erect a patriarchate in Kyiv specifically for the purpose of receiving converts from the Orthodox faith - which is not the case - it would be within its rights. After all, in 1905 the Russian Orthodox Church elevated its North American eparchy to an archeparchy, transferring it from San Francisco to New York partly in order to convert Greek-Catholic Galician and Transcarpathian immigrants from Austria-Hungary to the Russian Orthodox Church. It enjoyed considerable success. But in conditions of religious liberty this was entirely legitimate, as long as the conversions were conscious and voluntary. Similarly, the Greek-Catholic Church has the right to create structures to receive conscious, voluntary converts from Orthodoxy. This is not proselytism.

But this, again, is not the purpose of erecting the patriarchate. In practice, the Greek-Catholic Church in central and eastern Ukraine, as well as in Russia, serves the Greek-Catholics dispersed throughout those lands. Those newly received into the Church are more likely to be former unbelievers, or unchurched believers, than converts from other faiths.

5. In an age of religious liberty, the Russian Orthodox Patriarch's notion of an exclusive canonical territory is an anachronism that should be excluded from the ecumenical lexicon.

6. The patriarch of Moscow complains of the "wave of wild nationalism" that "destroyed" his three Galician eparchies. It should be noted that the chief ecclesiastical beneficiaries of the nationalism of the 1990s were the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. These intra-Orthodox problems should not be laid at the door of the Vatican. Besides, one may ask how the Patriarchate of Moscow acquired three eparchies in solidly Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Galicia in the first place. Surely there was a touch of nationalism here - not to mention proselytism.

7. Ultimately, only the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church can create its patriarchate. The foundation has been laid through the efforts of both clergy and laity. The major archbishop and the synod of bishops, sitting in Kyiv, can now declare a Kyivan patriarchate. Most likely the Holy See will defer recognition until a more propitious moment. But such a declaration would belie the notion that union with Rome entails a suppression of ecclesial identity and autonomy.

8. In the final analysis, it is neither proselytism nor an extension of the union that Moscow truly fears. Proselytism has been condemned and can be avoided through mutual cooperation. The old model of union has been officially rejected in the ecumenical discussions. No serious Vatican ecumenist would seek to make the Orthodox submit to curial authority. Enlightened ecumenism foresees a Russian Orthodox Church merely in communion with the Roman Church. But it also envisions a Kyivan Church in communion with both Constantinople and Rome. Such a Kyivan Church would be truly itself - both Orthodox and Catholic - and independent, naturally, of Moscow.

The creation of a Greek-Catholic Kyivan Patriarchate would be an important step towards fulfilling that ecumenical vision. That vision is in direct contradiction to Moscow's political-ecclesiastical dream of a unified East Slavic Orthodox polity including Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. This essentially political consideration - and not any fears of proselytism or uniatism - lies at the heart of Moscow's objection to the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate.

Andrew Sorokowski
Rockville, Md.

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Post 17 of the Ukrainian American Veterans extends its warmest greetings to you and your staff. The Weekly is in the forefront of helping the UAV to get its message across to the Ukrainian American community.

We appeal to community members to ask their congressman/woman to support the UAV bill, HR 1615. We need Congressional co-sponsors in order for the bill to come up for a vote.

Post 17 understands the financial needs of our Ukrainian American press and realizes that the Ukrainian National Association can't subsidize The Weekly forever. Therefore, we, the members of Post 17, are sending a very modest contribution to The Ukrainian Weekly Press Fund, and at the same time we extend a challenge to the other 34 UAV posts to match or surpass our modest gift.

In addition we, or most of us, are grandparents. Are our grand children members of the Ukrainian National Association? It's the UNA that sponsors The Weekly. I can't imagine a time when The Weekly will stop publishing, but without our help it could happen.

So, my fellow veterans, will you step up to the challenge?

Zenko Halkowycz
Clifton, N.J.

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