ANALYSIS
EU expansion: a benefit or a disaster for Ukraine?
by David R. Marples
On May 1, 10 nations became full-fledged members of the European Union, raising the EU's overall population by 105 million, and expanding its area by about one-third. What are the likely results of this expansion for Ukraine?
The EU has existed in some form for over five decades, originating in Paris as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Thereafter it expanded in waves, in 1957 with additions to the original five countries (Italy, Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg); 1973 (Britain, Ireland and Denmark); 1986 (Spain and Portugal); and 1995 (Finland, Sweden, and Austria).
Certain countries that logically should be a part of a European alliance have remained steadfastly outside it - Norway and Switzerland being the most obvious examples. Two others are poised to join in 2007, providing that they meet the relevant criteria: Romania and Bulgaria. Another would like to join but has been spurned thus far: Turkey, with a Muslim population of over 67 million, is not yet regarded as a stable democracy.
Turkey is not the only state outside the commonly known geographical borders of Europe to express a desire to join. Several others, headed by Israel and the states of the Caucasus, have also indicated their interest.
The EU is already a vast bureaucracy ruled from the Belgian capital of Brussels. In theory, it is a potential powerhouse with a combined economy larger than that of the United States. But it is far from cohesive. Britain, which joined only after a bitter referendum, is currently experiencing another national debate on whether it should adhere to the EU Constitution.
The two countries that have kept the European Union afloat are France and Germany. Once traditional enemies that went to war twice in the 20th century, they are currently close partners and allies under Prime Ministers Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schrõeder. They have recently found common ground with Russia in opposing the war in Iraq. The leadership of France and Germany provides the key to understanding the EU: some partners are more important than others. The large countries will often meet privately to discuss major issues.
What, then, is the advantage to joining? The answer is financial aid, subsidies, adherence to a single set of rules for trade and tariffs, and a common economic zone free from visa restrictions.
What are the criteria for joining? The EU insists on the so-called "Copenhagen Criteria": member countries should enjoy a stable democratic environment with a working market economy, and meet the standards of EU law. Decisions inevitably are somewhat arbitrary. But, in general, the 10 new members meet those stipulations.
The largest new member is an ancient European state, Poland, with a population of 38.6 million. The smallest are Cyprus (the Greek part of the island) and Malta. The rest comprise states that had Communist or Socialist regimes for most of the post-war period: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia.
The new members present some interesting social and demographic issues. Ethnic Russians make up between one-quarter and one-third of the population in Estonia and Latvia. The latter country is the poorest of the 10 nations. Two countries - Slovakia and Hungary - have manifestly failed to deal with the dire economic plight of Roma Gypsies, a group that is anticipated to make up 10 percent of Slovakia's population within the next decade. Slovenia is the first EU member from the former Yugoslavia. All the new members are poorer than the existing ones.
The current and prospective expansions (possibly including Turkey) will likely satiate the EU and bring with it a series of perplexing problems. In the short term, none of the new entrants can expect many benefits. In turn, the various countries offer varying degrees of political stability. Romania and Hungary, for example, like Turkey and Bulgaria, have long had serious disputes over ethnic nationals in the other's territory.
Established members like the Netherlands and Britain already are discussing the establishment of strict quotas on immigrants and migrant workers. It also is unlikely that the sort of generous subsidies that led to the economic growth in recent years in countries like Ireland will continue in the future.
The expansion has also caused much bitterness in those countries left outside the new borders. Writing in the Financial Times (April 30), former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev took issue with a statement by entrepreneur George Soros that Russia had spurned democracy and should always remain outside the EU. Ironically, Cyprus, one of the main business partners for Russian oligarchs, has gained entry without difficulty.
In Ukraine, opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko is fighting an election campaign based on providing a viable campaign for his country's entry into the EU in the near future. In his view, the complaints of President Leonid Kuchma that the EU has failed to come up with a constructive entry program for Ukraine are unjustified. He maintains that it is the Kuchma regime that has stymied Ukraine's prospects through its authoritarianism, restrictions on the media and corruption.
However, Ukraine and Russia (along with Kazakstan and Belarus) have also taken steps toward forming their own common economic space. They have little choice, since there are no prospects for entry prior to 2010, and some EU leaders have expressed their views that even long-term membership for these countries seems far-fetched.
Should Ukraine celebrate the expansion of the EU? Perhaps it should - though for symbolic rather than material reasons. For most of the countries, May 1 marked the return to a world that seemed little more than a dream during the years of Nazi German and Stalinist tyranny, through warfare, deportations and repression, and the indescribable dreariness of living in a Soviet-style command economy. No country has suffered more in this regard than Ukraine, which experienced (along with Belarus) the full brunt of the two most destructive wars in history, not to mention civil war and man-made famine.
The past two years have seen both Ukraine and Poland revisit some of the more painful events of the war years. The questions discussed - the events in Volhyn in 1943 and Akcja Wisla - elicited widespread debate at the highest levels. It was possible to conduct such an open debate between two post-Soviet countries dealing with issues of their national histories and self-perception. But now the old Soviet border between Poland and Ukraine is now the new border between the EU and Ukraine. It is not an event that seemed likely 12 years ago.
The EU, both implicitly and sometimes explicitly, holds the view that Ukraine's development since independence has left a country with significant prospects mired in political conflict and corruption, one in which there has been close collusion between the political leadership and powerful oligarchs from the industrial towns scattered along the Dnipro and Don rivers. Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, the former boss of the Donetsk region, is a classic example of the oligarch/bureaucrat that has given Ukraine such a bad name.
The political situation in Ukraine is little short of a tragedy in terms of Ukraine's international prospects. That tragedy would be compounded if, following the May 1 expansion, the EU does not make some sort of positive gesture toward Ukraine, and in particular toward Our Ukraine and Mr. Yushchenko personally. If the door is firmly shut, then the prospects for Mr. Yanukovych as a candidate for president in the October 31 election would be enhanced considerably. The elusive so-called multi-vectored foreign policy of President Kuchma might conceivably be replaced by the one originally advocated by Mr. Kuchma in his first presidential campaign 10 years ago: moving closer to Russia.
Ten years ago, such a policy did not seem outrageous. Russia had embarked on shock therapy, and while Russia and Ukraine had significant disputes in the Crimea and over oil and gas deliveries, they were not insuperable, as evidenced by the 1997 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two states. Russia in 2004, however, is a very different prospect. Moreover, President Vladimir Putin, his power firmly consolidated, has made no secret of the importance of Ukraine to Russia (even going so far as to suggest that the two Orthodox Churches be merged during a recent visit to Kyiv). Russia may have been willing to make concessions on Central Asia and the U.S. military presence in this former Soviet borderland. No such compromises will be forthcoming on Ukraine. And the ramblings of Mr. Gorbachev do not make a serious case for Russian membership of the EU. The Russian path lies outside the community.
Ukraine's prospects should not be painted uniformly black. The EU, as we have noted, is far from monolithic. It may also improve its relations with both NATO and the United States independently of the EU. Ukraine has experienced significant economic growth (though from a very low base point), and it has strong opposition voices that have widespread electoral support - in contrast to both Belarus and Russia. Nonetheless, May 1, 2004, a day celebrated across central Europe, is unlikely to please - and should even alarm - those concerned with the development of democracy and prosperity in Europe's largest country.
Dr. David R. Marples is a professor of history and director of the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine at the University of Alberta. The author of 10 books, his latest publication, released on April 21, is "The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1991" (Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education-Longman, 2004).
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, May 9, 2004, No. 19, Vol. LXXII
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