FOR THE RECORD: Ambassador Miller's observations on Ukraine's Orange Revolution (PART I) (01/23/05)

FOR THE RECORD

Ambassador Miller's observations on Ukraine's Orange Revolution

William Green Miller, who served as America's second ambassador to Ukraine (1993-1998), spent six of the last seven weeks of 2004 in Ukraine. He was an eyewitness to the Orange Revolution as an observer during the three rounds of Ukraine's presidential election, which pitted Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, representing the party in power, against the reformist opponent Viktor Yushchenko. He also discussed the developments there with the major political figures directly involved in those events, which had dominated the front pages of the world's leading newspapers and news broadcasts throughout the process.

Upon his return to Washington, where he is the senior policy fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Ambassador Miller was invited to share his observations at a Director's Forum at the Center on January 6. Following are excerpts from a transcript of his presentation (to be published in two parts).

PART I

Shortly after the 2002 parliamentary elections, I had a long conversation with the wisest and most astute of senior Ukrainian national security officials, Volodymyr Horbulin, who had been the national security advisor to President Leonid Kuchma, and his lifelong friend. ... On that occasion, Horbulin said to me, "There has been a profound change in the nature of Ukrainian politics. These recently concluded parliamentary elections showed that the party of power has lost majority popular support. Over 75 percent of the electorate is for new leaders like Yushchenko, or are opposed to the government and the existing system of governance."

Certainly, the majority of those who ran for the Parliament were supported by new groups other than the long dominant "party of power," or the successor Communists and Socialists. For the first time, too, votes were cast by large numbers of voters whose livelihood did not depend on employment in state organizations. The 2002 elections marked, in a definitive way, the time when a majority of emancipated voters emerged out of the swamp of docile, single-party voters so reminiscent of Soviet times.

Strong, coherent opposition parties - other than the party of power and allied lesser factions the party of power supported or allowed to function - did not exist, although a formidable opposition to the pervasive corruption and abuses of power was beginning to take shape. The Nasha Ukraina [Our Ukraine] coalition led by Viktor Yushchenko (who declared he was not head of any party) had not yet fully formed, but the key personalities had already emerged. ...

At the same time, the grassroots organizations so necessary for democratic political action were beginning to coalesce, building in part on the youth groups from earlier national movements like Rukh and the environmental organizations arising out of the Chornobyl catastrophe. For over 10 years observer groups for elections were trained, helped in part by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, and other U.S. and European non-governmental organizations. These observer groups, largely made up of students and young people, became a formidable element in the demand for free, fair, transparent, and honest elections. ...

During the two years between the parliamentary and the October 21, 2004, presidential elections, the party of power did everything possible to destroy the popular support for Yushchenko. They used the media and controlled press to picture Yushchenko as weak, a pawn of the United States and the West, spreading rumors that his American-born wife was a CIA agent. He was characterized as a dilettante, more interested in painting and raising bees than doing the hard work of running a nation. He would be too soft, not tough enough to run Ukraine. This characterization and evaluation of Yushchenko's abilities was held by many in Ukraine, as well as in U.S. government circles and in European capitals. ...

Yushchenko would have to maintain his popularity by proving his strength of character, integrity and abilities through two years of intense campaigning. He would have to survive several assassination attempts, including a near fatal poisoning. Further, his campaign would face enormous organizational difficulties, a press and TV blockade, shortage of funds, a massive disinformation campaign aimed at destroying his popularity among the Ukrainian people, opposition from many Russians, including President Putin and, until the last months before election, a relatively hands-off attitude from the United States government and the West.

Yet, it was more and more evident that the more the party of power led by President Kuchma and the oligarchs and clans that supported Viktor Yanukovych used illegal and brutal means to block Nasha Ukraina's efforts to campaign, the stronger Yushchenko seemed to get. Under adversity he proved his durability. When he started his campaign, he often sounded like an economics professor lecturing to a graduate school seminar, but from daily necessity to communicate, his speaking style grew more passionate, tighter in structure and more persuasive. Yushchenko learned and was able to speak surrounded by crowds used to pressure and adversity, as one of the people. I witnessed this remarkable transformation. ...

Independence Square

Day after day, night after night, the maidan crowd shared a glorious uplifting spirit and a determination to rid their country of criminality and corruption. As they said in some of their slogans, "bandu het" (thieves, crooks - out), and "nas bahato, nas ne podolaty," (we are many and we will not be overcome). To those who were on the street, on the maidan, who shared this experience, it was not surprising that this mass of hundreds of thousands, at times over a million, was transformed into a "Maidan Parliament." The creation of the maidan phenomenon would not have been possible unless certain key conditions had existed. The mayor of Kyiv, Oleksander Omelchenko, allowed the Maidan to be used by Nasha Ukraina for its gathering. The mayor and City Council allowed the Kreshchatyk to be occupied by the Pora tent city. Omelchenko, the City Council and the chiefs of militia and SBU [Security Service of Ukraine] could have moved to support Yanukovych, but they sided with Yushchenko. This was a crucial political decision.

The majority of police and militia of Kyiv were clearly in sympathy with Yushchenko and his Nasha Ukraina coalition supporters. The army and the SBU were held in check. Further, requests for the use of force to clear the maidan of demonstrations and to limit Yushchenko's activities by Yanukovych and his supporters were not agreed to by President Kuchma.

The speaker of the Rada, Volodymyr Lytvyn, allowed the Rada to be convened to discuss and vote on the fraudulent elections, and he brokered a consensus agreement on election and constitutional reform that was crucial to holding the winning coalition together. Oleksander Moroz played a vital role in supporting Yushchenko, while pressing for electoral and constitutional reform. Ivan Pliusch was one of several who worked tirelessly behind the scenes working out the compromises needed to allow the December 26 election to take place.

PART I

CONCLUSION

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