COMMENTARY: What the Orange Revolution did not revolutionize (03/06/05)

COMMENTARY

What the Orange Revolution did not revolutionize

by Roman Solchanyk

Now that the tents have been dismantled in Kyiv's Independence Square and the orange revolutionaries have gone home to attend to more mundane matters, it's time for a sober look at what Ukraine's Orange Revolution has changed and, no less importantly, what it has not changed.

At the end of last year, millions of Ukrainians took to the streets to say "no" to what must be ranked as one of Moscow's most enduring accomplishments during the past half century - a phenomenon that used to be proudly advertised from Vladivostok to Riga as the "Soviet way of life." At the heart of this schema - which was finally cast off by the East European countries with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; then by the Baltic states, which propelled the collapse of the Soviet Union; and more recently by the Rose Revolution in Georgia - is the simple proposition that those who hold power are everything and that everyone else is nothing. It was accurately reflected in the popular Soviet aphorism: "If I'm the boss, then you're an idiot. But if you're the boss, then I'm an idiot."

In Ukraine's recent presidential elections, the poster boy for the "Soviet way of life" was the Moscow-backed prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, a twice-convicted felon who at one point in the campaign characteristically referred to his countrymen as "goats" - Soviet prison slang for those who collaborated with their jailers. After more than a decade of so-called post-Soviet transition, the orange revolutionaries convincingly demonstrated that they no longer wished to collaborate.

Nonetheless, the Orange Revolution, far from being a revolution in the classical sense, is only the beginning of a lengthy and complex process fraught with serious problems and difficult challenges.

First, although it has a nice ring to it and is certainly quite suitable for ringing speeches in Strasbourg, the Orange Revolution did not give birth to a "new Ukrainian nation" - if only because nations are not born, but made. More to the point, if we conclude that the final round of Ukraine's elections in December 2004 was largely free and fair, then we must also recognize that nearly half of Ukraine's voters, those who cast their ballots for Mr. Yanukovych, still pine for the "Soviet way of life."

Public opinion polls conducted at the end of last year confirm the voting patterns: half of Ukrainians (and 67 percent of Russians) are saddened by the fact that the Soviet Union is no more. And when asked to choose between a union with Russia and Belarus and membership in the European Union, slightly more than half of Ukrainians opted for the "outpost of tyranny" in Mensk and Vladimir Putin's "managed democracy." In short, the nation-building project in Ukraine (and Russia) is far from over.

Oleh Rybachuk, the newly appointed vice prime minister responsible for European integration, summed up the situation nicely. Before Ukrainian-Russian relations can become normal, he recently told Izvestia, Russians need to abandon the notion that they are "almost Ukrainians" and Ukrainians should stop saying that they are "almost Russians."

Second, the Orange Revolution has changed nothing with respect to Russian perceptions of Ukraine. The overwhelming majority of Russians are still not prepared to recognize Ukrainians as a legitimate and separate nation. According to Yurii Levada, Russia's foremost pollster, nearly 80 percent of Russians are convinced that Ukrainians (and Belarusians) are really Russians; nearly 70 percent do not think that Ukraine is a genuine country.

Mr. Putin, it is worth recalling, told a press conference in Moscow last December that Ukraine, including its western part, is "completely Russian speaking" - another way of saying "almost Russians." True, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently announced a "turnaround" in Moscow's approach to relations with Kyiv, asserting that it now viewed Ukraine (and Georgia) as "absolutely sovereign," and that the term "near abroad" was no longer applicable. Some commentators went so far as to say that Russia now considered Ukraine to be outside of its orbit. When asked about this by the BBC, former Ukrainian First Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Oleksandr Chalyi suggested that he would feel more confident about Mr. Lavrov's statements if they were recorded in official bilateral documents governing Russia's relations with the U.S. and the European Union (EU). In less diplomatic language, what this means is that talk is cheap. Indeed, it might be recalled that assurances of mutual respect for sovereignty go as far back as the Ukrainian-Russian treaty of 1990.

And finally, there is Europe - or, more precisely, the EU - where little has changed as well. The previous leadership in Kyiv was fond of pointing out that "no one is waiting for us in Europe." They were quite right, certainly insofar as old Europe is concerned. As various high-level Eurocrats have once again made very plain, the Orange Revolution is a fine thing, but the European house is rather full at the moment and Ukrainians need not apply. From the perspective of Brussels, Albania and Turkey qualify as "European," but Ukraine does not.

The recently agreed upon Action Plan between the EU and Kyiv essentially offers Ukraine some economic concessions, which are touted as a "deepening" of relations, but pointedly omits the question of whether there is any prospect even for associate membership. Ukrainians are being asked not to pose unpleasant questions and be content with what EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner described as an EU door that is "neither open nor closed."

The degree to which Ukraine is seen as a nuisance in the capitals of old Europe can be gauged from the reported dissatisfaction of some European leaders with President Viktor Yushchenko's presence in Brussels during the recent NATO summit there, which, according to Der Spiegel, was arranged at the insistence of the White House and took the form of a spurious meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. It might be noted that President Jacques Chirac of France abruptly walked out of the meeting directly after Mr. Yushchenko's speech. The U.S. role, if confirmed, is a welcome sign suggesting that Washington has joined forces with Warsaw and Vilnius in support of Ukraine's European aspirations.

The Orange Revolution is quickly receding into history. But it ain't over until the fat lady sings.

Dr. Roman Solchanyk is an international affairs analyst in Santa Monica, Calif.

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