NEWS ANALYSIS: Rada rejects Yushchenko's nominee for PM in first vote (09/25/05)

NEWS ANALYSIS: Rada rejects Yushchenko's nominee for PM in first vote

by Taras Kuzio
Eurasia Daily Monitor

September 21

On September 20 the Ukrainian Parliament failed to approve Yurii Yekhanurov as prime minister, seven days after President Viktor Yushchenko submitted his candidacy. Mr. Yushchenko disbanded the government headed by Yulia Tymoshenko on September 8 after a corruption crisis engineered by outgoing State Secretary Oleksander Zinchenko (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 8, 9).

During four of the seven days between Mr. Yekhanurov's nomination and the Parliament's rejection of his candidacy, September 15-18, President Yushchenko was in the United States. Originally scheduled to arrive on September 13, he postponed his visit by two days.

A State Department official told EDM that he was "surprised" that Mr. Yushchenko would be visiting the United States during the political crisis. This reaction was frequently heard from other U.S. government officials and think-tank experts on Ukraine. The Carnegie Endowment's Anders Aslund could not understand why President Yushchenko traveled to the United States when his "political life" was on the line.

Ukrainian political commentators have criticized the Yushchenko team's poor interaction with Parliament. Even Mr. Yushchenko's presidential representative in Parliament, Serhii Soboliev, voted against Mr. Yekhanurov. Mr. Soboliev is a member of the Reforms and Order party faction that has now aligned itself with Ms. Tymoshenko.

Mr. Yekhanurov's candidacy was backed by 223 of the 450 deputies - three short of the bare majority required to pass. In contrast, 373 parliamentary deputies voted for Ms. Tymoshenko in February when she was confirmed as prime minister.

Prior to leaving for the United States, Mr. Yushchenko negotiated an agreement with parliamentary factions to drum up parliamentary support for Mr. Yekhanurov (Ukrayinska Pravda, September 14). But the declaration was vague and non-committal, and the Party of the Regions signed but did not vote for Mr. Yekhanurov.

The failed nomination of Mr. Yekhanurov results from the divisions in the Orange Revolution coalition. Before the crisis, 128 deputies belonged to the hard-line opposition Party of the Regions, Social Democratic Party - United and the Communist Party. Since the crisis, an "opposition-lite" has emerged around Ms. Tymoshenko. The political forces that support her (Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, United Ukraine, Reforms and Order) number 74 deputies. Thus, the hard-line and "lite" opposition to Mr. Yushchenko inside the Verkhovna Rada now totals 202 deputies.

The pro-Yushchenko camp includes 26 Socialists (SPU) who gave their votes in exchange for keeping three positions in the government. (It is understood that the SPU will become an independent political force after the March 2006 parliamentary elections.) The latest holder of one of these three positions, the minister of agriculture, was heavily criticized for his neo-Soviet approach to agricultural policy.

A fourth Socialist headed the State Property Fund (SPF), which sent the wrong economic signals to foreign investors preferring a free market. Under Ms. Tymoshenko, Ukraine's investment climate worsened. Although foreign investors will welcome the ruling out of further re-privatization by Messrs. Yekhanurov and Yushchenko, this boost of confidence could be undermined if a Socialist returns to the SPF.

After the SPU, the remaining votes for Mr. Yekhanurov came from national democrats (83) and former pro-Kuchma centrists (93). The crisis, therefore, has forced President Yushchenko to heavily rely upon centrists and Socialists, who together gave him 119 votes.

In reality, Mr. Yushchenko's parliamentary predicament is made worse by the fact that 14 members of the hard-line and "lite" opposition supported Mr. Yekhanurov. These included six Reforms and Order, four United Ukraine, and three Party of the Regions deputies. Without these 13 defectors, Mr. Yekhanurov would have obtained only 189 votes (rada.kiev.ua).

The president now has little choice but to cut a deal with either former Mr. Kuchma centrists, such as Rada Chairman Volodymyr Lytvyn, or Ms. Tymoshenko to create a parliamentary majority after the 2006 elections. Alone, Mr. Yushchenko's People's Union Our Ukraine will only obtain 20 to 30 percent support, according to polls conducted throughout this year. Relying on Mr. Lytvyn would tie Mr. Yushchenko's hands in two ways.

First, he will be unable to block constitutional reforms through the Constitutional Court. Both the centrists and the Socialists have always strongly backed them.

Ms. Tymoshenko's political opportunism and feeling of personal betrayal by Mr. Yushchenko has led her to undertake a 180-degree shift in her views on constitutional reforms. Now she endorses them. The Tymoshenko bloc was always the parliamentary force most hostile toward the move from a presidential-parliamentary to a parliamentary-presidential republic. Not any more.

Second, on September 20 the Verkhovna Rada finally heard the report of the commission established to investigate the murder of journalist Heorhii Gongadze in fall 2000. President Yushchenko's failure to investigate the instigators of the crime will be used against him by the "lite" opposition.

The commission was established in 2002, and it is headed by Hryhorii Omelchenko, who was elected in 2002 in third place on the Ms. Tymoshenko bloc list. Although the commission had submitted its findings to the Procurator General's Office in September 2002, it had never received any response. After charges are made, Ukrainian law requires that within 10 days either a case is opened or the charges are rebutted.

The commission's report accuses then President Leonid Kuchma, Mr. Lytvyn, former Security Services of Ukaine chief Leonid Derkach, and deceased former Internal Affairs Minister Yurii Kravchenko of collusion and organizing the murder of Gongadze.

The most damaging aspect of this report is its impact upon Mr. Lytvyn's reputation, which had risen along with the Orange Revolution and in the months afterwards. Mr. Lytvyn has already announced the creation of a 2006 election bloc named after him.

It is clear that Ms. Tymoshenko has seized the opportunity to damage the alliance between Messrs. Yushchenko and Lytvyn through the Gongadze affair. If successful, she could then force Mr. Yushchenko to ditch Mr. Lytvyn and strike a deal with her.

A repeat vote for Mr. Yekhanurov may take place. President Yushchenko had called upon the Verkhovna Rada to back Mr. Yekhanurov to head a "non-politicized and non-party" government. If Mr. Yekhanurov's candidacy fails again, an alternative candidate suggested by State Secretary Oleh Rybachuk is the popular acting Minister of Internal Affairs, Yurii Lutsenko (Ukrayinska Pravda, September 20).

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