NEWS ANALYSIS: Yushchenko's deal with Yanukovych secures Yekhanurov's approval (10/02/05)

NEWS ANALYSIS: Yushchenko's deal with Yanukovych secures Yekhanurov's approval

by Taras Kuzio
Eurasia Daily Monitor

The Ukrainian Parliament confirmed Yurii Yekhanurov as prime minister on September 22 with 289 votes. His candidacy had been rejected by Parliament two days earlier when only 223 members of the 450-seat legislature voted for him (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 21).

Without enough votes on his own, President Viktor Yushchenko had to reach a compromise with either former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko or the centrists that had supported former President Leonid Kuchma. Ms. Tymoshenko had held out a hand of friendship to Mr. Yushchenko after the failed first vote, calling for them to conduct negotiations and "return to our cooperation, our program" (Ukrayinska Pravda, September 21). Mr. Yushchenko needed a new prime minister after firing Ms. Tymoshenko earlier this month.

Nevertheless, members of the business wing of the Yushchenko camp refused any dealings with Ms. Tymoshenko. Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Borys Tarasyuk, whose Rukh faction voted on both occasions for Mr. Yekhanurov, said in Washington on September 20 that he hoped Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Yushchenko would re-unite.

Instead, Mr. Yushchenko struck a deal with his rival for the presidency in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, head of the Party of the Regions of Ukraine. The 50 votes from the Party of the Regions faction, the second largest in Parliament, tipped the vote decisively in favor of a "yes" on the second vote. In the first vote, three Party of the Regions deputies had voted for Mr. Yekhanurov and, ironically, were expelled from the faction a day later.

Why did Party of the Regions accommodate Mr. Yushchenko in the second vote? Regions had already expressed a willingness to work with Mr. Yushchenko when they, alone among the hard-line opposition, signed the bombastically titled "Declaration of Unity and Cooperation for the Sake of Ukraine's Future" after the removal of the Tymoshenko government.

The Party of the Regions and Mr. Yekhanurov signed a 10-point declaration that convinced the party to throw its weight behind the vote (partyofregions.org.ua). The declaration, however, ties President Yushchenko's hands and leaves him vulnerable to charges of betraying the Orange Revolution.

The 10 points include support for constitutional reform, ending "political repression" against the opposition, introducing an amnesty and preventing pressure on courts. Other points outline the adoption of laws on local government, the opposition, the Cabinet of Ministers and the president of Ukraine. The government is to be based on "professionalism and the separation of business from politics," while the right to private property will be guaranteed. Finally, there is a commitment to hold free parliamentary elections in 2006.

Why did Mr. Yushchenko take this potentially dangerous step towards Mr. Yanukovych?

First, the outgoing government left the economy in crisis and immediate action was needed. Economic growth had plummeted, inflation was high and high populist social spending depleted budgetary revenues.

Second, Mr. Yushchenko was losing high-ranking allies. He had signed a decree reducing the unconstitutional additional powers of the National Security and Defense Council and the State Secretariat. Oleksander Tretiakov's positions as first adviser and the state secretary were abolished. Mr. Tretiakov had been accused of corruption, but was cleared by the prosecutor's office.

Third, the deal with Mr. Yanukovych severely fractured the unity of the hard-line opposition. The Social Democratic Party-United (SDPU) and the Party of the Regions will now enter the 2006 elections separately, rather than in the same bloc (Ukrayinska Pravda, September 22).

The Party of the Regions agreement with Mr. Yushchenko reveals how shallow the party's commitment was to its "opposition" stance. The Party of the Regions had always reluctantly opposed President Yushchenko, because the oligarchs who supported it want to be on friendly terms with the executive. Mr. Yanukovych praised the agreement as a major victory for his party (regionsofukraine.org.ua).

The reaction of the "Orange" opposition was predictable and harsh. Outgoing First Vice Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko described the agreement as a betrayal of the Orange Revolution. In place of Ms. Tymoshenko, he argued, Mr. Yushchenko had brought in Mr. Kuchma and Mr. Yanukovych. Mr. Tomenko advised Mr. Yushchenko to replace his campaign slogan "Kuchma and Yanukovych - Away!" with "Kuchma and Yanukovych - Yes!" (Ukrayinska Pravda, September 22).

The most alarming phrase in the declaration is "political repression." By using the opposition's derogatory phrase President Yushchenko implied that he agrees with the opposition that criminal cases introduced this year against former Kuchma officials for abuse of office, corruption and election fraud qualified as "repression." This decision, coupled with the declaration's call for an amnesty, is highly controversial.

The Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU), a widely respected NGO involved in election monitoring, called upon Mr. Yushchenko to recant his stated support for an amnesty for those who committed fraud in last year's elections (cvu.org.ua). The CVU wonders how the 2006 election could be free and fair if the same officials who committed election violations in 2004 are still in place

What does the new Yushchenko-Yanukovych alliance mean for Ukraine?

First, Ms. Tymoshenko will now claim the mantle of the true representative of the Orange Revolution. Those who believe that Mr. Yushchenko has "betrayed" the revolution will flock to her side in the 2006 elections.

Second, the hard-line opposition that once challenged the president has been split, as Mr. Yushchenko has co-opted almost the entire centrist camp.

Third, the former Kuchma camp can claim a victory, as they were the main backers of the impending constitutional reforms that weaken the presidency - and Mr. Yushchenko. The Kuchma camp and oligarchs also won amnesty for election fraud and guarantees that re-privatization is over.

Fourth, Ukraine's relations with Russia will improve. (Ms. Tymoshenko had been unable to travel there due to an open criminal case against her.) However, Mr. Yushchenko's reliance on centrists, especially the pro-Russian Party of the Regions, could derail Ukraine's desire to be invited to join the process for NATO membership at the NATO-Ukraine summit in May 2006.

This has been a turbulent week in Ukrainian politics. President Yushchenko abandoned his principal ally from the 2004 presidential election, Ms. Tymoshenko, in favor of his principal adversary, Mr. Yanukovych. With some six months to go before the parliamentary elections, there is ample time for more maneuvering and more shifting alliances.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is visiting professor at the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University. The article above, which originally appeared in The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor, is reprinted here with permission from the foundation (www.jamestown.org).

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