ANALYSIS: Transition to parliamentary rule in the CIS: diverging trends (03/19/06)

ANALYSIS

Transition to parliamentary rule in the CIS: diverging trends

by Ilian Cashu

Two diverging political trends have emerged over the past five years in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the first group of countries, which comprises the Central Asian states and Belarus, incumbent presidents already serving their second terms have instigated referenda with the express aim of extending their rule for one or several addition terms, making it theoretically possible for them to remain in power for a further decade, in the case of Tajikistan's Imomali Rakhmonov - or even for life, as with Turkmenistan's Saparmurat Niyazov.

Other CIS states, by contrast, have set about curbing presidential powers through constitutional reforms. Moldova (2000), Ukraine (2004) and Armenia (2005) have all adopted models of the parliamentary rule that altered the power balance in favor of legislative majorities and their Cabinets. Proponents of parliamentarism emphasized its greater potential for democratization while highlighting the authoritarian character of presidentialism.

Yet whatever the official justification for these democratic reforms, basically they reflected bitter battles among political elites for influence and power control. In all three cases, the bulk of the bargaining was conducted behind the scenes, with little or no effort made to explain the essence of such important constitutional changes to the public.

The Armenian opposition launched a vocal campaign urging voters to boycott last November's referendum on constitutional changes, arguing that the amendments did not go far enough in curbing the president's powers, and they subsequently rejected as rigged official claims of 65 percent turnout, with 93 percent of participants endorsing the proposed changes.

President Robert Kocharian's opponents fear (as did those of Ukraine's ex-President Leonid Kuchma) that he plans to use the reform as a means to remain at the peak of Armenian politics beyond 2008, when his second presidential term expires, by assuming the post of prime minister.

It is speculated that Russian President Vladimir Putin, too, may favor a transition to parliamentary rule in order to remain in power as the head of the Cabinet after his second presidential term ends in 2008.

These constitutional changes determine the official rules of the political game, and, therefore, are vital to mitigating conflicts among the ruling elites. To that end, the implementation of the new rules counts more than the debates surrounding their design. With a parliamentary republic in place since March 2001, Moldova offers an indication of how things might develop in Armenia and Ukraine.

The Moldovan Parliament approved the regime reform bill by an overwhelming majority (a vote of 98-2) in July 2000. The reform aimed at dampening the political aspirations of then President Petru Lucinschi to introduce a superpresidentialist system along the model established by Boris Yeltsin in Russia. According to Mr. Lucinschi, such magnified presidential powers were a necessary precondition for successfully carrying out enduring economic reforms.

By contrast, his most vocal opponents, like Party of Moldovan Communists (PMC) leader Vladimir Voronin, insisted parliamentary rule would distinguish Moldova from the authoritarian regimes of Central Asian states and set it on a solid path of European-style democracy. In addition, the proposed reform abolished the direct election of the president, thus significantly reducing the legitimacy of the future head of state.

But, following a landslide victory in the February 2001 parliamentary elections, it was the PMC chief who obtained the leverage to both interpret and implement the constitutional reform. Mr. Voronin could have chosen either of the two most influential positions under the parliamentary republic - the Parliament chairman or the prime minister. Instead, he preferred to serve as president, albeit with a much more powerful mandate than his constitutionally reserved ceremonial role.

Given the popular prestige of the presidency and a lingering Soviet legacy for strong executives, Mr. Voronin's choice was not unexpected. In addition, he managed to retain his position as PMC chairman by skillfully exploiting a gap in the reform design, namely the absence of a clear constitutional ban on the president simultaneously holding two positions. A proposal floated by PMC officials in the summer of 2001 to have Mr. Voronin take over the prime ministership on top of his presidential function never saw the light of the day. In fact, the dual executive system was established to use the Cabinet as a scapegoat for potential policy failures.

The issue of a politicized presidency rose to the top of the country's political agenda in the wake of the parliamentary elections of March 6, when, in exchange for voting in favor of Mr. Voronin's re-election as president, one month later several political parties agreed on depoliticizing the position of the head of state. Also, the PMC pledged to abandon its Communist orthodoxy and join the mainstream of modern European leftist parties.

With a Communist majority government and a multiparty presidential coalition, Moldova's parliamentary republic continues to function as it did during the Communists' first term in power (2001-2005). And almost a year after the assurances given to the opposition, President Voronin is still PMC chairman. Nor are there any signs that the party's name will be changed in the near future. Mr. Voronin intends to control both the process of modernizing the PMC and the timing of his resignation as party chairman in order not to jeopardize the Communists' success at the ballot box in the local and parliamentary elections due in 2007 and 2009, respectively.

But while reform of the PMC might well be an internal party affair, the depolitization of the presidency is not. It deals with the constitutional rules of the political game and affects both the government and opposition players alike.

In November 2005 the leaders of the Democratic Party (DP) and Social Liberal Party (SLP), respectively, Dumitru Diakov and Oleg Serebrian, who backed Mr. Voronin's re-election, publicly accused the president of reneging on his promise to step down as party chief. The SLP leader went even further, calling for the president's impeachment.

Although the SLP lacks the institutional means to carry out this initiative (two-thirds out of a total 101 members of Parliament are required to impeach the president, compared to a combined number of 11 SLP and DP deputies), in itself it constitutes an important symbolic move from a representative of the so-called "constructivist opposition." These developments show that depoliticizing the presidency could become the most explosive political issue during the Communists' second term in power.

Of course, only a relevant constitutional amendment could bridge this legal gap. Even if such a proposal is not currently on the table, Mr. Voronin's official relinquishing of his chairmanship post might strengthen, rather than weaken, the PMC. The Moldovan president could follow the example of his Romanian counterpart, Traian Basescu. Although Mr. Basescu gave up the leadership of the Democratic Party (DP) after winning the presidential elections in December 2004, he remains an influential behind-the-scenes actor in DP affairs. Besides, the unofficial role of Mr. Voronin would perfectly conform to the Byzantine character of present-day Moldovan politics.

In addition, by abandoning the post of PMC chairman, Mr. Voronin would deprive his Transdniester critics from within the sultanistic regime of Igor Smirnov of any pretext to accuse him of authoritarianism. A consolidated democracy is not only a precondition for the reunification of the country with its rebellious Transdniester region, but also for Moldova's efforts to successfully integrate into the European Union.

Despite the fact that a similar reform has been in effect for two months now in Ukraine, its effects still remain inconclusive. The current standoff between the Verkhovna Rada and President Viktor Yushchenko will probably subside after next month's parliamentary elections only if the president manages to reassemble a strong Orange coalition capable of winning the majority of votes.

But whatever the procedural irregularities associated with deciding upon the reform's design before the critical third round of voting in December 2004, Ukrainian democracy would be better served if it is implemented without significant revisions. That would make the Ukrainian political process more transparent and help make the democratic aspirations of millions of Ukrainians who unequivocally supported Mr. Yushchenko during the Orange Revolution a reality.

It is clear from the Moldovan experience that the transition to parliamentary rule is a very complicated political process. Because the rules of the political game remain fluid, politicians tailor them to promote their partisan agendas, and so at times democratic advancement is sacrificed in the name of political stability.

However, curtailing the power of a strong executive is a decisive step in the right direction. Had this process been launched after the first wave of reforms in the mid-1990s, some CIS countries, including Moldova, would have been farther down the path of democratic consolidation today.

Ilian Cashu is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Syracuse University.

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