UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY: Tarasyuk speaks at Brookings Institution
Following is the text of the speech "Ukraine's Foreign Policy: from the Orange Revolution through the parliamentary elections and beyond" delivered by Ukraine's Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk at the Brookings Institution in Washington on March 9. (Editor's note: the text has been slightly edited for clarity.)
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I'm honored to be invited to address such a distinguished audience where I see so many friends.
During my visits to Washington both as foreign minister and an opposition deputy who chaired the Parliament's Foreign Policy Committee, the subject of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine was a topical issue in my discussions. Noticeably, even in the most challenging moments of Ukraine's modern history, my country's European and Euro-Atlantic prospect has never been questioned but incited a sincere interest and backing among the U.S. political elite and American political analysts alike.
Since the dramatic events branded as the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko, then the presidential candidate and now the president of Ukraine, has repeatedly stressed that the Ukrainian people, by standing up for their civil rights and freedoms and against cynical falsifications in November 2004, proved to be Europeans and, as Europeans, deserve their place in the united Europe.
It's commonly known that the notion of European and Euro-Atlantic integration has been a landmark of the Ukrainian foreign policy and politics for a decade. But the frank assessment of the real progress on Ukraine's move toward NATO and EU membership made by the end of Mr. Kuchma's tenure unmistakably leads to a blue conclusion that any mention of Ukraine's European integration sparkled nothing but irritation and "fatigue syndrome" among European politicians.
Let me briefly remind you that at the edge of the democratic breakthrough of 2004, Ukraine's image abroad was tainted by a discredited and corrupt political leadership incapable of getting rid of foreign policy ambiguity and securing any consistency in the implementation of strategic tasks.
Moreover, the undemocratic nature of the regime and de-facto international isolation of Ukraine kept at bay any prospect of joining Western institutions.
With the Orange Revolution unleashed by the widespread electoral fraud, the pro-democracy forces were able to seize the popular mood and formulate the mainstream civilization choice of the Ukrainian people to live in a democratic, law-abiding and fair society homogenous with other European countries.
Instead of incessantly speaking about the European and Euro-Atlantic perspective that found little response from European and NATO counterparts in the previous decade primarily due to democratic incompatibility, the new government articulated ambitious but clear-cut foreign policy priorities and backed them up with a trustworthy agenda and actions.
Although one year is a small period of time to draw profound conclusions, by all accounts Ukraine has made great progress toward Euro-Atlantic and European integration.
First off, by actively engaging the implementation of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan, we were able to melt down major fences between Ukraine and the rest of Europe. This Action Plan was instrumental in helping Ukraine to push economic and democratic reforms forward. As a result, Ukraine was graduated to market economy status and is fully committed to building on this success.
Our expectations are to kick start in the nearest future negotiations with the EU on a European-type agreement on association, as well as on a free trade area. Pending the assessment of the implementation of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan, the government of Ukraine will make its mind up on submission of an EU membership application during this year.
As far as joining the NATO is concerned, launching and successfully implementing the Intensified Dialogue on Membership is not a lesser achievement. The Intensified Dialogue on Membership and reform issues brought us into the formal stream of preparation for NATO membership.
We are pleased to note that each of the Alliance members recognizes the legitimacy of Ukraine's NATO aspirations. We believe that the goal of getting an invitation to NATO at the 2008 Summit is within the reach.
At this point, I am aware of the need to address the widespread concerns in the West over implications that the electoral outcomes of Ukraine's parliamentary campaign could have on a coherent foreign policy against the backdrop of constitutional reform.
Although the ongoing parliamentary campaign is heavily charged with a foreign policy component, primarily with NATO accession, as was the last presidential campaign, it is clearly a point of no return in the heated debate over national strategic priorities.
One should not be tricked by the fact that some political forces and especially the out-of-mainstream parties, which enjoy tiny public backing, gamble on NATO and Russia-related issues as they lack any trustworthy vision of foreign policy priorities.
By using the remnants of the existing phobias and ignorance that root back into Soviet-era indoctrination and brain-washing practices, these political players aim at winning constituency support while not giving up efforts to torpedo the democratic choice of the Ukrainian people. By the way, to address this challenge, the government of Ukraine appropriated in 2006, for the first time ever since the NATO membership clause was inserted into the national military doctrine, funds to run a NATO awareness campaign.
On the other hand, there are no grounds to deny that freedom of speech is flourishing in Ukraine. Opposition leaders and the harshest critics of the democratic government are the first to grasp these new opportunities to assail the media space and the constituency with ideas that sometimes are lethal for democracy. The media themselves are no longer the target of influence by the government or political forces supportive of it. This level of freedom of speech wasn't dreamed of just a year ago.
We have transparent and fair political competition, as no political force or opposition leader is harassed or persecuted by either law-enforcement or any other governmental agency on the basis of their political affiliations or ideologies. No wonder Ukraine was upgraded by the renowned Freedom House in its annual Freedom in the World 2006 report from a "partly free" to "free" country since both political rights and civil liberties ratings improved significantly.
The president and the government of Ukraine are aware that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be a test for Ukraine's democratic compatibility with united Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community, and its integration ambitions will be assessed by the democratic world through the ability to secure transparent, free and fair elections.
We are confident that the pro-democracy forces will gain a clear majority in the future Parliament.
Despite the fragmentation between the pro-democracy political parties, their combined approval rating has even slightly grown. There should be no doubt that the pro-democracy parties are capable of bridging their differences and restoring the Orange coalition.
With the elections to be held in two weeks' time, the consensus on the key principles and priorities of the future government have already been worked out and agreed upon by the pro-democracy parties that will have a legislative representation.
Besides, there is no place for argument that, with the constitutional changes taking effect upon the new Cabinet's formation, the president still keeps exclusive powers to articulate the foreign policy and secure the consistency of its implementation. The president will remain an active player in the Cabinet-forming process as the nominees for the posts of foreign and defense ministers are submitted at his discretion.
In my already not-so-brief speech, there is an obvious necessity that an assessment of current Ukrainian-Russian relations be given, as they will have repercussions on Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic strategy and integration pace.
Still these bilateral relations are not problem- free. Shifting the dialogue into the dimension of equal relations should be considered a milestone achievement. On the other hand, two countries managed to return to the process of seeking genuine solutions to long-standing problems of the Black Sea Fleet's stationing on the territory of Ukraine, delimitation of the Azov and Black seas, etc. Significant progress has been made on loosening the procedures of crossing the border by Ukrainian and Russian nationals.
When speaking of Ukrainian-Russian relations, one cannot avoid touching upon acute questions. The energy dispute with Russia has made international and domestic headlines for a couple of months. Although the agreement hammered out on January 4 might not be the better option for Ukraine, it still reflects to some extent the balance of interests. Ukraine's economy got an acceptable gas price that mitigates the negative impact on its performance.
With Ukraine securing tariffs on transit and its reliability, we expect that Russia provides, in exchange, guarantees that the gas price and the volume of gas pumped through the Ukrainian transit system will remain unchangeable for the agreed period of time.
The scheme of energy supply is far from transparent by Western standards. Still, with all economic and political factors taken into account, there was no other option or choice but to abolish previous barter schemes that fed corruption both in Ukraine and Russia and set up new mechanisms which better suit market-economy transformations. Although Ukraine's approach was legally strong and we have little doubt our country would have won the lawsuit in the Stockholm court, in practical terms the Ukrainian economy would be hit severely, as would be, to some extent, European economies. As a reliable partner, Ukraine decided it would be wise to hammer out a compromise that benefits both our country and Europe.
We are very optimistic about the prospect of further enhancing our relations with the U.S., which have never been better than today.
Eager to rediscover the meaning of genuine strategic partnership, the new Ukrainian authorities and the United States have been able in just one year to get rid of the bulk of problems that have been blemishing our relationships for ages. Frank discussion and true political will are back in the Ukrainian-American dialogue. The democratic authorities of Ukraine have proved they do what they say and say what they mean, leaving no room for ambiguity or misinterpretation.
I am happy to say that Ukraine has strictly lived up to its commitments under the Yushchenko-Bush Joint Statement of April 2005, as has the U.S.A. Ukraine's steadily improving economic performance and robust market transformation were recognized by the U.S. by upgrading Ukraine to market-economy status. My country is one step closer to achieving WTO membership after Ukraine and the U.S. successfully completed negotiations on market access on March 6, 2006. And today, I have just returned from the U.S. Congress, which approved the decision to abolish the Cold War relic of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment - a move that grants a normal trade regime to Ukraine.
As Ukraine is seen as an outpost of democracy in the region, we stand firmly for freedom, human rights and liberties. Having said that, let there be no doubt that Ukraine will remain a committed partner to the U.S. in promoting these shared values.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
As the Orange Revolution created prerequisites to develop the nation and society, Ukraine is going through a historic moment in its development. We have the unique chance to make this historic dream of generations of Ukrainians to re-integrate our country into the Euro-Atlantic family of nations a reality.
I thank you.
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, March 26, 2006, No. 13, Vol. LXXIV
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