IN THE PRESS
Commentaries on Ukraine's 2006 parliamentary elections
Wall Street Journal, "Ukraine's Victors," op-ed by Michael McFaul, Hoover fellow and professor of political science at Stanford University and associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 29:
... The Orange Revolution marked a democratic breakthrough in Ukraine that has not only proved enduring but also been built upon.
The skeptics got a couple of important things wrong. First off, the volatile politics leading up to last weekend's vote were an expression of democratic politics, not their rejection. After criticizing Ms. Tymoshenko for her performance, President Yushchenko dismissed her and her government. That's the way it's supposed to work in democracies. Accusations of corruption against Mr. Yushchenko's administration, brought to light by an aggressive independent press, forced resignations of other officials from his staff. That's also democracy in action.
Then, most amazingly, both Ms. Tymoshenko and her detractors from within the Yushchenko inner circle had the chance to compete against each other for votes. No one was jailed, no one was removed from the ballot, no one was denied access to television, and no one was denied campaign financing from private donors. All that has become the norm in regimes further east of Ukraine.
Certainly, many Ukrainians may have been disappointed with the first results of the Orange Revolution. There is always a letdown after a revolution, as high expectations often aren't met. But Ukrainian citizens did not express their disappointment by checking out of the political process. On the contrary, the 70 percent turnout for a parliamentary election is truly remarkable. During the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians came out on the streets of Kiev [sic] to protect their vote. This week, they demonstrated yet again that they value their right to decide who rules Ukraine. ...
Los Angeles Times, "The Orange glow," editorial, March 28:
... Ukraine's firm step in the right direction is proof that even countries for which few had high hopes a decade ago are capable of demanding, and achieving, democratic self-governance. This is a backdrop of optimism to the otherwise depressing scene last weekend of Lukashenko's [Lukashenka's] brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in Minsk [Miensk], the Belarusian capital. Police indiscriminately clubbed students, women and pensioners, locking up hundreds, including the former Polish ambassador to Belarus, at least one opposition leader, several international aid workers and some foreign journalists.
The good news is that the virus of democracy, especially in post-Communist Europe, has a proven track record of spreading and solidifying. It says something powerful that the Western country taking the lead role in pressuring Lukashenko is Poland - and that the beleaguered protesters are consciously drawing on a tradition that runs from Solidarity to Czechoslovakia's Charter 77 to the various "color" revolutions belatedly percolating along Russia's borders. The protesters' bravery deserves our applause and support, and the 10 million other residents of Belarus deserve the same opportunities finally being embraced in neighboring Ukraine.
Kyiv Post, "Yushchenko's choice will answer crucial questions," by Tammy Lynch, senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy, Boston University, April 6:
... A coalition with BYuT [the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc] would keep Ukraine enthusiastically on the road to Europe, with a possibly greater chance than last year to pass needed reforms. It would also mean a recommitment to promises made on maidan - in particular, further investigation into who organized the murder of Georgy [Heorhii] Gongadze and other journalists and the possibility of undoing certain murky privatization deals, although it is notable that Tymoshenko has implied she may be willing to forgo re-privatizations if "her team" is allowed to ensure the completion of investigations, such as the Gongadze case.
Finally, a union between Our Ukraine and BYuT would accomplish something important in a democracy: It would respond to the apparent will of the people.
BYuT placed first in 13 of 24 regions, and accomplished the best ever showing in eastern Ukraine of any West-oriented party. These votes, when added to Our Ukraine and the partner Socialists, show that a plurality of Ukrainians support Ukraine's movement Westward and that support for the Party of Regions has decreased in the last year. ...
The blunt fact is that President Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko don't seem to like each other very much. Their personalities and work habits are worlds apart. Therefore, a coalition between Our Ukraine and the Party of Regions appears to be a real possibility. ...
The Guardian, "To criticize capitalism don't try to defend the dregs of Soviet socialism," by Timothy Garton Ash, April 6:
... James Harkin argued in a column last Saturday that many of the (unnamed) "Western commentators" who had been "curiously dewy-eyed" about Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004 are "lost for words" now that the party of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych "has triumphed" in the recent parliamentary elections. Well, certainly not me. Why on earth should I, who rejoiced with the people in Kiev's [sic] independence square, be lost for words now? The Orange Revolution was not about giving power to any particular party. It was about using "people power" to give people the chance to choose their own government in a free and fair election. That's what Ukraine has just done. One British election monitor from the European Parliament said he thought the voting procedures used by the Ukrainians this time round were superior to those in Britain.
Roughly one in three Ukrainian voters, mainly in the more Russian-oriented east of the country, chose Yanukovych. That's about 10 percent less than he probably got in the rigged presidential election of 2004 that sparked the Orange Revolution. The so-called Orange vote was split between the now feuding leaders of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, but their combined vote exceeded that for Yanukovych. Voters, except in the pro-Western western end of the country, punished Yushchenko for disappointed hopes, economic mess, continued widespread corruption, dealing badly with the Russian gas squeeze at the beginning of the year, and falling out with Yulia. Fair on some counts, less so on others. But the essential point remains: the people could choose in a free and fair election. They can bring an old rogue back, if they want; then they can chuck him out again. It's democracy, stupid.
The Daily Telegraph, "The future is still Orange," editorial, March 28:
... Fifteen months after Mr. Yushchenko was elected president, his record was tested at the ballot box and found wanting. ...
... voters have been given a democratic chance to pass judgment on a government that has not met their expectations. While making Ukraine more open, Mr. Yushchenko has presided over a declining growth rate and a confrontation with Russia over gas supplies, and has failed to slough off the taint of venality.
The best thing now would be for him and Mrs. Tymoshenko to combine in tackling corruption, keeping Ukraine's nose pointing towards the West, the likely source of foreign investment, and attempting to bridge the divide between the east and west of the country. While a setback to reform, Sunday's vote in no way betrayed Orange democratic ideals. Just compare its conduct with the intimidation and vote-rigging that marred the presidential election in neighboring Belarus a week earlier.
Newsweek International, "Never mind the headlines. Ukraine's Orange Revolution is alive and well," opinion, by Adrian Karatnycky, president of The Orange Circle, April 10-17:
... yes, voters in Ukraine gave a plurality to Viktor Yanukovych, the former prime minister, figurehead of the old regime and friend of the Kremlin, while the Orange Revolution's hero, President Viktor Yushchenko, placed a dismal third. But this was a setback for one party, not for the democratic spirit of the Orange Revolution.
Put aside the fact that this was the first fully free and fair ballot in the country's history, and look at the numbers. While Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party lost ground, other Orange parties made it up. In the end, 55 percent of Ukraine's new Parliament will be held by groups that led the Orange Revolution - identical to the victory in December 2004. Charismatic Yulia Tymoshenko's party won nearly 30 percent of seats, making her the likely prime minister in an Orange coalition.
Nor is rival Yanukovych's strong showing all it seems. Without a legislative majority, the Regions Party cannot dictate any backward policies. And it, too, is deeply fissured. On one side is the motley gang that tried to steal the last presidential election. On the other are the pragmatic politicians associated with the billionaire Rynat Akhmetov, the party's de facto leader. They talk of economic reform, corporate-tax cuts, European integration and the need to heal the rifts between eastern and western Ukraine.
There are other important signs. Crisscrossing Ukraine recently, I met multibillionaires and trade-union leaders, media magnates and editors of small but influential Internet sites, bankers and civic activists. Ukraine was changing, they told me optimistically, and emphasized that they - not government - are the solution to the country's problems. This reflects deep social and economic changes over the 15 years since independence. ...
The Moscow Times, "The trick to understanding Ukraine," commentary, by Anders Aslund, senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, March 29:
... The surprise is what happened within the Orange coalition, with Yulia Tymoshenko's bloc trouncing Yushchenko's Our Ukraine. It is easy to understand why that happened. Our Ukraine ran an inept campaign and put its least popular representatives, such as discredited businessman Petro Poroshenko, in the spotlight, while the president and his prime minister, Yurii Yekhanurov, kept a low profile.
Tymoshenko is an outstanding campaigner, and she seems to have chosen the right political themes as well. Her main slogan was "justice," reflecting Yushchenko's unfulfilled promise from 2004: "Bandits to prison!" Once again, revenge against the old regime became the dominant line.
Her victory over Our Ukraine elevates moral issues over economic policy, and her rhetoric looks backward to the Orange Revolution, further cementing the east-west divide. She also defeated Pora-PRP [Reforms and Order Party], the new liberal bloc, which tried to offer a decent alternative to Orange voters appalled by both populism and corruption.
Since the campaign became a rehashing of the Orange Revolution, nothing but an Orange coalition appears natural, that is, Tymoshenko's bloc, Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party. The Lytvyn Popular Bloc will not enter Parliament. Today, nobody but Tymoshenko appears the natural prime minister. The job is hers to lose. ...
The big question is what policy a Prime Minister Tymoshenko would pursue. As deputy prime minister for energy in 2000, she surprised us positively by going after other oligarchs and cleaning up the energy sector.
As prime minister last year, by contrast, she surprised us negatively by focusing on re-privatization, which had not been part of her government program. Now she has received a greater popular mandate than ever before, so we can only wonder how she will amaze us this time. ...
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, April 16, 2006, No. 16, Vol. LXXIV
| Home Page |