BOOK NOTES: Experts explain Ukraine's democratic breakthrough (04/23/06)

BOOK NOTES

Experts explain Ukraine's democratic breakthrough

"Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough" by Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. 224 pp. $16.95 (paperback).

by Matthew Dubas

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has released a new publication titled "Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough." It is a compilation by various authors, each offering a thorough explanation of the events and factors that contributed to the Orange Revolution's success.

This highly informative book begins with a contribution by one of the editors, Anders Åslund, adjunct professor at Georgetown University, who brings the reader an in-depth look at the role that the oligarchs of Ukraine played in the success of the revolution. He describes how these oligarchs were intertwined with the government by forming their own political parties and placing push-over candidates in high positions.

In addition, the author shows the instability caused by former President Leonid Kuchma, as he pit oligarchs against one another, diverting their attention from Parliament to their competitors, resulting in divisions among the law enforcement community.

In the second chapter, Adrian Karatnycky, president of The Orange Circle and senior scholar at Freedom House, explores the rise of political opposition in Ukraine. He begins with the formation of the Rukh movement against the Communists, the problems occurring from a highly centralized government with a Constitution that granted the president supreme authority and goes on to note how the murder and cover-up of journalist Heorhii Gongadze was a catalyst for the unification of the opposition.

However, it was the use of the highly public space of the "maidan" or Independence Square, as the rally stage, Mr. Karatnycky writes, that was a key factor in the Orange Revolution's success. He closes with the reminder that the revolution was more than just a people's demonstration against voter fraud; it was a constitutional process for permanent democratic change.

The role of the everyday Ukrainian in the Orange Revolution, profiled by Taras Kuzio, visiting professor at George Washington University, outlines the typical passive stance taken by average citizens of the "it's not my business" attitude, which kept the elite in power. He also talks about the underestimation by the authorities of the popularity of new technology and its lack of censorship, allowing the opposition to disseminate information to all parts of Ukraine simultaneously on the Internet, satellite television and mobile phones.

Humor was another aspect of Ukrainian society that helped citizens comment on daily life via publications like "Yanukdote" (a play on the word "anecdote") and the egg-throwing incident that felled Viktor Yanukovych. The author goes on to describes how the average Ukrainian was mobilized nationalistically, linguistically and musically, and that the people were reminded it was "our Ukraine" - not the elite's.

Nadia Diuk, director of the Central Europe and Eurasia department at the National Endowment for Democracy, writes of the maturation of Ukrainian civil society and its organization. In its early years, political groups like Rukh were at the forefront of the opposition, and from that came other cultural, sporting, political and social groups.

In the streets, campaigns and groups such as Za Pravdu (For The Truth), Pora (It's Time), Chysta Ukraina (A Clean Ukraine) and Znayu (I Know) held mass rallies against the corruption known as "Kuchmism." The ability of these non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to assemble and organize a broad base of support was pivotal to the revolution's success, according to Dr. Diuk. As described by the author, the maidan at the time of the revolution, "looked like a microcosm of Ukrainian civil society," with its own organizations, policing, housing and enforcement of non-violent measures.

To follow up on the previous chapter, Pavol Demes, director for Central and Eastern Europe with the German Marshall Fund, and Joerg Forbrig, program officer with the German Marshall Fund, examine the Pora (It's Time) civic group, its organization, resources and reasons for success in the revolution. Pora, a volunteer network aimed at ensuring free and fair elections and democracy for Ukraine, had a campaign strategy that was broken into steps: "It's time to stand up," "It's time to think," "It's time to vote" and "It's time to keep watch." These methods were tested at mayoral elections, and the techniques were refined for the presidential election.

Evidence of the extent of Pora's organization is seen in its training manuals such as "How to Inform the Public," "Rights During Arrest," "Violations of Electoral Law" and "Internal Communication and Coordination of Action."

The role of the Ukrainian media prior to and during the Orange Revolution was covered by Olena Prytula, editor-in-chief of Ukrayinska Pravda in Kyiv. She begins with the censorship campaigns of President Kuchma and his use of directive documents knows as "temnyky" on how major stories should be covered. These directives led to the practice of self-censorship by media channels to avoid attacks from the government, a lack of live news broadcasts and a resultant rise of alternative sources of information.

The growth of the Internet in Ukraine, from 6 million users in September 2004 to 20 million users in December 2004, was compared by the author to the "samizdat" (a term used in the Soviet era for self-published suppressed works - "samvydav" in Ukrainian) offering a platform for an opposition view.

Television took a progressive step when Channel 5, owned by Petro Poroshenko, a supporter of Viktor Yushchenko, presented opposing views on national television - something that was never before done under the Kuchma regime. Many television personalities took advantage of their positions in the public eye by wearing orange as a silent statement of support for the opposition. Radio played a modest role in the revolution because of the president's control; radio stations were shut down and obtaining a license was made very difficult.

Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, director and project director, respectively, of the Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, separate myths from realities in their article on the role of Western influence in the revolution. Propaganda against the West by Mr. Yanukovych targeted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) as foreign entities that would not represent Ukraine's best interests. However, the Party of the Regions used Western PR firms in a failed attempt to further Mr. Yanukovych's campaign.

The United States wanted "honesty and transparency" from the elections and threatened sanctions against the authoritarian regime for violations of human rights. Pressure was increased to ensure a free and fair election by sending representatives of President George W. Bush to Ukraine, among them Sen. Richard G. Lugar and Secretary of State Colin Powell.

However, the European Union had a divided stance on its involvement in the Ukrainian elections, with Western European nations taking a "wait and see" attitude, and Central European members pushing for a more proactive approach.

In contrast to the previous chapter, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, both scholars in residence with the Carnegie Moscow Center, show the role that Russia played in the Orange Revolution - its forms, decisions and reasons for failure. What the authors call the "Kremlin Strategy" stressed the importance of Russian relations, highlighted Eastern Ukraine as an industrial center thanks to Russia and extended coverage in the Russian media of Mr. Yanukovych. Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Kyiv, according to the authors, was an attempt to promote the Russian interests of dual citizenship, official recognition of the Russian language and voting rights for Ukrainians in Russia.

To tie together all of the elements that made the Orange Revolution a success, Michael McFaul, co-editor and associate professor of political science at Stanford University, draws on examples of Serbia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, and the overthrow of their respective authoritarian regimes. He highlights the Ukrainian experience by noting the progressive non-violent use of negotiations by Mr. Yushchenko.

The author also profiles certain conditions that are necessary in order for revolutions of this nature to make permanent change. These include an autocratic or semi-autocratic regime, an unpopular leader, a well-organized opposition, the ability to create the perception of falsification, the use of the media to inform the public of findings, the ability of the opposition to mobilize thousands to protest, and the division between intelligence forces, police and the military.

This book comes in paperback and hardcover, with a who's who list of prominent figures in the Ukrainian political environment and a timeline of events. The paperback edition sells for $16.95 and the hardcover is $33.95. It may be purchased online at www.CarnegieEn-dowment.org/RevolutioninOrange, or by contacting Hopkins Fulfillment Service, PO Box 50370, Baltimore, MD 21211-4370; telephone, 800-537-5487 or 410-516-6956; fax, 410-516-6998.

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