The political divorce of Viktor and Yulia
by Zenon Zawada
Kyiv Press Bureau
CONCLUSION
The following is the second article in a two-part series examining the political relationship between Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, which came to an end one year ago.
KYIV - The gasoline industry is where Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko earned her first big profit, and it became the source of her first public scandal with the president.
At a May 16 press conference, Ms. Tymoshenko declared war on Russian oil executives, accusing them of conspiring to create a fuel crisis by inflating gasoline prices as high as 15 percent.
"Just when the new government came to power, this monopoly, or cartel conspiracy, raised prices for oil products in Ukraine significantly higher than what was agreed to," she said.
To deal with the situation, Ms. Tymoshenko reached agreements with three Ukrainian refineries to set prices that offered them reasonable profitability, while also stabilizing the market.
The agreements were reached without consulting the two Russian oil companies that dominate 90 percent of Ukraine's market - LUKoil and Tyumenskaya Nyeftnaya Kompaniya (TNK).
Displeased with Ms. Tymoshenko's interference, the companies responded by shutting down oil production in Ukraine and ceasing oil deliveries to Ukraine's primary refinery in Kremenchuk. The blockade lasted for a full week, disrupting supplies and causing gasoline shortages and even further price hikes.
Two days following her announcement, President Viktor Yushchenko expressed his disapproval of Ms. Tymoshenko's handling of the situation, issuing a presidential decree blaming the Cabinet of Ministers, not Russian oil entrepreneurs, for the crisis.
"In May this year, a sharp deficit in high-octane grades of gasoline arose in the domestic market of fuel products," the order said. "This crisis arose because the Cabinet of Ministers, in its price-setting, excessively regulated the gas and fuel market."
The decree forbade Ms. Tymoshenko from attempting to use government mechanisms, or "excessive non-market levers," to influence or regulate prices on Ukraine's commodity markets, particularly gasoline.
On May 19 both Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko met face-to-face with the Russian oil executives to resolve the situation.
While President Yushchenko took the approach of apologizing on behalf of his Cabinet for disrupting the gasoline market, Prime Minister Tymoshenko insisted she handled the situation properly.
Her assertions caused Mr. Yushchenko to lose his patience, according to anonymous witnesses interviewed by Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, Ukraine's weekly analytical newspaper.
Mr. Yushchenko allegedly said he regretted appointing Ms. Tymoshenko as his prime minister and suggested she resign.
"We work as a team, therefore, discussions can only take place at the discussion stage," the president reportedly said. "After a decision has been made, there is no place for discussion. Those who don't agree can resign."
Ms. Tymoshenko's fiercely independent stance during the gasoline crisis was the first of many signals perceived by Mr. Yushchenko and his entourage as Ms. Tymoshenko's attempt to upstage him, political analysts said.
Simultaneously, another policy conflict erupted when Ms. Tymoshenko criticized First Vice Prime Minister Anatolii Kinakh for creating a list of 29 Ukrainian firms targeted for reprivatization, insisting that no such list existed nor was one approved by the government.
Instead, the government should conduct re-privatization of questionably obtained properties on the basis of legislation that would establish criteria for repossession and subsequent auction, Ms. Tymoshenko asserted.
However Oles Doniy of the Kyiv-based Center for Political Values Research said he believes Ms. Tymoshenko publicly criticized Mr. Kinakh as part of her fight to manage the new government's re-privatization process.
"Whoever created the list controlled it," he said. "There was a fight to create this list because whoever had the right to cross out factories from this list theoretically obtained bribes from owners."
Once again, the lack of a common strategy resulted in the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko camps angling for power and influence against each other, said Serhii Taran of the Socio-Vymir Center for Sociological and Politcal Research.
With the lack of an opposition political force to unite against, they found their enemy in each other, he said.
Ms. Tymoshenko's ally Mykola Tomenko confirmed this the morning of the Cabinet's dismissal when he announced his resignation, stating that two separate governments were competing with each other, one led by Mr. Poroshenko and the other by Ms. Tymoshenko.
Meanwhile, Mr. Yushchenko grew increasingly concerned with Ms. Tymoshenko's growing prominence and popularity.
Ukrainians began seeing the attractive, telegenic Ms. Tymoshenko as frequently as the president, if not more so, on the evening news. A master in handling the media, she was holding press conferences sometimes on a weekly basis, without consulting the president.
Mr. Yushchenko's triumvirate of Petro Poroshenko, Oleksander Tretiakov and Mykola Martynenko was keeping close tabs on her and frequently warning the president of her threat.
In the view of some observers, they were justified in doing so.
"For Tymoshenko, the main goal is power, power and once more, power," said Stepan Khmara, a former ally of Ms. Tymoshenko. "Tymoshenko is not an altruist or a patriot of Ukraine. She is a political player, with a lust for power."
Petro versus Yulia
The rivalry between the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko camps reached the boiling point during the summer of 2005 as they battled over Ukraine's natural gas, experts said.
Before becoming Mr. Yushchenko's close confidante, Mr. Poroshenko enjoyed close ties with Mr. Kuchma and Kyiv clan boss Viktor Medvedchuk.
Already a millionaire, he joined Mr. Yushchenko's opposition at the end of 2001, serving as campaign manager for Our Ukraine during the 2002 parliamentary elections.
Though they are close, Mr. Yushchenko isn't all that dependent on Mr. Poroshenko the way Mr. Yanukovych is dependent on Rynat Akhmetov, who is the prime source of financing behind the Party of the Regions, political experts said.
When becoming president, Mr. Yushchenko appointed Mr. Poroshenko secretary of the National Defense and Security Council.
Though Mr. Poroshenko was not a Cabinet Minister, the president gave him a free pass to maneuver throughout government and even represent Ukrainian interests abroad. In turn, Mr. Poroshenko took advantage of opportunities to challenge Ms. Tymoshenko's authority and staged numerous attempts to overshadow her.
"Before she visited Georgia, he arrived there first," Kyiv political insider Ivan Lozowy said. "She planned a trip to France, and he goes there first. He was the proximate and long-term cause for her removal."
Mr. Poroshenko spent the summer months defending the president and Mr. Tretiakov against allegations lobbed by Ms. Tymoshenko that Ukraine's natural gas industry was mired in corruption.
On August 12, 2005, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) chief Oleksander Turchynov ordered a search of Naftohaz headquarters to investigate the corruption.
Our Ukraine leaders perceived the move as a direct provocation against them, particularly because many of them are heavily involved in the natural gas industry, including Mr. Tretiakov and Oleksii Ivchenko.
Earlier on July 6 Mr. Yushchenko had sent a letter directly to Ms. Tymoshenko, asking her to leave Naftohaz alone and not draw it into political intrigues.
In response to Mr. Turchynov's investigation, Mr. Poroshenko called the SBU "a danger to the security of the state," insisting on a revamping of Ukraine's top investigative agency.
This was Mr. Poroshenko's declaration of war against Mr. Turchynov, who had long been Ms. Tymoshenko's closest confidante, in the words of Radio Liberty journalist Roman Kupchinsky.
Revealing his support for Mr. Poroshenko's actions, Mr. Yushchenko personally told Mr. Turchynov in mid-August to stop "persecuting my men" and cease corruption investigations, the former SBU chair later revealed.
In yet another attempt to supplant Ms. Tymoshenko's authority, Mr. Poroshenko traveled to Moscow in late August to personally negotiate with Gazprom on natural gas prices and arrange a long-term supply agreement.
Though not dependent on Mr. Poroshenko, President Yushchenko remained fiercely loyal to him throughout the conflict.
"For everyone who shows him this love, Yushchenko's immediately ready to embrace them and he's ready to cooperate with them," Mr. Doniy said. "He loves to bathe in the rays of glory, the people's love for him, the love of his close people, his entourage, his allies."
The last straw
The Yushchenko-Tymoshenko government came crashing down September 5, 2005, when Presidential Secretariat Chair Oleksandr Zinchenko called a press conference to resign and expose the government's corruption and infighting. He laid full blame on the Poroshenko-Martynenko-Tretiakov triumvirate that was abusing its newly acquired power for its personal gain and enrichment.
"Poroshenko, Tretiakov and company appoint their own people everywhere possible, intentionally put pressure on the independent law-enforcement system and reign freely in privatization processes," Mr. Zinchenko said. "They think that if the government is ours, then it should work for us."
Mr. Zinchenko painted an image in which this triumvirate monopolized their influence on Mr. Yushchenko by isolating and denying him contact with even his key advisors, keeping the detached president in an informational vacuum.
Even Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk had complained that he couldn't speak with the president for three months because of Mr. Tretiakov's interference.
It was in this vacuum that political experts believe the triumverate built up Mr. Yushchenko's concern and fears over Ms. Tymoshenko's rising influence and popularity in government.
"Using their closeness to the president, this circle tried to create an alternative to Tymoshenko to make it impossible for her to strengthen her position," Mr. Doniy said. "Poroshenko played a key role in the process of Yushchenko's worsening attitude toward Tymoshenko."
Reserving the most criticism for Mr. Poroshenko, Mr. Zinchenko accused him of trying to use the National Security and Defense Council as his own personal law enforcement agency.
In a scene out of a Mexican soap opera, Mr. Poroshenko showed up unannounced, storming into the room packed with journalists with a furious, bullish glare aimed at the whistleblower.
After Mr. Zinchenko concluded his revelations, Mr. Poroshenko barreled towards the podium and denied any corruption in the Yushchenko government, noting that Mr. Zinchenko had no documentary evidence. He surmised that perhaps Mr. Zinchenko saw little chance for political advancement in the Yushchenko government, and was looking to use a scandal to launch his own political career.
"I think sociological data revealed his level of popularity and that it's high time he took to Pora's leadership," Mr. Poroshenko said. "Today, we are witnessing the beginning of his campaign."
As it turned out, Mr. Zinchenko never became a Pora candidate, nor was he acting on behalf of Ms. Tymoshenko, as widely suspected.
Whatever his true motive might have been, the Zinchenko press conference triggered a three-day verbal war between Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Poroshenko.
After the dismissal, President Yushchenko said he spent those three days trying to hold the government together, and it was an experience he never wanted to repeat again.
He acknowledged that he was aware Mr. Poroshenko had been battling with Ms. Tymoshenko for months, even admitting to feeling like a baby-sitter when trying to deal with them.
On the eve of the government's dismissal, Mr. Yushchenko said he put forth a proposition to the warring sides in which either everyone resigned, or that only partial resignations occur - namely Mr. Poroshenko's and Mr. Turchynov's.
It was during these discussions that Mr. Yushchenko allegedly complained about Ms. Tymoshenko's need for the spotlight. "Look at Putin or Lukashenka," Mr. Yushchenko allegedly said. "They have brilliant prime ministers. No one ever sees them on television."
Though she allegedly agreed to partial resignations, Ms. Tymoshenko called a late-night meeting at her dacha that very night, according to the president. Inviting the procurator general and the minister of internal affairs, she suggested that they hold their own press conferences in the morning to reveal corruption. In the view of Mr. Khmara, this was the last straw for Mr. Yushchenko. "It appeared as a subtle strike against the president," he said.
At 12:30 p.m. on September 8, 2005, Mr. Yushchenko appeared on live, national television to announce he was dismissing Ms. Tymoshenko and most of her Cabinet of Ministers, as well as Mr. Poroshenko.
He acknowledged corruption in his government, naming as the last straw Ms. Tymoshenko's alleged attempts to steer control of the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant from Viktor Pinchuk into the hands of his Dnipropetrovsk rival Ihor Kolomoyskyi.
Mr. Yushchenko claimed Ms. Tymoshenko wanted, in exchange, shares in 1+1, the second-highest-rated television network in Ukraine.
Just three weeks earlier, Mr. Kolomoyskyi declared his intention to buy a 40 percent stake in 1+1, however, Ms. Tymoshenko has denied she was involved in secret agreements with him or his partnership, Pryvat Group.
Mr. Yushchenko called the Nikopol scandal "a fight between two gangs" in his September 8 address.
What Mr. Yushchenko didn't reveal is that Mr. Poroshenko was also allegedly angling for a stake in a Ukrainian television network.
Russian businessmen Oleksander Abramov and Viktor Vekselberg wanted to "purchase the Inter channel and then transfer it to Mr. Yushchenko's inner circle in exchange for the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant," Russian Communist Deputy Viktor Iliukhin alleged. Mr. Poroshenko was reportedly interested in the deal.
"I agree with the president," Ms. Tymoshenko said afterwards. "This was the gang of Pinchuk fighting the gang of Poroshenko and a Russian businessman who was linked with Poroshenko."
Ms. Tymoshenko's defenders believe that she selected Mr. Kolomoyskyi to receive shares in the Nikopol reprivatization only because he already had a 25 percent stake in the factory, which he obtained legitimately. She viewed Mr. Kolomoyskyi as a partner the government could work with.
In the view of Mr. Doniy, the Nikopol affair was merely a pretext for dismissal. President Yushchenko has always been aware of the corruption surrounding him and it didn't faze him. "Political interests aren't so important to him; moral cleanliness is not so important nor are ties to corruption," Mr. Doniy said.
"The most important thing is whether a person directly serving Yushchenko is playing his or her own separate game ... If the game turns against Yushchenko, he immediately distances the person from him. Yushchenko only likes people who demonstrate love, flattery and kindness," he added.
Mr. Yushchenko went beyond the Nikopol scandal in his attempt to discredit Ms. Tymoshenko, accusing her of abusing her position as prime minister to erase $1.5 billion in government debt owed by her defunct gas-trading company, Unified Energy Systems of Ukraine. He also accused her of hatching an impeachment plot.
Despite the attacks upon her credibility and character, Ms. Tymoshenko never retaliated against Mr. Yushchenko himself, reserving her biting criticism instead for the triumvirate in his entourage.
All she would say is that Mr. Yushchenko's tacks against her were identical to the techniques Mr. Kuchma had used five years ago in repressing her.
"Throughout her political life, Tymoshenko has clung to him desperately, even when all hope was lost," Mr. Lozowy said.
Yulia's revenge
By all indications, the Our Ukraine leadership believed it had maintained the support of the Orange electorate, marching confidently toward the March 2006 parliamentary elections.
Its advertising campaign belied the bloc's hubris, frequently employing the slogan "Don't Betray the Maidan" in radio and television advertisements.
It never occurred to Our Ukraine's leadership that many Ukrainians believe it was the leaders themselves who betrayed the Orange Revolution, with their ongoing corruption scandals and Mr. Yushchenko's decision to make peace with Ukraine's businessmen, formerly known as oligarchs and criminals.
Rather than investing in advertisements, Ms. Tymoshenko took her bloc's campaign to Ukraine's cities, traveling a total of 80,000 kilometers and speaking in front of 4.5 million people, according to her website.
Entering the elections, most polls either predicted Our Ukraine would finish neck-and-neck with the Tymoshenko Bloc, or ahead.
However, there were polls that indicated as early as Septemer 2005 that the Tymoshenko Bloc had more than 20 percent of the electoral support, compared to about 15 percent for Our Ukraine.
On the night of March 26, the nation's top exit poll was already able to declare that the Tymoshenko Bloc had pulled off the elections' biggest surprise.
Days later, the final results confirmed that 22 percent of the Ukrainian electorate, or 5.7 million voters, opted for Ms. Tymoshenko and her bloc, compared with the 14 percent, or 3.5 million voters, who supported Mr. Yushchenko and Our Ukraine.
The Ukrainian people had lifted the Orange Revolution's torch out of Mr. Yushchenko's hands and passed it on to Ms. Tymoshenko, who walked away from the political divorce as the victor.
The scenario in which Our Ukraine found itself resembled the Greek tragedy of Oedipus fleeing his worst fear.
It was their fear of Ms. Tymoshenko's rising popularity that caused Our Ukraine's leadership to fire her from government. But in trying to prevent their fear from becoming reality, they only realized it. The plan to eliminate her only strengthened her.
"Yushchenko doesn't have anything to fear from Tymoshenko anymore because the difference in ratings between them is such that she's no longer a threat," Mr. Taran said, tongue in cheek.
Easier to slay a dragon
Humiliated by Our Ukraine's third-place finish in the March elections, President Yushchenko faced a no-win scenario.
Given that the Party of the Regions and the Tymoshenko Bloc had won the most votes, it meant that he would have to select as his next prime minister one of his two most threatening enemies - Mr. Yanukovych or Ms. Tymoshenko.
In the view of some political observers, Mr. Yushchenko immediately ruled out the option of allowing Ms. Tymoshenko to return as prime minister.
She, on the other hand, immediately called for a renewal of the Orange coalition.
Leaders of the Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party spent four months drawing up a 120-page coalition agreement.
Judging by how long and tedious the process was, Mr. Doniy said he believes it was merely a labyrinthine delaying tactic aimed at keeping Yurii Yekhanurov as prime minister for as long as possible, while shutting Ms. Tymoshenko out.
Throughout, even Ms. Tymoshenko suspected as much.
"They wanted to complicate the situation," Mr. Doniy said. "It was immediately obvious that the negotiations were conducted in such a way so that the coalition wasn't formed. Many forces didn't want it, and it meant that they wanted a coalition in a different format. They simply didn't want Tymoshenko as prime minister."
In the view of Mr. Khmara, Ms. Tymoshenko made a mistake by immediately lobbying for Oleksander Moroz to become Verkhovna Rada chairman, even though his Socialist Party finished fourth in the parliamentary elections behind Our Ukraine.
"She provoked the incident by inflaming the immense ambitions of Moroz," he said. "There wasn't any logic to it - he had 5 percent into the elections. She fell in a trap and suffered the damage."
Once again, Mr. Poroshenko began lobbying for power, expressing his desire to lead the Verkhovna Rada as its chairman.
Some believe President Yushchenko was willing to allow Ms. Tymoshenko to return as prime minister, as long as Mr. Poroshenko was in place as the Verkhovna Rada chair to offset her influence.
Other observers said the mere suggestion was purposefully laying the groundwork for yet another government conflict and collapse.
When Ms. Tymoshenko, Mr. Moroz and Our Ukraine Political Council Chair Roman Bezsmertnyi called a June 22 press conference to announce the formation of a democratic coalition, it appeared the parties involved had agreed to allow Mr. Poroshenko to become chairman.
The night before, Our Ukraine legal advisor Roman Zvarych said Our Ukraine would nominate Mr. Poroshenko.
Meanwhile, political observers watched in disbelief, wondering why those involved would repeat the same recipe for disaster.
Mr. Doniy believes Our Ukraine intentionally denied Mr. Moroz the Verkhovna Rada chairmanship - a position he had desperately wanted after losing it in April 1998 - in order to force him to defect to the Party of the Regions and thereby destroy the coalition.
It can even be said that Mr. Yushchenko and Our Ukraine's leadership were secretly hoping that Mr. Moroz would defect because they wanted to work alongside Mr. Yanukovych and the Party of the Regions instead, Mr. Doniy said.
"Tymoshenko wants redistribution, so she represents a war for them," he said. "The Party of the Regions and Our Ukraine are parties of peace. They want to expand further, in the same style. They want calm in order to enlarge profit, to control the situation in Ukraine and to rule in the state in which it is now. On the other hand, Tymoshenko in power represents a review of what currently exists."
If this was indeed the wish of Our Ukraine's leadership, it came true on July 6 when Mr. Moroz announced he was abandoning the democratic coalition and forming an Anti-Crisis Coalition with the Party of the Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine. The respective leaders signed a 12-page pact in a matter of hours.
In Mr. Moroz's defection, Our Ukraine benefited by appearing as the victim of a political betrayal rather than the catalyst for a Russian-oriented government, which would have destroyed the bloc politically.
Despite a public campaign led by Ms. Tymoshenko to demand that Mr. Yushchenko dismiss the Parliament and call for new elections, Mr. Yushchenko opted for stability.
On August 3 he accepted Mr. Yanukovych as his new prime minister - a move that nevertheless began the likely disintegration of the Our Ukraine bloc and the Our Ukraine People's Union political party.
Afterwards, polls revealed that only 5 percent of the electorate support Mr. Yushchenko's politics.
While not a foregone conclusion, political experts believe it would take a miracle for Mr. Yushchenko to be re-elected president in 2009 - a battle that will likely pit Ms. Tymoshenko against Mr. Yanukovych.
For the co-pilots of the Orange Revolution, it was their difference in personalities - the moderate compromiser versus the radical reformer - that served as the bedrock for their success, as well as for their relationship's ultimate demise.
What Ms. Tymoshenko characterized as Mr. Yushchenko's political betrayal in uniting with Mr. Yanukovych, the president prided as his strength.
"Through this document, we will think more of the nation's wholeness and unity, and I am convinced that we will be thankful to God for such a position," he said referring the Universal of National Unity.
Ms. Tymoshenko offered reporters a different view.
Political betrayal is a contagious disease that spreads quickly from one politician to the next, she said. "It's unknown how it spreads, but it affects men exclusively. Women don't suffer from this disease."
In the end, the reason Mr. Kuchma dismissed Mr. Yushchenko half a decade earlier was quite similar to the motivation behind Mr. Yushchenko's firing of Ms. Tymoshenko, experts said.
The young, dynamic reformer had stepped on too many toes and had become too popular.
Once out to slay Ukraine's dragons alongside Ms. Tymoshenko, Mr. Yushchenko began to grow his own tail, observers said. "It is easier to kill a dragon, but much more difficult not to turn into one yourself," wrote one disappointed Orange Revolution activist, citing a Chinese proverb.
CONCLUSION
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, October 15, 2006, No. 42, Vol. LXXIV
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