May 18, 2019

Implacable adversity: Moscow’s response to Zelensky’s election in Ukraine

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PART I

Moscow is treating Ukraine and its newly elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, with the same implacable hostility as it did during Petro Poroshenko’s presidency. The Kremlin has not taken even a brief time-out that would have allowed it to assess Mr. Zelensky’s first decisions and the staffing of his administration in the wake of the April 21 presidential election (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 25).

Given the Kremlin’s demonization of President Poroshenko and its “anybody-but-Poroshenko” line during Ukraine’s presidential election campaign, Moscow might have been expected to allow a respite at least as a tactical move in this long-term confrontation, perhaps to lure the inexperienced new Ukrainian president into a dialogue on Moscow’s terms. Mr. Zelensky, after all, does not carry the baggage of the “Maidan coup d’état,” “fascist junta,” and “Donbas-suppressor,” nor (by any stretch) that of “Ukrainian nationalism.”

Yet, instead of a wait-and-see pause, or at least maintaining the same level of confrontation, Moscow has actually escalated it. Mindful of Western admonitions against military escalation, it has escalated on the economic and political levels. The Kremlin initiated the escalation several days ahead of Ukraine’s election date, when Mr. Zelensky’s landslide victory over Mr. Poroshenko was already a certainty.

The measures chosen are preemptive in their character and timing, designed to step up the various sources of pressure on the post-Poroshenko administration. Following the October parliamentary elections, there will also be a new government in Ukraine. But Russia’s latest measures are consistent with its long-term policy to thwart Ukraine’s economic growth, foment political instability and manipulate the Donbas conflict with a view to obtaining Russian droits de regard over the country as such.

On April 18, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev announced a set of decisions by the Russian government to ban or restrict exports of vital energy products to Ukraine. Effective from that date, exports of Russian crude oil and a wide range of oil derivatives and petrochemicals to Ukraine are banned outright. Effective June 1, exports of gasoline, diesel fuel, liquefied gases, hard coal and coke shall only be possible by permission of Russia’s Ministry of Economy and other government agencies, through special licenses on a case-by-case basis. In the same move, Mr. Medvedev announced a ban on Russian imports on a wide range of Ukrainian products in the heavy and light industries (Kommersant, April 18, 19; TASS, April 24).

The export restrictions on liquid fuels and industrial coal should create wide scope for Russian manipulation and negotiating leverage. Supplies can be withheld, or, alternatively, be released in return for some Ukrainian concessions in other areas. With licenses to be approved on a case-by-case basis, Moscow could compel or tempt Ukrainian organizations, officials, or “oligarch” industrialists into bargaining to obtain the conditional release of supplies. Ukraine could resort to import substitution, first and foremost from Belarus for diesel and gasoline (unless Russia disrupts crude oil deliveries to Belarusian refineries). The re-routing of supplies from other directions will impose additional, transportation-related costs, and some new suppliers are likely to charge premium prices.

On April 24 and May 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued decrees on granting Russia’s citizenship en masse to residents of the Russian-controlled territories in Ukraine’s Donbas. This move (“mass-passportization”) negates the legal status of Donetsk and Luhansk as Ukrainian territories and of their residents as Ukrainian citizens (see EDM, May 1, 2).

Capping earlier moves to absorb this area de facto into Russia, the passportization represents a dramatic escalation of the conflict at the political level. Russia, in effect, annexes the population, still without acknowledging the territorial annexation, but cementing it. For the first time since the 2014 occupation, Russia creates a “legal” cover – namely, the conferral of Russian citizenship – to justify Russia’s military presence and political protectorate over this part of Ukraine. This fait accompli, ahead of a peace settlement, intends to render any solution impossible except on Moscow’s interpretation of the Minsk agreements: reinserting this territory into Ukraine nominally, under a Moscow-supervised and -protected special status, and (henceforth) with its “Russian” citizenry. The intention is to create an insurmountable bloc of pro-Russia voters in Ukraine’s elections and balance-holding factor in its Parliament, so as to derail the country from its westward course.

Moscow is thereby confronting the new Ukrainian president – and, soon, a new government – with the dilemma of either protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and refusing to negotiate on such a basis, or, alternatively, facing a protracted military stalemate and forfeiting the occupied territories. Either course of action would saddle the new Ukrainian president and government with heavy domestic and international costs.

Russia is still withholding an official acknowledgment of Mr. Zelensky’s election as president. The Kremlin has not taken even the routine step of releasing a congratulatory telegram or equivalent gesture through a spokesperson. Instead, the Kremlin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have “taken notice of the election’s results” and will “respect the choice of the people of Ukraine” (Bloomberg, April 22)

This stance is a part of Moscow’s preparations to influence Ukraine’s parliamentary election campaign, which will start shortly after Mr. Zelensky’s official inauguration as president. Russia’s hostile response to Mr. Zelensky’s election, and attacks on him on state television channels, aim to draw a deep wedge between the president’s Servant of the People party (which will run in the parliamentary elections) and the voters in Ukraine’s east and south. Mr. Zelensky won overwhelmingly there (as he did throughout Ukraine) in the presidential election.

Moscow, however, will try to reopen that fault line by mobilizing Ukraine’s east and south to vote for pro-Russia parties. Moscow is vested in the Opposition Platform–For Life party, led by Yurii Boyko (third-placed in the presidential election just held, first-placed in the Ukrainian-controlled part of the Donbas) and Viktor Medvedchuk (federalization proponent, and capitalizing on a personal relationship with Mr. Putin). The Kremlin’s goal in these elections is for this party to exploit the political fragmentation of the new Ukrainian Parliament, bargain its way into a governing coalition and influence it from within.

PART II

Ukraine’s outgoing president, Mr. Poroshenko, and the governing coalition (whose mandate is also about to expire) have bequeathed the foundation and building blocks of Ukrainian resilience against Russia’s adversity.

President-elect Zelensky and the soon-to-be-elected next Parliament are inheriting a Ukraine that has finally exited the Russian World; de-Sovietized the public space and the memory policy, suppressed many pro-Moscow propaganda outlets within Ukraine; achieved the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church; legislated the position of the Ukrainian language into the lingua franca in the public sphere, mass media and education; decentralized local-level administrations so as to prevent centrifugalism at the level of regions; ended the once-crippling dependence on Russian natural gas; reoriented a growing share of Ukraine’s trade toward Europe; enshrined Ukraine’s goals to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union in Ukraine’s Constitution; established a strategic partnership with the United States; built a capable army; and enacted what should be (if honored) insurmountable legal safeguards against compliance with the Minsk armistice agreements in their existing form.

These results are, however, an unconsolidated work in progress after a single term in office of the outgoing authorities. The Zelensky team can build on this legacy to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience vis-à-vis Russia’s intensifying political and economic pressures amid a protracted war. But Mr. Zelensky is also inheriting a highly heterogeneous electorate by dint of its sheer size: an ad hoc, unrepeatable conglomeration of protest-motivated voters, as distinct from a party-based coalition. 

The 73 percent of voters (spread almost evenly throughout Ukraine) who elected Mr. Zelensky on April 21 differ widely in terms of their values, interests, priorities and the expectations they attach to the new president. These differences include attitudes toward Russia, the ongoing war, and national and cultural identity. Mr. Zelensky’s decisions down the road on these issues will carry the political risk of splitting his electorate. On the other hand, the national interest would be put at risk by compromise decisions or issue-straddling with electoral motivations.

Mr. Zelensky’s own statements thus far indicate, basically, continuity with the policies of the outgoing president and governing coalition vis-à-vis Russia. The president-elect has not yet authorized members of his team to make policy statements publicly. This team is still the electoral campaign team. He has yet to recruit experts on foreign policy, international relations and (particularly) on Russia for a transition team. Given Mr. Zelensky’s lack of experience in these areas, it is assumed that his public statements are supplied to him, possibly from experts outside the known team. Mr. Zelensky has aired a number of policy positions on Russia via Facebook.

According to the president-elect, “we are prepared to discuss the new conditions of Ukraine’s coexistence with Russia,” but “real normalization only after the complete de-occupation of Crimea and Donbas” (Liga.net, April 27). The difference between coexistence and real normalization remains to be clarified after Mr. Zelensky takes office. (Comparatively, the current relations between Georgia and Russia may be described as a model of “coexistence without real normalization.”)

Mr. Zelensky has dismissed Russian President Putin’s references to “commonalities” between Russia and Ukraine (same people, same language, said Mr. Putin most recently on April 29 – Kremlin.ru, April 29). “All that remains ‘in common’ between us is one thing: the state border. And Russia must give back every millimeter of it on the Ukrainian side [in Donbas],” Mr. Zelensky replied (Liga.net, May 2).

The president-elect has already ruled out a “special status” for the Russian-controlled territory in Donbas, “dialogue” with Russia’s proxies there, and amnesty for them (an amnesty would pave the way for “elections” to be staged there). These positions are fully in line with the legislation adopted by the Verkhovna Rada and signed by President Poroshenko in January, which provides a legal shield against the implementation of the political provisions of the Minsk armistice.

Russian state television channels characterize Mr. Zelensky’s statements as “anti-Russian,” and similar to those of Ukraine’s previous authorities. However, Mr. Zelensky’s high popularity in Russia protects him at least for the time being from ad hominem attacks on Russian television.

Along with the punitive economic and political measures against Ukraine (see EDM, April 25, May 9), Moscow seeks to lure Mr. Zelensky into bilateral talks following his inauguration. The Kremlin has extended to Kyiv the same offer on natural gas that Moscow had presented to the pro-Russia opposition leaders on March 22 ahead of Ukraine’s presidential election. As rehashed by President Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (Kremlin.ru, April 27, 30), Russian Gazprom would grant to Ukrainian Naftohaz a 25 percent price discount, if Ukraine re-starts procurement of natural gas directly from Russia (as distinct from procuring gas of varied provenance including Russian via European traders and reverse transit).

External recommendations from any quarter for Mr. Zelensky to meet with Mr. Putin are premature. Inexperienced, lacking a competent team of foreign policy advisors and without having formulated a strategic policy concept, venturing into such a meeting would be a high-risk move for the Ukrainian president-elect.

The article above is reprinted from Eurasia Daily Monitor with permission from its publisher, the Jamestown Foundation, www.jamestown.org.

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