February 15, 2019

A new Orthodoxy?

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A “new Orthodoxy” – isn’t that an oxymoron? The very word, with either an upper-case or a lower-case “o,” connotes conservatism. And Church “Orthodoxy,” which means “right teaching” or “right belief,” suggests dogmatism. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church, which is the bearer of the kind of Orthodoxy with which most Ukrainians are familiar, is well-known for its conservative approach to matters both theological and political. 

But now, the appearance of a new autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine is rich with promise of renewal and reform. It will not, however, happen of its own accord. Orthodoxy in Ukraine is burdened with the Russian heritage of a state Church and a national Church. Just as many Orthodox hierarchs and clergy were able to switch from the Russian nationalism of a government-controlled imperial Church to the Soviet Russian nationalism of a Church indebted for its very survival to the Stalinist regime, so today many would find it all too easy to substitute Kyiv for Moscow and Ukrainian nationalism for Russian. Despite the urgings of some politicians, this would not be a good thing, either for Orthodoxy or for Ukraine. 

There is already grumbling about why the new Church constituted last December 15 in Kyiv, and granted autocephaly by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in a Tomos (decree) of January 6, is headed by “only” a metropolitan, not a patriarch. There are good reasons for this. Considering that in its first millennium the Christian Church had only five patriarchates, and that even today not every national Orthodox Church is patriarchal, raising the Kyivan Metropolitanate to patriarchal status is hardly automatic. As with the Greco-Catholic Church, patriarchal status requires a certain maturity in consciousness and organization, not to mention a decent passage of time. Moreover, it remains to be seen just what territory a Kyivan patriarchate would comprise. 

In fact, the OCU’s designation as a metropolitan Church emphasizes an important, though easily overlooked point. The tradition of the Kyivan Metropolitanate is a major support of the legitimacy of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. True, that history is marked by discontinuities – the migration of the Kyivan metropolitan to northern Rus’ at the end of the 13th century, the Union of Brest of 1595-1596, the Muscovite take-over of the Kyivan Metropolitanate in the 17th century, and its subsequent absorption into the Russian synodal Church. The Soviet regime inflicted further disruptions, and in the post-Soviet period rival Kyivan metropolitanates arose again. But what matters is that today, there exists a Kyivan Metropolitanate that traces its origins to an institution created under Byzantine tutelage over a millennium ago. 

That the birth of the OCU has major implications for Ukraine is obvious. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko) will surely be remembered as fathers of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and pivotal figures in the history of Ukraine. At the same time, the emergence of the OCU as the world’s second largest Orthodox Church, with as many as 30 million faithful to Russia’s claimed 150 million (thus constituting about a tenth of the estimated global total of 300 million), will affect the balance of world Orthodoxy. The tug-of-war between Moscow and Constantinople is likely to continue in the short term. But it may eventually be replaced by a multipolar system where the Ecumenical Patriarchate retains its rightful place as leader (though not dictator) of world Orthodoxy. 

The presence of the OCU will change the religious landscape of Europe. As Ukraine becomes integrated with the rest of the continent, its Orthodox tradition and culture may begin to influence its fellow European nations. Today, Orthodox number only about 7 percent of the population of the European Union. With Ukraine (and Serbia and Bulgaria, but without Russia, Georgia or Armenia), the proportion of Orthodox in Europe as a whole comes to about 10 percent. But statistics are not prophecies. The impact of Ukrainian Orthodox culture on a de-Christianized and increasingly Islamicized Europe will depend on the Ukrainian Orthodox themselves.

Yet, in order to participate in a revival of European Christianity, the OCU must first refresh the Christian faith of its own adherents. It would have to shed the old Soviet habits of political meekness, socio-cultural introversion, and self-limitation to “performing rituals” and “satisfying spiritual needs.” Keeping the institutional Church separate from the state does not mean marginalizing religion or silencing its voice in the public forum. 

Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly also has implications for the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church. Although the notion of a future joint Kyivan patriarchate, as was envisioned in the 1620s, may not be consonant with modern ecumenism, closer Catholic-Orthodox ties are now possible. Catholics can learn from Orthodox traditions of conciliar or synodal church government, including broad participation by lower clergy and laity. This applies not only to the conduct of major councils, but to the election of bishops and priests. The UGCC may not be prepared to take such a decentralizing, “democratic” step as to allow parishes to choose their pastors – a practice that the Soviet authorities exploited to undermine and control the Orthodox Church. But recently, in the wake of the clerical abuse scandals, some Roman Catholics have called for lay participation in the election of bishops in order to ensure accountability. This, in fact, has historical precedents. (Jack Quirk, “The People Should Elect the Bishops” (Part II), Christian Democracy, January 23, 2019). Before the 19th century, and especially in the early Church, lay men and sometimes women had considerable influence in Church governance (Bronwen McShea, “Bishops Unbound,” First Things, January 2019, p. 33-39). 

The vertical of hierarchy and authority, and the horizontal of conciliarity and communion, have formed a tense but fruitful cross from the Church’s earliest days. Surely it would not be flirting with heresy to suggest that Ukrainian Greco-Catholic and Orthodox theologians explore such issues through joint studies of their common Kyivan Byzantine tradition, maintaining due respect for their relatively few dogmatic disagreements. The result could be not only a new Orthodoxy, but a renascent Ukrainian Christianity.

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